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ABSTRACT
This dissertation focuses on three leading theoretical and empirical issues in the 
anomaly of dividend policy. The first essay analyzes the explanatory power of the various 
theories of dividend determinants, many of which have not been tested yet. In this essay, 
time-series cross sectional tests are undertaken using individual firm data, while the 
structural vector autoregressive (VAR) methodology is applied to the aggregate data.
The second essay proposes an alternative approach to the ex-dividend anomalies 
that fully incorporates both the tax-effect hypothesis and the short-term trading hypothesis. 
This approach draws on normative portfolio selection models to examine the relationships 
between the ex-dividend anomalies and the ex-post portfolio choice in the context of the 
1984 and 1986 federal tax reforms.
The third essay tests signalling equilibrium models empirically. In this essay, tests 
are conducted to provide statistical evidence of the empirical validity of dividend signalling 
models. Empirical validation of the notion of a signalling equilibrium is examined for a 
sample of dividend-paying firms selected from the NYSE and AMEX.
VIII
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Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION
The objective of thii dissertation is to extend empirical work on dividend policy 
in three ways. The first essay investigates the determinants of dividend policy. The 
extant dividend theories suggest that dividends should be distributed depending on the 
firm's attributes such as earnings, investments, free cash flow, tax, firm size, industry 
classification, etc. Empirical work on these dividend determinants has lagged behind 
theoretical research, and the econometric techniques used thus far leave something to 
be desired.
The first essay examines a wide range of theoretical determinants of dividend 
policy, including free cash flows. In this essay, time-series cross-sectional tests are 
undertaken using individual firm data, while the vector autoregressive (VAR) 
methodology is applied to the aggregate data. These methodologies are desirable 
because previous studies, which employed cross-sectional analysis of either firm-specific 
or aggregate data, failed to capture important information explaining differences in 
dividend policy over time. This essay, furthermore, analyzes the explanatory power of 
the various theories of dividend policy.
The second assay examines the relationships between ex-dividend anomalies and 
ex post portfolio choice in the context of the 1984 and 1986 federal tax reforms. Ex- 
dividend anomalies are addressed through competing hypotheses of tax effects and 
short-term trading. The two tax reforms are expected to have a significant effect on 
dividend policy. The 1984 Tax Reform Act extended the minimum holding period for the 
dividend tax deduction, exposing tax-induced short-term traders to more risks. The 
1986 Tax Reform Act equalized tax rates on dividends and capital gains, reducing the 
dissipative costs of dividends. Transition periods between the two tax reforms provide a 
valuable opportunity to analyze the validity of each hypothesis.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2The second essay draws on normative portfolio selection models and 
incorporates both tax effects and short-term trading around the ex-dividend day. The 
underlying conjecture of this essay is that any change in the risk-expected return trade­
off induced by the two tax reforms should be manifested in the portfolio choices. This 
portfolio approach seems more appropriate since it is an equilibrium model with proper 
measures of risk and return, rather than a model of behavior.
The third essay tests signalling equilibrium models empirically. Signalling 
equilibrium models imply that firms distribute dividends in order to convey favorable 
insider information and thus achieve a higher stock price. For example, corporate 
insiders are proposed to have incentives to signal more valuable future cash flows by 
paying larger dividends if the firm's current shareholders require more liquidity than 
internally generated funds.' This signal would result in a bidding up of stock price, thus 
benefiting the firm or current shareholders selling stocks. The third essay tests the 
explicit relations among the announcement effect, the dividends, and the cum-dividend 
market values, suggested by signalling models.
Dividend issues are addressed in a vast body of theoretical and empirical 
literature. The literature can be categorized into several broad groups. The first group 
has sought to identify the determining factors of dividend policy. The seminal works of 
Lintner (19561 and Miller and Modigliani (1961) have motivated many people (see, for 
example, Dhrymes and Kurz (1964, 1967), Fama and Babiak (1968), Higgins (1972), 
Fama (1974), McCabe (1979), Smirlock and Marshall (1983), and Partington (1985)1 to 
investigate empirically the determinants of dividend policy with mixed results. Rozeff 
(1982), Easterbrook (1984), and Jensen (1986) draw on agency theory to explain 
dividend payments, whereas Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) view dividend 
policy in terms of pecking order theory. In addition, many authors (see, for example, 
Michel (1979), Feldstein and Green (1983), Michel and Shaked (1986), and Dyl and
^This argument ia originally attributable to John and Williams 
(1985).
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3Hoffmeister (1986)] have extended theoretical and empirical works on other dividend 
determinants such as industry classifications, firm size, and beta coefficients.
The second group focuses on the ex-dividend anomaly. In order to explain 
excess ex-dividend returns, some authors [see, for example, Elton and Gruber (1970), 
Booth and Johnston (1984), Elton, Gruber and Rentzler (1984), Barclay (1987), and 
Michaely (1991)] follow the tax-effect hypothesis, which is challenged by Eades, Hess 
and Kim (1984), and Grinblatt, Masulis and Trtman (1984). Others [see, for example, 
Miller and Scholes (1978, 1982), Kalay (1982, 1984), Lakonishok and Vermaelen 
(1983, 1986), Karpoff and Walkling (1988, 1990), Grammatikos (1989), and Fedenia 
and Grammatikos (1991)] relate this ex-dividend anomaly to the short-term trading 
hypothesis, by allowing for transaction costs around the ex-dividend day.
The third strand of literature began with studies dealing with dividend 
announcement effects (see, for example, Pettit (1972), Watts (1973), Aharony and 
Swary (1980), Asquith and Mullins (1983), Penman (1983), Patell and Wolfson (1984), 
and Kalay and Loewenstein (1985)]. These studies, which document the informational 
contents of dividends, have evolved into recent dividend signalling models [see, for 
example, Bhattacharya (1979), Miller and Rock (1985), John and Williams (1985), 
Ambarish, John and Williams (1987), Ofer and Thakor (1987), Williams (1988), and 
Kumar (1988)]. Even though empirical testing of signalling is in its infancy, these 
dividend-signalling models have emerged as one of the most appealing theories that 
seemingly explain the enigma of dividend policy.
The remaining body of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 
presents a more detailed discussion and review of the extensive literature relating to the 
three essays comprised in this dissertation. Chapter 3 encompasses various 
econometric analyses of dividend determinants using time-series cross-sectional tests 
and the vector autoregressive (VAR) methodology. In Chapter 4, a portfolio approach is 
proposed that can explain the ex-dividend anomalies. In Chapter 5, some empirical tests
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4of dividend signalling are attempted. A summary of this dissertation and some 
suggestions for future research are presented in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE
The vast body of literature on dividends includes numerous theoretical and 
empirical papers. This chapter reviews several bodies of literature that are directly 
related to the dissertation. The first body of literature, focusing on dividend policy, 
investigates the determining factors of dividends. The second body encompasses 
studies associated with two hypotheses tnat attempt to explain the ex-dividend 
anomalies: the tax-effect and short-term trading hypotheses. The other two bodies of 
literature cover studies dealing with dividend announcement effects and discuss many 
recent theoretical studies on dividend signalling.
A. Dividend Policy 
Dividend policy has long been an issue of interest in financial literature. The 
seminal paper on dividend policy is that of Lintner (19561, which was based on field 
interviews with managers at 28 companies. The results of these interviews indicate that 
a company's dividend decisions depend on current earnings and previous dividends, 
where the relationship between the two determinants constitutes a target pay-out ratio. 
Lintner (1956) encapsulizes these observations in a theoretical model, as follows:
D IV / .  0,EARNh (2.1)
DIV, - DIV,,., « a, + d, ( D IV / ■ DIV,.,., ) + 12.2)
where
DIV,* = target dividends in the current year,
0, = target pay-out ratio,
EARN, > current earnings, and
DIV,, DIV,,., = dividends paid in the current and previous years.
(Lintner (1956), p. 107]
Equation (2.2) can be rearranged as
DIV, .  o, + A EARN, + K, DIV,.,., + f,. (2.3)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6Lintner fitted equation (2.3) to the aggregate data that he secured from the national 
income accounts. The dividend prediction equations that he obtained are
DIV -  352.3 + 0.15 EARN^ + 0.70 DIV^„ (2.4)
when earnings are adjusted for inventory gains, or 
DIV .  106.0 + 0.145 EARN„„^ + 0.788 DIV,.,, (2.5)
when earnings are not adjusted.' {ibid., p. 109]
This Lintner model has drawn two criticisms. First, as Dhrymes and Kurz (1964) 
point out, the Lintner model gives a satisfactory prediction of short run dividend policy, 
but it does not explain intertemporal variations in dividend policy. Second, Miller (1986)
argues that the Lintner model remains a behavioral model because no author has been
able to solve it as a maximization problem.
The "two variable" Lintner model is supported by Fama and Babiak (1968). They 
examine the predictive powers of various dividend models including the Lintner model by 
using data for individual firms. Fama and Babiak conclude that the Lintner model 
performs well, but the best is the model deleting the constant term and adding the 
lagged term for earnings.
Miller and Modigliani (1961) present a strong challenge to the conventional view 
of dividend preference. They are concerned with the effect of a firm's dividend policy 
on stock price in an ideal economy where perfect capital markets, rational behavior, and 
perfect certainty are assumed. Miller and Modigliani develop the irrelevance proposition 
on dividend policy in the sense that the value of a firm is not affected by dividend policy. 
Miller and Modigliani derive a firm's value as the following expression:
VAL, *  [EARN,,, • INV„, + VAL,., ) / ( I  + p ,„  ) (2.6)
where
VAL,,VAL,,, « the values of a firm at t and t+ 1 ,
EARN,,, » the firm's earnings,
INV„, = the firm's investment, and
p „ , -  the rate of return. (Miller and Modigliani (1961), p. 414]
^The units dsnotad are billions of dollars.
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7Miller and Modigliani show that •• since the firm's earnings, investment, and the value at 
t+ 1  are all independent of dividend in equation (2.6) ~ the dividend decisions are 
irrelevant for the value of the firm. They also argue that dividend decisions are still 
irrelevant for a growing firm with debt and taxes or under uncertainty. This "dividend 
irrelevance” proposition is possible because investors can create "homemade dividends" 
by selling off portions of the stock of the non dividend paying firm or reinvesting the 
dividends paid by the dividend paying firm.
Another major thrust of their paper on dividend policy is an implication of the 
Fisherian model of the firm, in which the value of a firm is independent of its method of 
financing. Miller and Modigliani propose that dividend decisions are independent of 
investments because the higher dividends would induce the more external financing 
through the issue of new shares to keep the investment level unchanged. They argue 
that the firm undertakes the investment opportunities that maximize its current value, 
which is independent of dividend decisions. These imply that there are no "financial 
illusions" in a rational and perfect environment. In a world of well-functioning capital 
markets, a firm's dividend policy is essentially an exercise in financial packaging. The 
value of the shares is determined solely by the underlying real, economic factors, and 
not by "mere financial packaging."
This separation proposition on dividends and investments has motivated many 
researchers to undertake empirical tests. Higgins (1972) designed a dividend model for 
a firm maximizing stockholders' wealth and conducted a two-stage least squares 
estimation as follows:
INVRATIO -  0.0280 + 0.7194 SALRATIO + 0.0437 DIVRATIO 
(2.77) (11.68) (0.19)
and
DIVRATIO .  0.0033 + 0.5903 EARRATIO - 0.0625 INVRATIO,
(2.16) (30.20) (-5.25) (2.7)
where
INVRATIO "  investments/assets,
DIVRATIO *  dividends/assets,
SALRATIO -  sales/assets.
EARRATIO ” eamings/assets, and
t-values are in parentheses. (Higgins (1972), p. 15391
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8Higgins concludes that dividends are considered a residual in the corporate decision 
nexus and that investments are not significantly influenced by dividends.
In a more rigorous study, Fama (1974) applies simultaneous equations models to 
the data for individual firms. His findings are that dividend decisions are not determined 
by investment, and, furthermore, that investment decisions are not affected by 
dividends. These results are very consistent with the separation proposition of Miller 
and Modigliani (1961) on dividends and investments, even though the proposition 
assumes a perfect capital market.
Smirlock and Marshall (1983) provide an extension of Fame's work on the 
separation proposition of Miller and Modigliani (1961) by using the Granger-causality 
tests. Their use of causality tests has some appeal because "they were developed to 
test for statistical exogeneity without specification of structural models" [Smirlock and 
Marshall (1983), p. 1660). Smirlock and Marshall do not find any Granger-causality 
between dividends and investments. These results, consistent with Fame's (1974), fully 
support the separation proposition on dividends and investments.
Another test in support of the separation proposition is offered by Partington 
(1985). He conducts a questionnaire survey with 93 large Australian companies to 
analyze the relationship among dividend, investment, and financing decisions. His 
results indicate non-residual determination of dividends. He concludes that firms would 
usually make dividend and investment decisions independently, and that external 
financing is residually determined.
On the other hand, Dhrymes and Kurz (1964, 1967) go against the separation 
proposition. The motivation for their study (1964) stems from arguments that Untner's 
(1956) hypothesis is vulnerable to the explanation of long-run dividend policy. In order 
to account for the observed variety of dividend payment practices in firms, Dhrymes and 
Kurz (1964) examine several explanatory variables such as size, investment, 
indebtedness, liquidity position, control, and income variability in electric utility firms.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
9They find that a firm's dividend policy is affected by investment, indebtedness, size, and 
the regulatory status of the firm.
Dhrymes and Kurz (1967) provide an interesting argument and empirical 
evidence of dividend policy. They note that, contrary to the assumption of Miller and 
Modigliani (1961), capital markets are characterized by imperfections, and that external 
financing, including new equity and bond issues, is a more expensive vehicle of 
financing than internal funds. They argue that dividends and investments are 
competitive outlays, both of which rely on limited internal funds. Their hypothesis 
relates that dividends, investments, and external financing are interrelated. Consistent 
with the hypothesis, their results indicate that a firm's dividend decisions are 
significantly affected by its investment requirements, while investment decisions are 
impeded by the rigid dividend policy, and that investments and dividends induce external 
financing.
McCabe (1979) examines Dhrymes and Kurz's (1967) study and Fame's (1974) 
study, and stresses the role of new debt as a determinant of dividend policy. McCabe 
argues that Fama (1974) failed to consider all the relevant variables, which led to a 
biased result supporting the Miller and Modigliani separation proposition. His hypothesis 
follows arguments of Dhrymes and Kurz (1967) that funds raised from profits and 
external financing are allocated between investments and dividends, but his contribution 
is that new debts have significant effects on dividend decisions. He finds strong 
interdependence among dividends, investments, and new debts, which is against the 
separation proposition. This implies that dividend decisions are influenced by new debt 
decisions as well as investment decisions.
Agency theory explanations of dividend payments build on Ross (1973), Jensen 
and Meckiing (1976), Fama (1980), Rozeff (1982), Fama and Jensen (1983), 
Easterbrook (1984), and Jensen (1986). Of these authors, Ross (1973), Fama (1980), 
and Fama and Jensen (1983) are dealing with the general agency problems that arise 
when the agents do not act in the best interests of the principal. They argue that these
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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agency problems developing In any princlpal-agent relationship are characterized by the 
aberrant activities of the agent from the principal's viewpoint. They also suggest that, 
since the purpose of a firm Is to maximize the utility of the principals, control of agency 
problems Is necessary for the survival of a firm. In this regard, the contribution of 
Jensen and Meckiing (1976) Is In viewing agency problems as quantifiable costs Incurred 
In agency relationships; monitoring costs, bonding costs, and the residual loss.
Rozeff (1982) Is among the first authors who attempt to explain dividend 
payment In light of agency theory. He argues that "a wealth maximizing firm adopts an 
optimal "monitoring/bonding" package which acts to reduce agency costs. — the 
payment of a dividend Is a device, like a bonding cost or an auditing cost, which Is 
employed to reduce agency cost of equity* (Rozeff (1982), p. 2501. Assuming that the 
firm Is raising new funds to finance the payment of dividends, Rozeff posits that a firm 
seeks an optimum dividend policy minimizing the sum of dividend agency costs and 
external financing costs. He suggests that a higher dividend payout ratio associated 
with smaller agency costs should be linked to lower Inside ownership and a large number 
of stockholders. Consistent with his hypotheses, Rozeff finds that the dividend payout 
ratios are negatively related to the percentage of stock held by Insiders, whereas they 
are positively related to the firm's number of common stockholders.
Pointing out that Rozeff (1982) does not show any dividend mechanism of 
mitigating agency problems, Easterbrook (1984) attempts to explain simultaneous 
payment of dividends and raising of new funds In view of agency theory. Easterbrook 
defines two forms of agency cost as monitoring cost and risk aversion of managers, and 
he presumes that dividend payment forces firms to tap new funds from the capital 
market. Easterbrook argues that agency problems characterized by monitoring and risk- 
aversion problems are reduced when firms enter capital markets for external financing, 
because those firms are efficiently reviewed and monitored by Investment banks and 
Intermediaries In the market. His conjecture Is that dividends are paid In order to keep 
firms In the market subjecting managers to consistent monitoring. Since other financial
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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devices can be supposed to keep firms in the capital market, his argument is considered 
a naive explanation of dividends that does not explain the dividend itself. Easterbrook 
himself acknowledges this criticism by saying that "dividends exist because they 
influence the firms' financing policies, because they dissipate cash and induce firms to 
float new securities" (Easterbrook (1984), p. 652).
Jensen (1986), elaborating on takeovers, emphasizes the role of dividends in 
reducing free cash flows at managers' disposal. Defining free cash flows as cash flows 
exceeding the funds required for investments. Jensen argues that a firm's substantial 
free cash flow aggravates agency problems between stockholders and managers. Under 
this theory, managers have strong incentives to expand the resources under their control 
and they are likely to waste funds on inefficient projects. Jensen suggests that 
dividends should be paid out in ways that instigate managers to gorge the cash beyond 
the optimal amount. This implies that free cash flow positively determines dividend 
payments.
Pecking order theory, suggested by Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984), 
is at variance with agency theory. Although both theories imply that dividends are paid 
to reduce asymmetric information problems, pecking order explanation considers 
dividend payments when managers have superior information, whereas agency theory 
explanation is concerned with how the interests of agents can be aligned with those of 
shareholders.
According to Myers and Majluf (1984), a firm's issue invest decisions are 
affected when managers know more about the true value of the firm than outsiders do. 
The managers having access to true information are assumed to act in the interest of the 
shareholders. If the stock is undervalued, the firm would be reluctantly forced to either 
issue stock at a low price for a good investment opportunity, or pass it up. If the stock 
is overvalued, the firm would have incentives to take advantage of investors by issuing 
stock at a high price. These adverse selection problems can be averted if the firm has 
ample financial slack. With adequate financial slack, the firm can avoid having to issue
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stock at a low price when it needs funds for investments. Financial slack also prevents 
the firm from exploiting investors by sending a strong negative signal, if the firm 
attempts to finance investments by issuing risky stock rather than using internal cash 
flows or safe debts.
Myers and Majluf (19841 therefore argue that, since the financing pecking order 
ranks internally generated cash flows first, followed by debt and finally equity, firms are 
interested in building up financial slack by restricting dividends. In pecking order theory, 
a firm's free cash flow representing financial slack is negatively related to dividend 
payments.
B. Dividends and Taxes 
Elton and Gruber (1970) originally proposed the tax-effect hypothesis, which 
suggests that the differential tax rates of dividends and capital gains affect the ex- 
dividend behavior of a stock. They assume long-term investors who have already 
decided to sell a stock around the ex-dividend day. The only concern of these investors 
is the timing decision of whether to sell before or after the ex-dividend day. In the case 
of no transaction costs, equilibrium market ex-dividend prices will be determined such 
that a stockholder with different tax rates on dividends and capital gains will be 
indifferent as to selling the stock between, before, or after the ex-dividend day. This 
indicates that the equilibrium market price on the ex-dividend day should reflect the 
value of dividends vis-a-vis capital gains to the marginal shareholders.
Elton and Gruber argue that price change on ex-dividend days implies the 
marginal shareholders' tax rates. Observing the relationship between this implied 
stockholders' tax rates and the firm's payout ratio, they support a clientele effect 
hypothesized by Miller and Modigliani (1961). The clientele effect suggests that 
stockholders in lower tax brackets prefer high-yield stock, whereas those in higher tax 
brackets prefer low-yield stock. Elton and Gruber find that, with the exception of the 
first and eighth decile out of ten deciles, the price change-to-dividend ratio increases up
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to 1 as the dividend yield rises. Since the price change to dividend ratios less than 1 
indicate low dividend yields and high implied tax rates, they argue that low dividend 
yields should attract stockholders in relatively higher tax brackets.
Criticism of the tax-effect hypothesis dates to Black and Scholes (1973). They 
document unusual returns for several days on each side of the ex-dividend day. This 
phenomenon is referred to as the ex-dividend period anomaly because the tax-effect 
hypothesis is unable to interpret this behavior. The tax-effect hypothesis is later 
exposed to serious criticism by Eades, Hess and Kim (1984) and Grinblatt, Masulis and 
Titman (1984). They examine the ex-dividend day returns for non-taxable cash 
dividends, stock dividends, and splits and find that the returns behave as if dividends are 
taxable. These findings may seriously weaken the validity of the tax-effect hypothesis.
Miller and Scholes (1982), on the other hand, offer an alternative explanation, 
arguing that the excess returns on the ex-dividend day, if any, are expected to be 
eliminated by short-term traders. Every investor, taxable or not, has a strong incentive 
to take advantage of profit opportunities on the ex-dividend day. Individual investors are 
likely to be constrained from cum-ex trading by regulatory provisions because of their 
tax status. But corporate traders such as brokers and dealers are induced to exploit 
profit opportunities on ex-dividend days, because they are eligible for the 85% corporate 
dividend tax deduction and taxable at the same rates on dividends and capital gains. 
These traders have to face the round-trip costs in their trading. Transaction costs may 
well provide a short-term trading equilibrium, securing above-normal returns on the ex- 
dividend day.
Kalay (1982) reviews past studies evidencing the ex-dividend day anomalies and 
finds potential biases inherent in those studies. He argues that these biases may result 
from improper use of closing prices on ex-dividend day or correlation techniques with 
some of dependent observations. He adjusts for these biases, but obtains similar results 
consistent with the tax-effect hypothesis. However, the striking insight of Kalay (1982) 
is in showing that, because of short-term profit elimination on ex-dividend day.
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stockholders' marginal tax rates cannot be inferred from those ex dividend price drops 
less than dividend per share.
Elton, Gruber and Rentzler 11984) dispute Kalay (1982) by arguing that Kalay 
has underestimated transaction costs to the extent that short term trading is profitable 
to investors. Their argument is that the costs associated with bid and ask spread, 
clearance, and transfer taxes should be included in transaction costs; then, short-term 
trading around ex-dividend days would no longer be profitable. Responding to Elton, 
Gruber and Rentzler (1984), Kalay (1984) provides evidence that transaction costs are 
not actually large enough to constrain short-term trading. Kalay concludes that short­
term trading, as well as long-term tax rates, is a determining factor of equilibrium prices 
around the ex-dividend day.
Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1983) and Booth and Johnston (1984) extend the 
Elton and Gruber technique to test a Canadian tax reform. They note that, under the 
Canadian 1971 tax reform, dividends and capital gains are not differentially treated for 
tax purposes. Examining the ex-dividend stock prices during the post-Canadian tax 
reform period, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1983) find the price changes smaller than the 
dividend per share on the ex-dividend day. This is interpreted as the result of short-term 
trading activities, which is inconsistent with the tax-effect hypothesis.
The concern of Booth and Johnston (1984) is to investigate whether marginal 
tax rates can be inferred from the price changes on ex-dividend days in Canada. They 
do not obtain much evidence consistent with dividend tax clienteles. Booth and 
Johnston also find ex-dividend day price ratios between zero and one. This shows that 
the market prefers capital gains to dividends. Booth and Johnston thus argue that 
capital gains may still be treated more favorably than dividends because individual 
investors can maintain a tax timing option on the realization of capital gains.
Barclay (1987) supports the tax-effect hypothesis by testing the ex-dividend 
stock prices before the enforcement of federal income tax. His findings are that in a 
world without taxes, dividends are perfect substitutes for capital gains, and stock price
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drop on ex-dividend days is always equal to the full amount of dividends. Barclay argues 
that, in a world with taxes, investors receive a compensating premium for the tax 
penalization of dividends relative to capital gains on the ex-dividend day. Positive excess 
returns are observed on ex-dividend day, which reflects the higher dividend taxes 
compared to taxes on capital gains. This means that the relative taxation of dividends 
and capital gains alone determines the ex-dividend prices. It is thus predicted that the 
higher the effective dividend tax is than capital gains tax, the greater is dividend tax 
penalization and the larger are positive excess returns on ex-dividend day.
Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986) analyze trading volume around ex-dividend 
days to test for tax-induced trading. The original contribution of Lakonishok and 
Vermaelen is in realizing the importance of trading activities by short-term traders and in 
investigating trading volumes around the ex-dividend day. Their hypothesis is that an 
observed increase in trading volume will be followed by short-term trading around ex- 
dividend days. They also predict that abnormal trading volume caused by short-term 
trading has a negative relationship with transaction costs.
Consistent with their hypothesis, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986) find that 
trading volume increases significantly around ex-dividend days. They ascribe this result 
to the existence of short-term traders who are tempted to capitalize on profit 
opportunities around ex-dividend days. It is interpreted that pressures by the short-term 
traders result in abnormal trading volume on ex-dividend day.
Another test in support of short-term trading is undertaken by Karpoff and 
Walkling (1988). They argue that short-term trading complements the dividend tax 
penalty explanation of positive ex-day returns. Karpoff and Walkling propose that ex­
day returns positively related to transaction costs are eliminated up to marginal 
transaction costs. Using four proxies for transaction costs, they find positive 
relationships between transaction costs and ex-day returns, which turn out to be 
apparent in high-yield stocks after the enactment of negotiated commissions.
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Green (1980) and Grundy (1985) suggest the delay and acceleration hypothesis. 
Their arguments state that trading activities around the ex dividend day will concentrate 
on the last cum dividend day and on the first ex dividend day, because investors attempt 
to avoid costs resulting from delaying or accelerating transactions relative to their 
optimum trading date for tax purposes. High dividend taxed sellers and low dividend- 
taxed buyers who want to trade cum-dividend will be induced to transact on the last 
cum-dividend day. High dividend-taxed buyers and low dividend-taxed sellers who want 
to trade ex-dividend will be induced to transact on the first ex-dividend day.
On the other hand. Long (1977) is the first author to consider dividend and tax 
problems in view of portfolio choice. The basic idea of his portfolio approach is that the 
ex-dividend value of stock and short-term trading behavior around ex-dividend day 
should reflect the trade-off of risk and expected return. Long argues that the market 
value of stock is given by a linear function of its expected end-of-period value, the 
covariance of its end-of-period value with the end-of-period value of all risk assets, and 
its end-of-period dividend. He suggests that "the portfolio dividend yield choice cannot 
be made independently of the risk-expected return trade-off, since the dividend yield of 
all mean variance efficient portfolios is a linear function of their non-diversifiable risk” 
(Kalay (1982), p. 1059).
Long (1977) shows that, with the introduction of income taxation, investors will 
demand after-tax efficient portfolios, which may not be before-tax efficient. For 
example, under the tax regime that raised dividend tax rate relative to capital gains tax, 
investors are induced to revise their portfolio holdings to reflect new tax differentials. 
That sort of portfolio revision will lead to an efficiency gain at the new tax rates because 
"such a move will both increase the expected after-tax return at the new tax rates and 
reduce the after-tax variance of the portfolio" (Long (1977), p. 391. An increase in the 
expected return is to be anticipated in the tax-effect hypothesis since the tax premiums 
occur with an increase in dividend tax or a decrease in capital gains tax, but its variance 
is not considered in the tax-effect hypothesis.
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Accordingly, the after-tax efficient portfolio will dominate any given before-tax 
efficient portfolio on an after-tax basis. Furthermore, Long predicts that the potential 
after-tax efficiency gains due to moving from the before-tax efficient portfolio to the 
dominating after-tax frontier will be smaller if the correlations between two portfolios are 
large.
C. Dividends and Stock Price
It has been accepted by many authors [Graham and Dodd 11951); Walters 
(1956): Gordon (1963); and Asquith and Mullins (1983)1 that investors prefer dividends 
to capital gains, and that firms could increase the market value of their shares by 
choosing a generous dividend policy. These arguments belong to the "bird in the hand" 
hypothesis and are perhaps the most popular and durable arguments for dividends. This 
notion implies that, because stock prices are highly variable, dividends represent a more 
reliable form of return than capital gains.
Among the first authors in favor of this dividend preference are Graham and 
Dodd (1951). Graham and Dodd state, "The considered and continuous verdict of the 
stock market is overwhelmingly in favor of liberal dividends as opposed to niggardly 
ones." Elaborating on his "bird in the hand" argument, Gordon (1963) shows that 
dividend has an influence on stock price because investors discount the expected stream 
of future dividends. According to Frankfurter and Lane (1990), this "bird in the hand" 
hypothesis implicitly assumes that there are two rates of return for evaluating future 
cash flows: the investors' opportunity rate and the firm's opportunity rate. These two 
rates are completely known under symmetric information. Dividend policy is then the 
consequence of the relationship of these two rates.
On the other hand. Miller and Modigliani (1961) note that their dividend 
irrelevance proposition holds even under uncertainty, but they puzzle over the observed 
fact. They observe that in the real world a change in the dividend rate is often followed 
by a change in the market price. Miller and Modigliani hint that the "informational
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content of dividends” may be considered as a way of reconciling the dividend irrelevance 
theory with this observed fact. But what they had in mind is different from the formal 
signalling models that Spence (1973) invented later. Asquith and Mullins (19831 
demonstrate that dividend policy affects shareholders' wealth because dividends 
provide valuable information to investors. Asquith and Mullins recognize that dividends 
may contain information.
The major problem with these dividend preference models -  thougn it is very 
common to other dividend models ~ is the inability to explain observed behavior 
thoroughly. Some firms do not pay dividends, whereas other firms pay dividends 
following distinct patterns of dividend policy. For example, one explanation for observed 
dividend policies may be "the needs of individual investors.” Feldstein and Green (19831 
point out that "there is the desire on the part of small investors, fiduciaries, and 
nonprofit organizations for a steady stream of dividends with which to finance 
consumption” {ibid., p. 17). This argument germinates a signalling model such as that 
of John and Williams (1985).
D. Dividend Signalling
Signalling models were developed under the assumption of asymmetric 
information, with corporate insiders being better informed than the market as a whole. 
These models seek to explain dividend payment in the context of its informational 
content. Signalling models originate in the works of Akerlof (1970), Spence (1973), and 
Riley (1979). Bhattacharya (1979) is the first to view a dividend as a signal of 
management's private information about future cash flows. Later, Miller and Rock 
(1985), John and Williams (1985), and Kumar (1988) have developed different models 
of dividend signalling. In dividend signalling models, dividends are assumed to affect 
stock price because the market believes that they signal favorable insider information. 
Management is motivated to pay dividends in order to convey information and thus 
achieve a higher stock price.
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As Miller (19871 specified, dividend signalling models are characterized by three 
key conditions. First, the dividend is intended to signal the firm's attributes such as its 
current and future earnings, which are asymmetrically known to insiders. Insiders act in 
the best interest of shareholders. Second, the beneficiaries of signalling must exist. The 
higher stock price induced by signalling benefits (11 the firm having easy access to 
future public floatations (e.g., Leland and Pyle (19771 and Harris and Raviv (1986)]; (2) 
the current shareholders selling their shares [e.g.. Miller and Rock (1985) and John and 
Williams (1985)1; and (3) management who is compensated by the rise of stock price 
[see, for example, Ross's (1977) incentive'Signailing model]. Third, dividend payments 
should incur cost penalties including personal taxes, the firm's transaction costs of 
funding liquidity shortfalls, and costs of underinvestments.
In signalling models, these sufficient conditions for signalling equilibrium are 
manifested in the form of maximizing shareholders' objective function. This qualitatively 
differs from other dividend models dealing with its announcement effects. Thakor 
(1989) raises another puzzling question: "Why dividends are chosen as a signal when 
less costly signals are apparently available 7 Why management does not convey 
information in some other way involving less tax cost to the stockholders than the 
payment of dividends?" [Thakor (1989), p. 433].
The first model in dividend signalling is that of Bhattacharya (1979). He 
assumes that current shareholders care about their firm's present value and that outside 
investors cannot differentiate the quality of projects undertaken by the firm. Outsiders 
correctly appreciate the firm's stock and then buy its stocks at the correct price in the 
perfect capital market. Bhattacharya develops an equilibrium model that relates the 
benefits and costs of dividend signalling. In his signalling model, taxable dividends are 
paid in order to signal expected cash flows of the firm. This dividend maximizes the 
after tax objective function of shareholders, which incorporates the signalling benefit of 
dividends coming from the increase in liquidation value, conditional on dividend payment.
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The tax-based cost structure generates feasible signalling equilibria because it is 
negatively related to true expected cash flows. An asymmetric transaction cost is also 
embodied in his signalling model. Bhattacharya (1979) argues that larger values of 
corporate private attribute reduce the extent of outside financing. If the firm has 
insufficient cash flows to make up its promised dividend, then it must rely on outside 
financing and incur a higher transaction cost relative to the case of sufficient cash flows. 
This transaction cost is asymmetric in the sense that larger values of private attribute 
known only to insiders decrease the present value of future transaction costs and 
thereby decrease the marginal signalling cost. This marginal signalling cost, which is 
strictly negatively related to true expected cash flows, weighs the marginal benefits of 
dividend signalling and produces a signalling equilibrium.
Miller and Rock's model (1985) works with the similar assumption that outside 
investors cannot observe the firm's current cash flows. The investor infers that, since 
corporate earnings have a great deal of persistence, current earnings convey information 
about the firm's future prospects. Investment opportunities are available to all firms 
with diminishing marginal returns, and outside financings are costlessly raised through 
sales of corporate bonds. Dividends are perfect substitutes for repurchases of bonds, 
and they are not taxable differentially from capital gains. Miller and Rock also assumes 
that, unlike Miller and Modigliani (1961), investments are determined as a residual in the 
financial nexus.
Miller and Rock (1985) argue that, in the context of information asymmetry, 
paying dividends instigates the market to believe higher current earnings in the firm, thus 
bidding up the stock price. Corporate insiders then have incentives to signal by 
distributing more dividends and cutting investment below the optimal level. Even 
insiders with less valuable projects attempt to mimic more valuable firms by paying more 
dividends and forgoing profitable projects. Since dividend payments reveal cash inflows 
and firms forgo projects with positive net present values, the Fisherian optimum 
investment policy breaks down.
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Miller and Rock (1985) suggest one possible route for achieving a signalling 
equilibrium, as follows. Outsiders understand that more informed insiders are tempted 
to take advantage of their superior information. Outsiders are therefore induced to 
discount the stock price offered on dividend announcement day, while corporate insiders 
are exploiting a departure from the Fisherian optimum. These conflicting pressures lead 
to an equilibrium, restoring the consistent dividend and investment policies even at the 
sacrifice of efficiency.
John and Williams (1985) develop a signalling equilibrium with dividends and 
personal tax on dividends. In their model, capital gains are not taxable, and issuing, 
retiring, or trading shares does not incur any cost. According to their arguments, if the 
liquidity demand by the firm and its current shareholders exceeds internally generated 
funds, corporate insiders are motivated to distribute a taxable cash dividend and to 
reveal to outside investors the present value of their firm's future cash inflows. This 
signal would result in a raising of stock price and a benefit to current stockholders.
John and Williams (1985) attempt to explain why some firms do not pay dividends, 
whereas others do pay dividends and simultaneously sell new shares to investors. In 
order to finance investments, a firm needs to either issue new shares or retire fewer 
outstanding shares. Similarly, to collect cash for personal use, current stockholders 
must sell their shares. In either case, stockholders have to suffer some dilution in their 
fractional ownership of the firm. Current shareholders desire to reduce this dilution on 
corporate or personal accounts, and insiders, in the best interest of current stockholders, 
are induced to convey their favorable information by paying a taxable dividend. 
Recognizing the relationship between favorable information and stock price, the market 
bids up the stock price and thereby mitigates stockholders' dilution.
The signalling equilibrium of John and Williams (1985) is achieved because the 
marginal gains from paying dividends are balanced against the marginal cost incurred by 
dividend tax. In the market, stocks with marginally larger dividends are responded with 
the premiums, following the reduction in dilution for current shareholders. These
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benefits compensate shareholders for taking proportional costs due to dividend taxes.
For firms paying marginally smaller dividends, the marginal dead-weight costs of 
dividends outstrip the marginal benefits of reducing ownership dilution. In John and 
Williams' (1985) model, an optimal signalling equilibrium is derived when firms with 
favorable inside information distribute higher dividends and receive higher stock prices 
for their shareholders.
Following Miller and Rock (1985), Kumar (1988) assumes that the dividend 
signal produces endogenous investment. He then argues that dividend changes can be 
used as a "coarse" signal kwcause dividends reflect partitioned spaces of all possible 
corporate prospects and thereby dividend changes represent "broad" changes in these 
prospects. Kumar states that these coarse signalling equilibria attain the simultaneous 
explanation of several extant dividend anomalies such as (1) information effects of 
dividend changes (e.g.. Petit (1972) and Aharony and Swary (1980)]; (2) dividend 
smoothing [e.g., Lintner (1956), Fame and Babiak (1968), and leub (1972)1; and (3) 
dividends as a poor predictor of future earnings [e.g.. Penman (1983)1.
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Chapter 3. THE DETERMINANTS OF DIVIDEND POLICY
A. Introduction
This essay empirically investigates the determining factors of dividend policy. In 
this study, a structural model is specifically designed and tested, encompassing 
determinants from previous dividend theories. The motivation for this study is that 
many of these previous theories have not been tested, and that the econometric 
techniques used thus far are inappropriate.
The vast body of literature dealing with dividend determinants can be grouped 
into two distinct categories: symmetric and asymmetric information, in the symmetric 
information milieu, the seminal work is that of Lintner (1956). According to Lintner's 
model, the current dividends are predicted on the current profits and past dividends.
This "two-variable* model is supported by evidence by Fame and Babiak (1968). On the 
other hand, in an idealized world. Miller and Modigliani (1961) show that the dividend 
decision must be independent of the investment decision. This is because higher 
dividends would induce more external financing through the issue of new shares to keep 
the investment level unchanged. Miller and Modigliani (1961) also argue that the 
dividend decision is irrelevant for a growing firm under the conditions of taxes and debt 
financing. This separation proposition on dividend and investment has motivated many 
people to investigate empirically the dividend subject with mixed results. Higgins 
(1972), Fame (1974), Smiriock and Marshall (1983), and Partington (1985), for 
example, find that corporate dividend and investment decisions are separable and 
independent. Ohrymes and Kura (1964, 1967) show that dividend and investment 
decisions are strongly interrelated. McCabe (1979) also provides strong evidence of 
interdependence among the dividend, investment, and financing decisions, and he 
argues that dividends are affected by new long-term debts.
23
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Theories based on the premise of asymmetric Information Includes agency, 
pecking order theory, and dividend signalling. Agency theory explanations of dividend 
behavior build on the works of Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama (1980), Rozeff 
(1982), Easterbrook (1984), and Jensen (1986). The argument Is that agency costs 
associated with free cash flows positively determine dividend payments. Pecking order 
theory, suggested by Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984), Is at variance with 
agency theory. In these papers it Is argued that, since the financing pecking order ranks 
Internally generated cash flows first, followed by debt and finally equity, firms are 
Interested In building up financial slack by restricting dividends. In the pecking order 
theory, a firm's free cash flows are negatively related to dividend payments.
In addition, many authors have extended theoretical and empirical works on 
other dividend determinants. Michel (1979) and Michel and Shaked (1986) consider 
Industry Influence on dividend policy. In Feldstein and Green (1983), size and risk 
aversion are assumed to Influence the dividend decision. Dyl and Hoffmeister (1986) 
suggest that dividend policy should be reflected In the beta coefficient as a proxy of the 
riskiness of a firm.'
The work here differs from earlier studies in three ways. First, in this essay, 
time series cross-sectional tests are undertaken using individual firm data, while the 
vector autoregressive (VAR) methodology is applied to aggregate data. These 
methodologies are more appropriate In the sense that previous studies employed cross- 
sectional analysis of either firm-specific or aggregate data and they lost Important 
Information explaining differences in dividend policy over time. Second, this study 
includes empirical tests of agency theory and pecking order theory associated with free 
cash flows. The literature In this area Is limited or non-existent. Third, this study
'Rozeff (1982) also shows that beta coefficients are negatively correlated with dividend 
payout ratios.
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examines a wide scope of dividend determination theories including industry, size, and 
beta. Section B is a description of the sample and the variable definitions. In Section C, 
the methodology is explained. Section D presents tests, results, and their interpretation. 
Section E is the conclusion.
B. Data
The tests are undertaken using both individual firms' data and aggregate data. 
Five firm-specific accounting variables -  dividends, earnings, investments, long-term 
debts, and free cash flows -  are analyzed over the 1979-1990 period using quarterly 
data because firms usually pay dividends on a quarterly basis. The aggregate data are 
obtained by cumulating individual firms’ data.' The effects of firm size, beta, and 
industry are also tested. The data sources are the Quarterly COMPUSTAT tapes and the 
CRSP files.
1. Sêoipl» SeheHon
The sample used in this study is taken from two COMPUSTAT quarterly tapes 
for the period 1979-1990. The 1991 COMPUSTAT tape is used to obtain the data for 
1980-1990. The 1990 COMPUSTAT tape is used only for 1979.
To be included in the sample, the data must meet several screening criteria.
First, all data required for this study must be complete for the sample period for each 
firm. All data items used to represent or calculate dividends, earnings, investments, 
long-term debts, free cash flows, and firm sizes must be in the COMPUSTAT files 
throughout the sample period. Second, the firms must keep a December fiscal year-end 
for the sample period. This screening allows matching of quarterly data items across
The tests conducted for aggregated data may be affected by the aggregation bias 
because some of the variables are not necessarily non-negative. This aggregation problem 
will be explored later by testing for sensitivity to sample sizes.
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firms. Third, the firms must be listed on the Center for Research in Security Prices's 
(CRSP) monthly file for the sample period. The firms' SIC codes for classification of 
industries are also obtained from the CRSP file. Application of these criteria during the 
screening process yielded a final sample of 446 firms.
2. Variabh OefhA&vrs
Variable definitions used in the analysis and their sources are as follows. All 
accounting variables are seasonally unadjusted quarterly data, it is assumed that 
because of budget constraints, firms are more interested in the levels of accounting 
variables than in their percentage changes. Since the purpose of this study is to 
investigate the relationships among five quarterly variables, flow variables that uniquely 
accrue to each quarter are needed for dividends, earnings, investments, long-term debts, 
and free cash flows. Investment and long-term debt are stock data obtained from each 
firm's balance sheet, whereas earnings and free cash flows are flow data calculated 
from the firm's income statement. Accordingly, net quarterly changes are calculated for 
investments and long-term debts in order to get the amounts allocated to each quarter. 
DIV: Three different proxies of dividend are usually discussed in the literature:
(1) amounts of common stock dividends paid (Lintner (1956), Dhrymes and Kurz 
(1967), Higgins (1972), McCabe (1979), and Smiriock and MashalK 1983)1;
(2) change in dividends (Fama and Babiak (1968), Fama (1974)1; and
(3) dividend payout ratio [Rozeff (1982)1.
The dividend proxy used in this study is the amounts of common stock dividends 
paid. This measure is calculated by COMPUSTAT data item #15 (common 
shares used to calculate earnings per share) * data item *16  (dividends per 
share).
/NV: Proxies of investments include;
(1) change in net plant and equipment (Higgins (1972), Fama (1974)1; and
(2) investment in fixed assets (Ohrymes and Kurz (1967)1.
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The measure of investments used In this study is the change in property, plant, 
and equipment less depreciation. This measure is given by COMPUSTAT data 
item *42  (total property, plant, and equipment) • lagged data item #42.
EARN'. Available earnings after taxes for common stockholders are defined as:
Net Income • Preferred Dividends [Lintner (1956), Higgins (1972), and 
Fama (1974)1.
The earnings measure in this study is obtained from COMPUSTAT data item #25 
(income before extraordinary items, available for common).
DEBT'. This includes net new long-term debts (McCabe (1979)1.
The measure of debts used in this study is calculated by COMPUSTAT data item 
#51 (total long-term debts) - lagged data item #51.
FCASH: A measure of free cash flows is calculated according to Lehn and Poulsen 
(1989) as follows.*
CF = INC - TAX - INTEXP - PFDDIV - COMDIV, 
where
INC > operating income before depreciation,
TAX “ total income taxes, minus change in deferred taxes from the 
previous year to the current year,
INTEXP « gross interest expense on short- and long-term debt,
PFDDIV > total amount of preferred dividend requirement on cumulative 
stock and dividends paid on noncumulative preferred stock, 
COMDIV > total dollar amount of dividends declared on common stock
(Lehn and Poulsen (1989), p. 7771.
This measure is also used by Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1991). Unlike their
annual measures, the quarterly measure of free cash flows used in this study is
calculated by COMPUSTAT data item #21 - (data item #8 - change in data item
#52) - data item #22 - data item #24 - (data item #15 * data item #18).
'Although this measure of free cash flows is computed by several accounting numbers, 
including operating income and dividends, FCASH is an another independent variable. Thus, 
the parameter estimation on FCASH is not influancad axclusivaly by ona or two input 
variables (e.g., operating income and dividends). The intrinsic problem of interdependencies 
among accounting numbers would be considered, but simultaneous estimation methods and 
structural models can produce superior estimations under such conditions (see Appendix A).
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SIZE: Two proxies of firm size are:
(1) the logarithm of book assets [Wansiey and Lane (1987), Friend and 
Hasbrouck (1988) I; and
(2) market value of equity outstanding.
The proxy of firm size used in this study is the logarithm of book assets, which 
is given by COMPUSTAT data item *44  (total assets).
INDUSTRY: Four digit SIC industries are obtained from CRSP.
The first two-digit SIC codes are used to determine industry.
BETA: The market model is used to obtain beta coefficients (see Sharpe (1963)1.
C. Methodology
1. Tim»-S9ri9S Cross-Sêctionêl Aniyais
First, a time-series cross-sectional model is applied to individual firms' data. A 
generalized linear model is considered, where observations occur at T time periods for 
each of N firms. The model at time t for each firm I is designed as
DIVg~9f , *  e ,  INVg *  02  EARNg *  8 ,  DEBTg *  8 4  FCASH, * u , , , 3 ^ ,
/■i,...,Af Ni,...,r
where 9  are the coefficients, and 
Un is a regression error term.
To estimate 0 , the error components model of Fuller and Battese (1974) is 
followed. In the error components model, the regression error u* is assumed to consist 
of three independent components.
Wt ■ Y; ♦ */•*•«#  • 13 2)
where k, is an unique cross-sectional effect, k ~  (0,o /);
d, is an unique time effect, d, (0 ,a /); and
f* is an error term, f , ~  (0 ,0,').
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Under these assumptions, the covariance matrix of the regression error term u„ is
a[ « / ' )  -  o j ♦ 0* <3.3)
where I* is an NxN identity matrix,
®  is the Kronecker product matrix, and
Jt is a TxT matrix of ones.
Fuller and Battese found that premultiplying equation (3.1) by the covariance
matrix yields the uncorrelated errors with variance a /. The observations are thus 
transformed by the covariance matrix, and an OLS regression is run on this transformed 
data. Then, unbiased and efficient generalized least squares (GLS) estimates are 
obtained.
The estimated 9  values and t statistics for H,: 8  = 0 are used to determine the 
relationship between dividends and explanatory variables.
2. V«etof Autongfttsiv* Modt!
Vector autoregressions are employed to analyze the aggregate data (see, for 
example, Sims (1980), Lhterman (1986), Lupoletti and Webb (1986), Holtz Eakin, 
Newey and Rosen (1988), Blanchard (1989), Keating (1990), and Clements and Mizon 
(1991)1. Under the VAR model, a system of dynamic linear equations are constructed 
such that a vector of dependent variables is related to lagged vectors of all variables in 
the system. For example, the dividend equation takes the form;
M  M  M
(3.4)
where the a, f  u, x  and «  are the coefficients, 
m is the lag length, and
e, is a white noise error term.
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Since the model is assumed to consist of a system of five equations, the structural VAR 
model has the following form:
X  •  Am  X  * C * E , (3.5)
aSxl) (5*5) (5x1) (5x1) (5xf)
where X is the vector of variables (i.e., DIV, INV, EARN, DEBT and FCASH),
A (LI is a matrix polynomial in the lag operator L 
(i.e., A(L) -A ,L  + AjL* + ... + A^L"),
C is a vector of constant terms, and
E is a vector of error terms (i.e., eo*v> <mv> (omT, and Ckash)-
Equation (3.5) can be rewritten compactly as
X  ~ (I -  A m ) X  •  C * E , 136)
where B(L) is a matrix polynomial in the lag operator L
(i.e., B(U-l-A,L-A,L*-...-A„L"’), and 
I is the identity matrix.
If X is stationary and the roots of B(L) lie outside the unit circle, equation (3.6) 
can be inverted as foilows.
X  -  Bm'^ c  ♦ ' E  13 7)
According to Wold's decomposition theorem, the vector process X of equation 
(3.7) consists of two components: a deterministic one and an indeterministic one. This 
can be represented as a vector moving average.
♦ E  • /  «r-/ >hO
where \  is a constant,
0 , is the coefficient matrix, and
e, is a vector white noise.
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Following Sims (1980), the VAR methodology generally uses two statistics 
which are derived from the coefficient matrix 0  in equation (3.8). The first VAR 
statistic is the variance decomposition of forecast errors for X,, which are constructed to 
show the dynamic relationship between the system variables. This measures the 
proportion of each variable's contribution to the forecast error variance in the h-step 
ahead forecast of X,. Since the h-step ahead forecast of X, is
♦ E  ♦/ «►*-/ •hh
the forecast error and its variance matrix are caiculated as foilows:
*-i
" E •/ *hh-i.K
vuKh - - E •/ ♦/' -EK  M)
(3.10)
The h-step forecast error variance of the variable, X», is expressed as the sum 
of the k"* diagonal elements of each 0 ,0 ,' in equation (3.10), where the k*** diagonal 
elements of 0 ,0 ,' is defined as the sum of the squares of elements in the k" row of 0 ,.
E (Ê C ) .
M  Ml m>1
where 0kmj the km*^  element of 0„ and 
n is the number of variables.
The contribution of the j*  variable, X,, to the h-step forecast error variance of X„ is
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
32
*•1
M
where is the kj'” element of 0 ,.
Then, the relative proportion of the j"" variable, X,, to the h-step forecast error variance 
of Xk is measured by
»-i »
E ( E OM M>1
(3.13)
Variance decomposition allocates the h-step forecast error variance for each 
variable into the components accounted for by its own surprise movements and by 
shocks to other variables in the system. Since the error variance of a variable is 
identified as the sum of contributions by all variables in the system, variance 
decomposition can be used to investigate the influences of a variable on another 
variable. For example, if investment makes significant contributions to the forecast error 
variance of dividend, then this will imply that investment is a major influence on 
dividend.
The second test statistic in VAR is an impulse response function (IRF), which is 
meant to trace out the response path of the system variables to an unexpected unit 
shock in a variable. The normalized unit shock to a variable is given by a one standard 
deviation surprise movement in that variable.*
*This is often called innovation accounting in the sense that it traces out the system's 
reaction to a shock (innovation) in a variable [see Sims (1980)1.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
33
Since the impulse response of X, to the shock e, is measured as the h*”
moving average coefficient of X, is obtained from equation (3.9).
. (3.14)
a«, *
Consequently, this impulse response function can be regarded as dynamic multiplier that 
indicates the size and direction of response of system variables to an unit shock in a 
variable.* For example, if impulse responses of dividend to a unit shock in investment 
are significant and negative, then Miller and Modigliani's proposition of irrelevance can 
not hold because dividend and investment would be substitutes for the firm's funds.
Prior to the VAR estimation, the error terms e, in equation (3.8) must be 
orthogonalized in order to eliminate any contemporaneous correlation. To obtain the 
orthogonalized errors, the Choleski decomposition transforms equation (3.8) by using the 
lower triangular matrix, P, from the covariance matrix, E, as follows.
M (3.15)
M
where O,* = (P,P is the transformed coefficient matrix, and 
6,* > P‘'e, is the transformed vector white noise.
This VAR model has much appeal over earlier models. In the VAR, all variables 
are jointly modeled to represent their dynamic relationships without imposing any « 
priori restrictions. The VAR also has no risk of misspecifications such as serially 
correlated and heteroscedastic errors.
*See McMillin and Parker (1990).
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D. Empirical Rasults
1. SiflipH» ChênetÊristha
Table 3.1 presents sample characteristics for the 446 firms included in this 
study. The cross sectional medians, means, and standard deviations for each variable's 
averages from the second quarter of 1979 to the fourth quarter of 1990 are shown in 
Panel A of Table 3.1. It is interesting to note from the mean column that the sum of 
DIV and INV representing outflows of corporate funds approximates the sum of EARN, 
DEBT, and FCASH representing inflows of corporate funds. This seems to be consistent 
with Dhrymes and Kurz's (1967) suggestion that one of the firm's long-term objectives 
is to grow while keeping the cash flow balance. The standard deviation of SIZE is quite 
large compared to that of other variables, which may be the cause of heteroscedasticity.
The correlation matrix between the variables is shown in Panel 8 of Table 3.1. 
Accounting variables are standardized on SIZE in order to adjust for potential 
heteroscedasticity. There are also several other points to note in Panel B. First, the 
correlations between DIV and other explanatory variables provide a preliminary picture of 
the subsequent tests. The correlations with INV and DEBT are not significant. The 
correlation with EARN is positive and significant, whereas the correlations with FCASH 
and BETA are negative and significant.
Second, although some correlations between the explanatory variables are 
significant, they do not produce serious multicollinearity.* The correlations of INV with 
EARN, DEBT, FCASH, and BETA are significant. The correlation between EARN and
"Multicollinearity Is not a problem in this study for several reasons. First, the 
coefficients of simple correlations are not high. Second, this kind of multicollinearity can 
be remedied when time-series cross-sectional regressions follow the estimated generalized 
least-squares (GLS) procedure with more than 20,000 observations. Third, the VAR 
analysis focuses on forecast error variance decompositions and impulse response functions, 
which are not affected by multicollinearity.
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frequency
Distribution of firm 
(in millions)
sisss
Median Mean standard deviation
Mining snd 
construction
1000-1999 28 (6.28%) $633.118 $2,710.202 $7,028.921
Non-dursblo 
swnu fscturing
2000-2999 93 (20.85%) $1,053.903 $4,195.658 $9,405.505
Dursbis
SMnuCscturing
3000-3999 127 (28.48%) $361.115 $3,441.985 $10,648.941
Trsnsportstion 
mnd utilities
4000-4999 124 (37.80%) $2,112.433 $3,318.134 $3,593.406
Mh •isssis snd 
rotsii trsde
5000-5999 11 (2.47%) $330.290 $1,262.387 $1,847.221
Pinsncs,
insurance and 
real estate
6000-6999 52 (11.65%) $10,240.014 $23,533.952 $33,293.750
Services 7000-8999 11 (2.47%) 
446 (100%)
$384.695 $501.159 $491.321
^Accounting variable# Including DIV, INV, BARN, DBBT and FCASH ara atandardisad on SISE. 
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BETA is negative and significant. Since these correlations are not high, they imply that 
controlling for heteroscedasticity yields less multicollinearity.
Panel C of Table 3.1 displays the sample by industry classification. The firms in 
each industry are distributed by size of the firm. It would appear that cross industrial 
variations in firm size are evident. The finance, insurance, and real estate industry has 
the largest mean of firm size. The smallest mean of firm size is found in industries such 
as services, wholesale, and retail trade.
2. Tbn»-S9ri0s Crost-Saetionsl R tgntthn Rasults
Time-series and cross-sectional regressions are estimated using the error 
components model of Fuller and Battese (1974). The error components model is an 
estimated generalized least-squares method for estimating regression parameters when 
time-series and cross-sectional data are simultaneously used. This procedure can take 
care of heteroscedasticity as well as serial correlation in the error terms.’
The estimates of time-series cross-sectional regressions are presented in Table 
3.2, which is divided into four panels. Panel A shows the estimates for the full sample. 
The most striking result is the verification of Miller and Modigliani's (1961) dividend 
irrelevance proposition; the coefficient estimates on INV and DEBT are not significant. 
Equally surprising is the coefficient estimate of FCASH, which is negative and 
significant. This seems to imply that pecking order theory explanation holds.* The 
coefficient of EARN is positive and significant, consistent with Lintner's (1956) 
prediction. The F-test rejects the null hypothesis at probability less than 0.01.
’Since this procedure transforms the variables by the covariance matrix of residuals, it 
can control heteroscedasticity in a less restrictive way than simply dividing the variables by 
firm size, while it adjusts for serial correlations due to time-series data.
"As shown in Sections D.3 and D.4, the effect of FCASH should be explored in the 
context of dynamic interactions between FCASH and DIV.
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Panais B, C, and D of Table 3.2 present the estimates for subsamples classified 
by size, beta, and industry. Coefficient estimates on EARN and FCASH are quite 
consistent with the findings for the full sample. However, the signs and significances of 
the INV and DEBT estimates reveal mixed results, compared with those for the full 
sample. The estimates for intercept are interesting, since they provide some insight into 
the subsequent tests. Coefficient estimates on intercept in the subsamples sorted by 
size are significant and larger in magnitude as firm size increases. In contrast, for the 
subsamples sorted by beta, the intercept estimates are significant and smaller in 
magnitude as beta increases. Coefficient estimates on intercept in the industrial 
subsamples vary both in significance and magnitude. This suggests that missing 
variables may cause model misspecification collapsing in the intercept.
Table 3.3 reports time series cross sectional regression estimates using six 
different model specifications. In Table 3.3, model (1) is the regression in which the 
variable BETA is included. The coefficient estimate on BETA is negative and significant. 
In model 12), four size variables are included. Of these, two size variables, S* and S„ 
representing large firm sizes, show positive and significant estimates. When BETA and 
size variables are entered at the same time in model (3), the effects of beta and firm size 
are the same as those in models (1) and (2).
Alternatively, model (4) includes industry variables. The estimate results show 
that none of the industry variables are statistically significant at the 1 % levai. When 
BETA is added to model (41, BETA shows a negative and significant estimate in model 
(5), but the industry variables do not show any significance. Also shown are the 
regression results of model (6) in which four size variables are added to model (4). Two 
large size variables have positive and significant coefficient estimates, whereas the 6^ 
industry variable representing finance, insurance, and real estate reports a negative and 
significant estimate of coefficient.
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^fbr the purpose of estimation, each one dummy variables ere lost. The dummy variables not represented in 
the table are 83 for 81:8 variable and ly for INDU8T8T variable.
T3
CD
(/)
CD
Q.
T3
CD
(/)
(/)
*t-etatietice are given in parentheses. 
*8ignificant at the 0.01 level. 
^Significant at the 0.05 level.
8
^S a OeOl a a le
CD
3 .
3"
CD
CD■D
O
Q.
C
aO3
"O
o
w
44
Finally, in model (7), all the variables are included in the regression. The sets of 
coefficient estimates on BETA and size variables are consistent with the estimate results 
in other models of Table 3.3. While other industry variables are insignificant at the 1 % 
level, the industry variable for finance, insurance, and real estate also shows significant 
estimate results, similar to those of model (6). This casts doubt on the industry effects 
in dividend policy. As noted in Table 3.1, the finance, insurance, and real estate 
industry has the largest mean of firm size. Also that industry variable has a significant 
estimate of coefficient only when size variables enter the model. This evidence, along 
with the insignificant estirnates of other industry variables, suggests that industry effect 
might not exist and that industrial variations in dividend policy as documented in Michel 
(1979) might be only the manifestation of size effects.
The estimate results of INV, EARN, DEBT, and FCASH In model (7) are entirely 
consistent with the findings for the full sample in Table 3.2, as well as those for other 
models in Table 3.3. The coefficient estimates on INV and DEBT are insignificant. The 
EARN coefficient estimate is positively large and has highly significant t-statistics, 
whereas the FCASH coefficient estimate is negative and significant.
3. Vector Autorsgrotsion Results
The assumption of VAR is that the regression variables are stationary over time. 
Since statistical inference based on non stationary variables results in incorrect 
conclusions, it is imperative to scrutinize the stationarity of the variables. The tests of 
stationarity applied here are the unit root tests and cointegration tests.
In Panel A of Table 3.4, unit root tests are conducted by using the augmented 
Dickey Fuller (ADR statistic. The existence of a unit root implies non stationarity.
Thus, the null hypothesis of a single unit root or H*: p -  0 is tested against the 
alternative or H :^ p < 0 that the variable is stationary. Since the t statistic does not
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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have Student's t-distribution under the null hypothesis of non stationarity, critical values 
for the t statistic on p, Z(t,), are simulated by Fuller (1976).
The single unit root test in Table 3.4 with the exception of DEBT does not reiect 
the null hypothesis of a unit root at the 10% significance*. For the two-unit root test, 
the procedure is repeated for first difference data. The null hypothesis of a unit root in 
the differenced variables is rejected at the 10% level for all variables. Overall, the 
results suggest that the variables become stationary only after first differencing. This 
means that the variables follow an 1(1) process.
Panel B of Table 3.4 details the cointegration tests. Cointegration means that 
the difference between two variables becomes stationary when these variables move 
closely over time. If the variables are cointegrated, tests for stationarity may not be 
reliable. Furthermore, Engle and Granger (1987) suggest that vector autoregressions 
using differenced data will be misspecified because of omitted constraints when 
cointegrated variables are used. Cointegration tests are conducted by repeating unit 
root tests on the cointegrating residuals. The null hypothesis of no cointegration is that 
the cointegrating residuals have a unit root. As it can be seen from Panel B of Table 
3.4, no ADF statistic exhibits significance at the 10% level. Therefore, the null 
hypothesis that the variables are not cointegrated cannot be rejected.
Based on these results, the first-order differenced data are used in the following 
VAR analysis to satisfy the stationarity condition. The variance decompositions from 
vector autoregressions are presented in Table 3.5. The ordering of variables used in this 
analysis is INV, DIV, EARN, FCASH, and DEBT. The results reported here appear to be 
quite robust to ordering since almost the same results are obtained with several different 
orderings. Confidence intervals of 99% for the point estimates are computed by a
'It is customary to refer to the 10% critical values in stationarity tests.
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Panal Ci Relative percentage of earning, 
explained by each ahock to
(BARM) forecaat variance h-quarter ahead
QUARTIR ihi DIV U U BARM DBBT FCASH
2 15.7961 
<0» 43.2)
2.7635 
(0, 22.3)
45.9658 
(18.1, 69.7)*
18.4599 
(0, 35.1)
17.0145 
(0, 35.7)
4 20.5698 
(G| 50.4)
6.2978 
(0, 36.0)
38.9069 
(9.9; 60.5)*
17.8462 
(0, 33.4)
16.3790 
(0, 34.5)
• 22.9841 
(0| 52.3)
12.4979 
(0, 46.0)
34.9319 
(6.8, 52.9)*
16.6153 
(0, 29.1)
12.9705 
(0, 27.6)
12 28.1824 
(1.2, 56.7)*
11.3649 
(0, 46.7)
34.1938 
(5.8, 51.1)*
14.9142 
(0, 26.9)
11.3445 
(0, 25.4)
Panel Oi Relative percentage of debt (DEBT) forecaat 
explained by each ahock to
QS2MITEB. ihi BIV 1ÜÏ BARM DBBT FCASH
2 36.3906 
(5.0, 65.9)*
4.5996 
(0, 25.3)
8.6597 
(0, 25.9)
47.9804 
(16.3, 68.5)"
2.3694 
(0, 13.5)
4 55.9334 
(27.7, 76.4)*
1.9179 
(0, 18.2)
20.2229 
(0, 39.4)
20.6968 
(4.0, 33.8)*
1.2288 
(0, 9.3)
8 46.4060 
(15.7, 69.4)*
7.1753 
(0, 36.6)
29.5955 
(1.6, 50.2)*
13.0490 
(0.3, 24.0)*
3.7739 
(0, 13.9)
12 38.1480 
(7.0, 65.3)*
12.5902 
(0, 55.6)
30.4431 
(0, 53.1)
9.8142 
(0, 20.4)
5.0042 
(0, 16.4)
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Panai li Ralativa parcantaga of fraa caah 
aaplainad by aach ahock to
flow (PCASH) forecaat vari nca h-quartar ahead
OUARTIR ihl BIX IBX BMW DBBT PCASH
2 16.3005 4.0063 1.2025 4.0588 74.4317
<0| 44.2) (0| 23.8) (0| 13.7) (0| 13.5) (38.4; 94.7)"
4 18.1732 4.6180 2.6570 6.6930 67.2585
(0| 48.7) (0| 27.8) (0} 16.9) (0; 17.0) (29.0; 82.3)"
a 11.1667 14.6336 5.2756 6.4788 62.4451
(0| 38.4) (0, 47.5) (0| 21.0) (0| 16.8) (21.0; 74.8)"
12 8.9709 20.9885 6.6926 6.8339 56.5139
(0| 38.9) (0> 58.9) (0| 25.0) (0| 17.5) (11.7; 71.5)"
*Tha 99% confidence Intervale are preaented
^Significant at tha 0.01 laval.
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Monte Carlo simulation'^ with 1,000 replications. This confidence interval is bounded 
by 0% and 100%. If the confidence interval includes 0. the null hypothesis of no 
impact cannot be rejected.
Point estimates in Table 3.5 measure the degree of exogeneity for a given 
variable in the sense that the h quarter ahead forecast error variance in a variable is 
allocated to each source, and that a strictly exogenous variable explains all its forecast 
error variance. If the forecast error variance in a variable is largely due to unexpected 
shocks to itself in the last h quarters, then the implication is that there are no strong 
interactions with other variables.
Panel A of Table 3.5 provides variance decompositions for DIV at the horizons of 
2, 4, 8, and 12 quarters. At a horizon of two quarters, 96.15% of the variance in DIV 
is explained by its own disturbances, whereas only 1.10% of the variance in DIV is 
accounted for by INV. Other variables, including EARN, DEBT, and FCASH, also have 
little impact on DIV. At the 12 quarter horizon, DIV explains 71.29% of its own 
variance. However, INV explains only 4.87% of the variance in DIV, while EARN, DEBT, 
and FCASH account for 12.10%, 5.61%, and 6.11% of the variance in DIV, 
respectively. This suggests that nearly all variance in DIV is attributable to the shocks 
to DIV itself, and that DIV has no dynamic interaction with other variables.
Variance decompositions for INV are shown in Panel B of Table 3.5. At the two- 
quarter horizon, 87.20% of the variance in INV is attributed to its own shocks. The 
percentage of the variance in INV explained by other variables ranges from 0.65% to 
6.74%. At the 12-quarter horizon, the percentage of INV variance due to its own 
shocks is a still dominating 75.31 %. DIV explains only 7.79% of the variance in INV, 
which is insignificant at the 1 % level. The contributions of EARN, DEBT, and FCASH to 
the variance in INV are 5.11%, 2.02%, and 9.76% respectively, insignificant at the
'This method constructs the posterior distributions of the estimate.
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0.01 level. These results imply that the variance in INV is fully explained by its own 
shocks and thus INV appears to be exogenous.
Panel C of Table 3.5 presents variance decompositions for EARN. At the two- 
quarter horizon, less than half the variance in EARN is accounted for by its own shocks. 
At this short horizon, INV explains only 2.76% of the variance in EARN, while DIV,
DEBT, and FCASH account for 15.79%, 18.45%, and 17.01%, respectively. At a 
longer horizon of 12 quarters, INV gradually becomes more important, explaining 
11.36% of the variance in EARN. DIV accounts for 28.18% of the variance in EARN, 
which is significant at the 1 % level. This would suggest that dividends explain future 
earnings. DEBT and FCASH explains 14.91% and 11.34% of the variance in EARN, 
respectively. EARN has 34.19% of its variance accounted for by its own shocks, 
suggesting strong interactions among the variables.
Variance decompositions for DEBT are presented in Panel D of Table 3.5. An 
interesting feature at the two-quarter horizon is that DIV explains 36.39% of the 
variance in DEBT, which is significant. Of the variance in DEBT, 47.98% is attributable 
to its own shocks. EARN explains only 8.65% of the variance in DEBT, while the 
contributions by INV and FCASH are 4.59% and 2.36%, respectively. At the 12-quarter 
horizon, the proportion of the variance in DEBT explained by DIV is 38.14%, which is 
still significant. However, the proportion of the variance in DEBT attributable to its own 
shocks decreases to 9.81 %, which is not significant. EARN contributes 30.44% to the 
variance in DEBT, while INV and FCASH are responsible for 12.59% and 5.00%, 
respectively. This result suggests that DEBT is set as a residual after all corporate 
decisions are made. In particular, this implies that since DIV has a significant effect on 
DEBT, firms borrow in order to finance dividend payments.
Variance decompositions for FCASH are also portrayed in Panel E of Table 3.5.
At the horizon of two quarters, DIV explains 16.30% of the variance in FCASH, implying
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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that frea cash flows of the firm may be restricted by dividend payments. Of the 
variance in FCASH, 74.43% is accounted for by its own shocks. The proportion of the 
variance in FCASH explained by INV, EARN, and DEBT ranges between 1.20% and 
4.05%. At a longer horizon of 12 quarters, the contribution of DIV to the variance in 
FCASH decreases to 8.97%. INV explains 20.98% of the FCASH variance and becomes 
more important, while EARN and DEBT account for 6.69% and 6.83%, respectively.
The proportion of the FCASH variance explained by its own shocks is 56.51%, more 
than half the variance in FCASH.
In order to test for sensitivity of the VAR results to samples, two subsamples of 
100 firms and 300 firms are selected randomly. Variance decompositions are calculated 
for each subsamples. This procedure is also helpful in mitigating potential selection bias 
due to sample screening. Table 3.6 reports the results of sample size sensitivity 
analysis. Since tiie focus of this study is on DIV, only dividend variance decompositions 
are presented.
Panel A of Table 3.6 shows dividend variance decompositions for a randomly 
selected sample of 100 firms. At all horizons, the proportion of the variance in DIV 
explained by its own shocks is more than 70%, while other variables explain less than 
8% of the variance in DIV. These figures are consistent with the findings in Panel A of 
Table 3.5. The results shown in Panel B of Table 3.6, in which dividend variance 
decompositions are calculated for the sample of 300 firms, are also consistent with 
those in Panel A of Table 3.5. At all horizons, DIV accounts for most of its forecast 
variance. Overall, this suggests that the variance decomposition results reported in 
Table 3.5 appear quite robust.
Figure 3.1 plots the impulse responses of DIV to each one standard deviation 
shock to DIV, INV, EARN, DEBT, and FCASH. The 99% confidence intervals are also 
plotted around the impulse response line. If this confidence interval band covers the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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value of zero, the null hypothesis of no effects cannot be rejected. Diapram (1) shows 
that a one standard deviation shock to DIV has significant short run effects on itself. At 
a horizon of one quarter ahead, the effects are positive and significant. At a horizon of 
two quarters ahead, negative and significant effects are found. At longer horizons, the 
effects are insignificant since confidence interval bands fluctuate around the value of 
zero. By contrast, diagrams (2)*(5) indicate that dividend responses to each one 
standard deviation shock to INV, EARN, DEBT, snd FCASH are not significant at all 
horizons. It appears that this evidence is consistent with the results using variance 
decompositions.
4. Th» Laggtd-DMdênd Modê!
The results from Section D.2 suggest current relationships among dividends, 
earnings, free cash flows, beta, and firm size. The analysis in Section D.3 provides 
evidence of short memory in dividends. It is found that dividends are associated with 
short memory of its own past, while any given shocks in all other variables under study 
do not induce significant deviations in dividends. This would suggest that stronger lag 
specifications might be useful in investigating determinants of dividend policy. 
Accordingly, this section estimates several additional specifications of the time series 
cross sectional regression model including lagged dividend variables, and tests for their 
robustness. Since the early study of Lintner (1956), the empirical literature testing 
lagged dividend models has been scant with the exception of Fama and Babiak 11968) 
and Fama (1974). These studies also failed to explain the reason for the inclusion of 
lagged dividends."
"Moreover, many econometric problems due to lagged dependent variable models or 
time series cross sectional data have not been effectively adjusted.
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Estimating lagged dependent variables in the regression causes many 
econometric problems. If the disturbances are serially correlated in the lagged 
dependent variable models, OLS estimates are inconsistent. Even if the disturbances are 
"well-behaved", OLS estimation produces biased coefficients in finite samples. In order 
to adjust for these problems in the context of time-series cross-sectional regressions, the 
method of instrumental variables is suggested. The lagged-dividend variable is first 
regressed on ali other explanatory variables. The resulting predicted values are then 
used in an error components model to obtain time-series cross-sectional regression 
estimates.
Table 3.7 reports time-series cross-sectional regression results using lagged 
dividend variables. Model (1) is Lintner's (19561 model in which current dividends are 
determined by the previous dividends and current earnings. The coefficient estimates on 
DIV., and EARN are positive and significant. The adjusted R' is 51.89% and the F-test 
reiects the nuli hypothesis at the level less than 0.01. Model (2) includes additional 
lagged variables of dividends in the model of EARN and FCASH, which turned out 
significant in Table 3.2. As predicted, the coefficient estimates are positive-significant 
for EARN and negative-significant for FCASH. With the introduction of more lagged- 
dividend variables, the first, second, and fourth lags show significant estimates and the 
adjusted R' increases to 65.74%. This implies some persistence of dividend poiicy since 
current dividends seem to be affected by the dividends paid one quarter, two quarters, 
or four quarters before.
Similarly, models (3) and (4) introduce BETA and size dummy variables which 
proved significant earlier. The coefficient estimate of BETA is negative-significant at the
0.01 level, whereas the coefficient estimates on the two largest size variables are 
positive-significant at the 0.01 level. The positive impacts of the first, second, and 
fourth lagged-dividend variables are the same as in model (2). In model (51, all variables
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Table 3.7t Tt—  Parle» Croaa-Sectlonal Regreaalone with Lagged Dependent Variable# 
Model (1)1 DlVit - Tg * * ^5
»0 ♦ ♦ *2 0:V-2,it * »3 “IV-3.lt ♦ 4 “IV-4,itNodal (2)1 
Nodal (3)1 
Nodal (4)1 
Nodal (5)1
DIV,'It 
“:Vit 
DIV,»
»0 ♦ ♦ »2 “IV-2.lt ♦ »3 “IV-a.lt ♦ %  “*V-4. It
. ♦ Ts EANNit
♦ Tg rCASH^g ♦ “It
: ♦ »S ««"it
♦ BCTA^t * "It
♦ Tg EANNit
* “It
♦ Tg BARNit“ :V it  -  *0  + *1 “ : v _ i , i t  ♦ »2 “ :v _ 2 .it  ♦ »3 “ :v _ 3 .it  ♦ 4 “ *v _ 4 .it
♦ Tft ♦ 1? — TAlt ♦ »J47 »J.lt<l-»*a» ♦ *j*6 “j.ltO-^.S) ♦
Indapandant
Variable
Coafflclant
Batlmata
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
INTBRCBPT *0 13.4902 
(9.538)*
8.9897
(7.291)*
22.7459
(8.148)*
1.7407
(0.738)
9.5618
(2.847)*
DIV_i *1 0.3829
(34.277)*
0.2149
(12.255)*
0.2116
(12.069)*
0.2043
(11.690)*
0.2029
(11.606)*
DlV.j *2 0.1692
(7.349)*
0.1676
(7.288)*
0.1602
(6.988)*
0.1597
(6.966)*
01V_3 *3 -0.0361
(-1.521)
-0.0375
(-1.580)
-0.0392
(-1.656)
-0.0398
(-1.684)
DIV_4 *4 0.2642
(14.982)*
0.2607
(14.790)*
0.2510
(14.273)*
0.2495
(14.191)*
BABM *5 0.0293
(9.684)*
0.0257
(8.252)*
0.0257
(8.279)*
0.0238
(7.693)*
0.0240
(7.730)*
FCASH *6 -0.0054
(-7.921)*
-0.0055
(-8.006)*
-0.0050
(-7.360)*
-0.0051
(-7.425)*
BETA *7 -16.0414
(-5.491)*
-9.8201
(-3.272)*
Ol<o
CD"O
O
Q .
C
g
Q . Tmbl# 3.7 (cont'd)
"D
CD
C/)W
o"3
0
5
CD
8■D
C Q '
2
13
CD
3.
3"
CD
CD■D
O
Q .
O
3
■D
O
&
Indapandant
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datInata
( 1) ( 2 | (3) Ml (S)
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AdJ. M
Prob. of r
0.5109 
<  0.0001
0.6574 
<  0.0001
0.6580 
< 0.0001
-2.7386 -0.9233
(-0.852) (-0.282)
-2.3470 -0.5164
(-0.732) (-0.158)
8.5426 7.9051
(2.648)* (2.444)'
36.6389 36.4119
(11.2381* (11.159)'
0.6604 
<  0.0001
0.6610 
< 0.0001
3Tha aima duany varlablaa, Sja, ara daflnad an followai Sj - 1 If SIZE < $161.21 million, Sj > O otharwlaa; 
S; - 1 If $161.21 million s SIEE < $687.74 million. S; - O otharwlaa; S3 • 1 If $687.74 million S SIEE < 
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used in models (1)-(4) are added. The estimate results are essentially the same as in 
other models, indicating the insensitivity of parameter estimates. The adjusted R' is 
66.10%.
The findings in Table 3.7 have several interesting implications. First, unlike 
Lintner's argument, more lags in dividends are important determinants of dividend policy. 
With the addition of more lags reflecting the past memory of dividends, the explanatory 
power of the model increases considerably. Second, as shown in Section 0.2, current 
earnings have positive impacts on dividends, while free cash flows and beta have 
negative effects. Also the firm size appears to play an important role in dividend policy.
Since the sensitivity of the estimates to alternative model specifications has been 
established in previous sections, conducted in Table 3.8 are robustness analyses of the 
time-series cross-sectional model (7) in Table 3.7 for randomly selected subsamples and 
subperiods. In order to test for robustness of the model, the full sample is first split into 
three subsamples: randomly selected samples of 100 firms, 200 firms, and 300 firms. 
Then, the time-series cross-sectional model (7) in Table 3.7 is estimated on each 
subsample. As shown in Table 3.8, the sets of coefficient estimates on DIV.,, DIV.*, 
EARN, S*, and S, are the same as the findings in Table 3.7. However, the coefficient 
estimates on DIV., and DIV., show mixed results for each subsample. The coefficient 
estimate of BETA is insignificant in the subsample of 100 firms, whereas it is significant 
in the subsamples of 200 firms and 300 firms.
To test for coefficient stability over time, the time-series and cross-sectional 
model is also estimated for two subperiods; 1979:11-1984:1V and 1985:1-1990:IV. The 
coefficient estimates on explanatory variables for the two subperiods shown in Table 3.8 
are quite consistent with those in Table 3.7, except for the third lagged dividend variable 
during the subperiod 1979:11-1984:1V.
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Varlobl.
Co.fflci.nt
I.tiaat.
Randomly a.lMtad Sampl.a 
(79iII-90iIV)
Total Sampl.a 
446 firms 446 firm.
100 flnw 200 firm. 300 firm. (79iII-84iIV) (85:1-90:IV)
1 *8 -1.3309
(-0.1431
-0.5976
(-0.155)
-1.0523
(-0.244)
-0.4959
(-0.185)
-1.0510
(-0.251)
♦9 -2.0229
(-0.272)
0.1095
(0.028)
-0.7056
(-0.171)
-0.1524
(-0.057)
-0.6896
(-0.165)
*4 *10 2.2909
(0.2841
6.6538
(1.757)
8.7361
(2.001)**
6.9132
(2.606)*
8.0647
(1.941)
»5 *11 36.9703
(5.032)*
22.5234
(5.447)*
29.3538
(6.961)*
34.9107
(13.106)*
36.4564
(8.576)*
Adj. 0.7427 0.4990 0.5754 0.6664 0.5530
Prob. of F < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001
^the aime diumy variable#, Sj#, are defined ae followes « 1 if SUE < $161.21 million. S* - 0 otherwiee; 
S, " 1 if $161.21 million d SISE < $687.74 million, Sg " 0 otherwiee; S3 • 1 if $687.74 million S SISE < 
$2,004.02 million. S3 - 0 otherwiee; S, - 1 if $2,004.02 million & SISE < $5,265.82 million. S* - 0 
otherwiee; Sg - 1 if $5,265.82 million S SISE, Sg » O otherwiee.
^for the purpose of estimation, one dummy variable is lost. The dummy variable not represented in the tabl# 
is 83 for SISE variable.
^t-etatietice are given in parentheses.
"significant at the 0.01 level.
"O
CD
"significant at the 0.05 level.
(/)(/) S
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Therefore, in spite of small differences, all coefficients of the time series cross- 
sectional regression in Table 3.8 display consistent signs and significances of estimates 
in all subsamples and subperiods. This confirms that the regression model and its 
coefficient estimates in this study are quite robust.
5. Intarprêtaddn of RtsultM
The empirical results of this study are as follows: (1) contemporaneously, 
dividends are not affected by investments and long-term debts; (2) as in Linter (1956), 
dividends are positively predicted by current earnings; (3) dividends are negatively 
related to current free cash flows; (4) dynamically, dividends are not influenced by any 
other past variables except for lagged dividends;'' (5) dividends are negatively related 
to beta and positively related to firm size; and (6) there are no significant industry 
effects.
The main results of this study concern the relationship between a firm's 
investments and financing decisions. According to the Miller and Modigliani (MM) 
proposition, investment decisions are independent of financing decisions such as new 
debts or dividends, since in perfect capital markets the value of a firm is not affected by 
financing but by investment. Dhrymes and Kurz (1964, 1967) claim that the complete 
separation of investments and financing decisions is implausible because in imperfect 
capital markets financing should be considered as part of the firm's investment 
decisions.
The empirical literature associated with the MM proposition has shown mixed 
results. Dhrymes and Kurz (1967) and McCabe (1979) found that the firm's investment 
decision is linked to its financing decision. Higgins (1972), Fama (1974), and Smirlock
"Moreover, investments and free cash flows are not dynamically affected by any other 
past variables. But, long-term debts are influenced by the past dividends and earnings.
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and Marshall 119831 documented no interdependence between investments and 
dividends. It is argued here that these tests seem to be misspecified or inappropriate 
because they have omitted important explanatory variables and/or lagged variables.
The dynamic analysis in this study provides strong results. The MM proposition 
indicates that investments should not be influenced by dividends and debts. A stronger 
formulation of this proposition is that investment and financing variables also should not 
affect each other dynamically. For instance, current investment decisions should be 
determined independently of the previous debt and dividend decisions. Based on the 
dynamic investigation as wall as the contemporaneous tests, the results in this study 
support the MM proposition.
The results of this study also show that dividends and new debts are 
contemporaneously independent, but that current dividend decisions affect future debt 
decisions. This is an indication that new debt decisions are subordinated to dividend 
decision. On the other hand, the results of this study confirm that, as Untner (1956) 
argues, current earnings and the first lagged dividends serve to predict current 
dividends. Furthermore, this study shows a stronger persistence in dividend policy. It is 
found that current dividend decision is affected by the dividends paid two quarters or 
four quarters before, in addition to the immediately previous dividends.
The test results of free cash flows involve an intriguing interpretation. Although 
the contemporaneous relationship between dividends and free cash flows is negative, 
dividends are dynamically unaffected by free cash flows. The agency theory explanation 
of dividend payments is that the firm should pay dividends to reduce agency costs 
associated with excess cash flows [see Jensen (1986)]'*. In contrast, the pecking 
order theory states that dividend payments would be negatively influenced by free cash
''Furthermore, Easterbrook (1984) argues that paying dividends can reduce agency 
costs such as monitoring cost and risk aversion of managers, by keeping firms in the market 
for consistent monitoring.
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flows. Myers and Majluf (1984) claim that "firms can build up financial slack by 
restricting dividends when investment requirements are modest" [ibid., p. 220). Since in 
this study the current free cash flows are generated from the current accounting 
numbers including current dividends, an interpretation of this result should resort to the 
stronger implication whether current dividends are affected by the previous free cash 
flows (see Appendix A). Thus, the dynamic results provided here are not consistent 
with agency theory argument or pecking order theory explanation.
A final interpretation concerns beta, size, and industry effects The negative 
correlation between dividends and beta indicates that firms with higher betas pay lower 
dividends to reduce the costs of external financing, since higher betas are associated 
with higher leverage [Rozeff (1982)1, or that firms distribute dividends to affect the 
systematic risk of their stocks (Dyl and Hoffmeister (1986)1. Since the variables related 
to firm size are adjusted explicitly, it should be noted that the differences in dividend 
policy between small firms and large firms are substantial. The evidence in this study 
seems to indicate that the larger firms would choose to increase dividend payments 
rather than to retain earnings for their faster growth. The tests in this study find no 
evidence for the systematic relationship between dividend policy and industrial 
classification, inconsistent with Michel (1979).'* This suggests that industrial 
variations in dividend policy might be attributable to firm size effects.
E. Chapter Summary and Conclusions 
The purpose of this study was to analyze empirically a wide scope of dividend 
determinants including investments, earnings, debts, free cash flows, firm size, beta, 
and industry classification.
'*Higgins (1972) also found no pervasive industry effects, whereas Dhrymes and Kurz 
(1967) documented significant inter industry differences.
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First, time-series cross-sectional regressions using an error components model 
were estimated to test for the contemporaneous relationships among these potential 
dividend determinants. It was found that a firm's dividend payments are significantly 
related to earnings, free cash flows, beta, and firm sizes. Perhaps the most important 
finding is that dividends are not influenced by investments and debts, consistent with 
the irrelevance proposition of Miller and Modigliani (1961). It was also shown that 
industry effects might not exist or might be only the manifestation of firm size effects.
Second, in order to examine the dynamic relationships among these variables, 
the VAR analyses were conducted. The variance decompositions and impulse response 
analyses consistently demonstrated that dividends have significant short-run effects on 
itself, whereas other variables have no dynamic effects on dividends. It also appears 
that dividends have short memory of their own past and that other variables have no 
dynamic interactions with dividends.
Finally, on the basis of both time-series cross-sectional regression results and 
vector autoregression analysis, a lagged-dividend model was developed and tested for 
robustness. The evidence suggests that dividend payments are heavily influenced by a 
series of past dividend payments, as well as contemporaneous factors such as earnings 
and free cash flows.
Although this lagged-dividend model may be exploratory, it sheds some light on 
the dividend puzzle. One fruitful avenue for future study may be to apply a structural 
vector autoregression which simultaneously incorporates both contemporaneous 
variables and dynamic factors.
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Chapter 4. DIVIDENDS, TAXES, AND PORTFOLIO CHOICES:
The Effects of the Tax Reform Acts of 1984 and 1986
A. Introduction
There have been two hypotheses relating to the ex dividend anomalies: (1) the 
tax-effect hypothesis; and (2) the short-term trading hypothesis. The tax-effect 
hypothesis predicts that positive excess returns are observable on the ex-dividend day 
because of the dividend tax compensation. This tax-effect hypothesis is first put forth 
by Elton and Gruber (1970). Later, Booth and Johnston (1984), Elton, Gruber and 
Rentzler (1984), Barclay (1987), and Michaely (1991) follow this reasoning. These 
authors find that, on ex-dividend day, stock prices fall by less than the dividend per 
share. These authors ascribe this phenomenon to the tax premium effect in which 
investors receive a compensating premium for the dividend tax penalization. This tax- 
effect hypothesis is questioned by Eades, Hess, and Kim (1984) and Grinblatt, Masulis, 
and Titman (1984), who find abnormal ex-dividend returns in non-taxable distributions.
The short-term trading hypothesis predicts that positive excess volumes are 
observable around the ex-dividend day because there exist tax-induced arbitrage 
opportunities around the ex-dividend day for short-term traders, given transaction costs. 
Miller and Scholes (1982), Kalay (1982), and Karpoff and Walkling (1988, 1991) argue 
that short-term traders have incentives to eliminate arbitrage profits up to their marginal 
transaction costs around the ex-dividend day. Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1983) and 
Grammatikos (1989) investigate major tax reform options to support the short-term 
trading hypothesis. Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986) and Fedenia and Grammatikos 
(1991) also examine excess trading volume around ex-dividend day and conclude that 
short-term traders are responsible for abnormal volume behavior, or that portfolio 
rebalancing takes place.
68
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The motivation for this essay is that empirical tests of these two hypotheses in 
the context of the 1984 and 1986 tax reforms show mixed evidences (e.g., Michaely 
(1991) vs. Robin (1991)1', and that these two hypotheses seem to be mutually 
exclusive and neither is sufficient to fully explain the ex dividend anomalies.
The purposes of this essay are; (1) to test the tax-effect hypothesis and the 
short-term trading hypothesis in the context of the 1984 and 1986 tax reforms; and 12) 
to propose an alternative approach to the ex-dividend anomalies that fully incorporates 
both the tax-effect hypothesis and the short-term trading hypothesis. In this essay, a 
portfolio approach is proposed that predicts some observable differences between cum 
and ex-dividend efficient portfolios based on a portfolio selection model to investigate 
the impact of the tax reform acts on portfolio choice.
Portfolio theories allowing for personal taxes are divided into two camps.
Brennan (1970) and Elton and Gruber (1978) derive a post-tax CAPM model, and Long 
(1977) posits a positive portfolio theory on an after-tax basis. Talmor (1985) and 
(amoureux (1990), on the other hand, take a normative portfolio approach, which 
allows for the differential taxation of dividends and capital gains.
The portfolio model used in this essay follows that of Long (1977). Long (1977) 
focuses on the implausibility of the efficiency equivalence hypothesis between before- 
and after-tax portfolios, noting that (1) "the after-tax efficiency gains to shifts from 
portfolios that are before tax efficient to portfolios that are after-tax efficient" (Long 
(1977), p. 251; (2) "the greater the risk level of a before-tax efficient portfolio, the less 
efficient it is on any given after-tax basis" {ibid., p. 411; and (3) "any given before-tax 
efficient portfolio will be less efficient on an after-tax basis the greater the difference 
between an investor's marginal tax rates on dividends and capital gains" [ibid., p. 41 ].
^Michaely (1991) teste the effect of the 1986 Tax Reform Act on ex- 
dividend day stock prices. He finds no support for the tax-effect 
hypothesis. In contrast, Robin (1991) argues the impact of the 1986 Tax 
Reform Act on ex-dividend day returns, which is consistent with the tax- 
effect hypothesis.
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The portfolio approach has several advantages over the other approaches. First, 
it fully incorporates the tax-effect since it differentiates between the tax treatments of 
dividends and capital gains. Second, it also encompasses the short-term trading 
hypothesis, according to which the firm's clientele is shifting and portfolio revisions are 
taking piace. Third, but not least, the portfolio approach is an equilibrium model with 
appropriate measures of risk and return, rather than a model of behavior.
The remainder of this essay is organized as follows. Section B summarizes major 
changes in the Tax Reform Acts of 1984 and 1986. Section C reviews the extant 
models that have been advanced to explain the ex-dividend anomalies, and testable 
hypotheses are derived in light of the 1984 and 1986 tax reforms. Most important, this 
section presents the portfolio approach that is proposed to explain effectively the 
portfolio choices around the ex-dividend day. Section D describes the data and 
methodology used in the tests. Section E reports the results of the tests of the tax- 
effect hypothesis, the short-term trading hypothesis, and the proposed portfolio 
approach, and it explores the usefulness of the portfolio approach in explaining ex- 
dividend behavior. Section F summarizes and concludes the essay.
8. The Tax Reform Acts of 1984 and 1986
1. Th9 Têx Raform Act of 1984
Under the Tax Reform Act of 1984, the required holding period for the dividend 
income tax deduction is extended from 16 to 46 days (see Panel A of Table 4.1). A 
taxable corporation owning stock of another corporation is allowed a deduction of 
85%: gf fffg 3n,ount of any dividend received for that stock. At the same time, the 
corporation can claim the loss resulting from the ex-dividend decline in value of the 
stock as a short-term capital loss. This short-term loss can be used to offset an 
unrelated short-term gain otherwise taxable at the maximum corporate tax rate of 46%.
^The Tax Reform Act of 1986 decreased the dividend income tax 
deduction from 85% to 75%.
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TmW# 4.1: Sununarv of Chong## in th# T#x Roform Acts of 1984 #nd 1986
Pantl A : 1984 Tax Reform Act
Topic Before 1984 TRA After 1984 TRA
( Corporation» i 
Holding period for 
85% dividends received 
tax deduction
16 days 46 days
PaneiB: 1986 Tax Reform Act
Topic Before 1986 TRA After 1986 TRA
1987 After 1987
( Individuais )
Tex Rate Schedule Min 11% 
Max 50% 
(IS bracketsi
Min 11% 
Max 38.5% 
(5 bracketsi
Min 15% 
Max 28% 
(2 brackets)
Dividends Taxable at income tax rate 
(11% 50%)
Dividend Exclusion of )  100 
(Of $ 200)
Taxable at 
income tax 
rate (11 %, 
38.5%) 
Repealed
Taxable at 
income tax 
rate (15%, 
28%) 
Repealed
Capital Gains Taxable at income tax rate Taxable at 
the lower rate 
of income tax 
rate and 28% 
(11%. 28%)
Taxable at 
Income tax 
rate (15%, 
28%)
60% capital gains deduction Repealed Repealed
* The highest effective capitai 
gains tax rate ■ 20% (50% x 
40%)
* The lowest effective capitai 
gains tax rate -  4.4% (11 % 
x40%)
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Tabla 4.1 (cont'd)
I Corporationa I 
Income Tax Rate Schedule
Dividende
* The highest effective 
dividend tax rate
* The lowest effective 
dividend tax rate
Capital Gains
Min 15%
Max 46%
IS brackets)
Taxable at income tax rate
85% dividends received 
deduction
6.9% (46% X 15%) 
2.25% (15% X 15%)
Taxable at special corporate 
capital gains tax rate (Max 
28%)
Min 15% Min 15%
Max 34% Max 34%
(3 brackets) (3 brackeu)
Taxable at Taxable at
income tax income tax
rate rate
80% dividend 70% dividend
received received
deduction deduction
6 .8 %  (34% X 10.2% (34%
20%) x30%)
3.0% 115% X 4.5% (15% X
20%) 30%)
Taxable at Taxable at
income tax income tax
rate (15%, rate (15%,
34%) 34%)
Note : I , ) denotes (Minimum rate. Maximum rate).
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If the corporation is financing an Investment in stock with borrowed funds, interest on 
the indebtedness is also tax deductible. These corporations are generally taxed at a 
lower rate on dividends than on capital gains.
2. Th» T»x R»fom Act of 1986
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 equalizes the nominal taxation of dividends and 
capital gains for individuals (see Panel 8 of Table 4.1). 8efore passage of the act, 
capital gains were preferantially taxed compared to dividends for individuals. Individuals 
we;e taxable in as many as 15 brackets at rates thst varied from 11% to 50%.
Dividends were taxable at these ordinary income tax rates for individuals and were 
subject to a maximum tax rate of 50% after deducting dividend exclusion'. Individuals 
cc'uld deduct 60% of net capital gain from gross income. As a result, the highest tax 
rate applicable to an individual's net capital gain was only 20% (the 50% maximum 
individual tax rate times the 40% of net capital gain).
Under the 1986 Tax Reform Act, the tax schedule was reduced to two brackets 
of 15% and 28%, starting with the 1988 tax year. There was a blended rate schedule 
for 1987 with five brackets, varying from 11% to 38.5%. The dividend exclusion for 
individuals also was repealed. Thus, dividends were taxed at a maximum rate of 38.5% 
in the transitional year of 1987 and were subject to a maximum rate of 28%' after 
1987. In addition, the 1986 Tax Reform Act repealed the 60% net capital gain 
deduction for individuals. Beginning in 1987, capital gains are taxed at a maximum rate 
of 28%. Thus, for 1988, there was no longer a distinction between dividends and 
capital gains for tax purposes for individuals.
The 1986 Tax Reform Act generally reduced corporate tax rates, but did not 
change much the effective tax differentials between dividends and capital gains. Prior to 
the 1986 tax reform, corporations were taxed from a five bracket tax schedule ranging
^The exclueion amount# were $100 of dividend# received by an 
individual atockholder and $200 by a married couple.
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from 15% to 46%. Since corporations could deduct 85% of the dividends received, 
corporate income from dividends was taxed at a maximum effective rate of 6.9% (the 
15% of dividends received times the maximum corporate tax rate of 46%). Capital 
gains were also subject to a preferential tax rate of 28% under prior law.
Under the 1986 Tax Reform Act, the old-five bracket corporate tax schedule was 
reduced to a three-bracket schedule varying from 15% to 34%, effective July 1987. 
Under the new act, the 85% dividends received deduction is lowered to 70%. Thus, the 
highest effective tax rate of corporate dividends received became 10.2% (the 30% of 
dividends received times the maximum corporate tax rate of 34%). Also, prior law's 
preferential 28% tax rate for corporate capital gains is repealed. Beginning in July 
1987, corporate capital gains were taxed as ordinary income and were subject to a 
maximum tax rate of 34%.
C. Models and Testable Hypotheses 
7. Th* Tax-£ff$et Modxt
The tax-effect model was originally proposed by Elton and Gruber (1970). Later, 
Kalay (1982), Booth and Johnston (1984), Barclay (1987), and Michaely (1991) pursue 
this logic.
Elton and Gruber (1970) suggest that the ex-dividend price of a stock should be 
related to the tax rates of marginal stockholders. Because dividends and capital gains 
are taxed at different rates, they argue that the equilibrium market price on the ex- 
dividend day should reflect the value of dividends vis-a-vis capital gains to the marginal 
stockholders.
Elton and Gruber (1970) assume long-term traders who have already decided to 
sell a stock around the ex-dividend day. These investors' only concern is whether to sell 
before or after the ex-dividend day. In case of no transaction costs, the long-term trader 
would be indifferent between selling the stock cum- or ex-dividend day as long as the 
returns are the same.
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- E{P„] -r,(E[P„] -Phy) *D{1-Ta) . (« 1)
where
Pan is the cum dividend stock price,
P* is the ex-dividend stock price,
Ptuy is the stock purchase price,
T, is the marginal tax rate on capital gains, and
Ty is the marginal tax rate on dividends.
Equation (4.1) means that the cum-dividend return would be equal to the ex- 
dividend return. This can be rearranged as
(4*2)
D 1-T,
Equation (4.2) is the market pricing model for long-term traders on the ex- 
dividend day. In equilibrium, market ex-dividend prices will be determined such that a 
stockholder with different tax rates on dividends and capital gains will be indifferent as 
to selling the stock between before or after the ex-dividend day.
Rewriting equation (4.2) as the ex-dividend rate of return yields;
^
where P., is the ex-dividend rate of return and d = is the dividend yield.
Equation (4.3) implies that observable positive excess returns on ex-dividend day 
reflect the higher taxes imposed on dividends compared to taxes on capital gains. 
According to the tax-effect hypothesis, investors receive a compensating premium for 
the tax penalization of dividends relative to capital gains on the ex-dividend day. This 
means that the effective taxation of dividends and capital gains alone determines the 
price behaviors on the ex-dividend day. Thus, it is predicted that the higher the 
effective dividend tax vis-a-vis the capital gains tax, the greater the dividend tax 
penalization and the larger the positive excess returns on ex-dividend day.
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Hypothesis 1 : Prior to the 1986 tax reform act, significant positive excess returns wifi 
be observed on the ex-dividend day.
Since the 1986 Tax Reform Act eliminated the nominal tax differentials between 
dividends and capital gains, the tax-effect hypothesis predicts that positive excess 
returns observed on the ex-dividend day will be drastically reduced to an insignificant 
level during the post-1986 tax reform period compared to the pre-1986 tax reform 
period. However, as Booth and Johnston (1984) argue, capital gains may be still treated 
more favorably than dividends because individual investors can maintain a tax timing 
option on the realization of capital gains. The effects of tax deferral of capital gains may 
prevent excess ex-dividend returns from being completely eliminated.
Hypothesis 2; During the post-1986 tax reform period, average ex-dividend day excess 
returns will be significantly lower than those during the pre-1986 tax reform period, or 
will not be different from zero.
Based on the tax-effect hypothesis, many studies document the positive 
correlation of the price change-to-dividend ratio with the dividend yield of the stock, 
suggesting dividend clientele effects. For example, Elton and Gruber (1970) report that 
with the exception of the first and eighth decile, the price change-to-dividend ratio 
increases up to one as the dividend yield rises. Since price change-to-dividend ratios 
less than unit would indicate low dividend yields and high implied tax rates, thay argue 
that low dividend yields should attract stockholders in higher tax brackets. This can be 
interpreted in terms of excess returns on the ex-dividend day. If dividend clientele 
effects exist, negative correlations between the dividend yields and ex-dividend day 
excess returns will be observed. Marginal stockholder's tax rates can be inferred from 
those ex-dividend day excess returns.
Hypothesis 3: There will be negative correlation between dividend yields and ex- 
dividend day excess returns. This correlation will be weakened between the pre-1986 
tax reform period and the post-1986 tax reform period.
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2. Short'Ttm Tnding Modal
The short-term trading model was first studied by Miller and Scholes (1982) and 
Kalay (1982). Later, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1983, 1986) and Karpoff and Walkling 
(1988, 1991) follow this reasoning.
Miller and Scholes (1982) argue that every investor can exploit profit 
opportunities from short-term trading, buying cum-dividend shares and selling them ex- 
dividend. Such trading activities are expected to eliminate the excess returns on the ex- 
dividend day, but transaction costs may well prevent the excess returns from being 
completely eliminated.
The marginal short-term traders include taxable corporations and dealers in 
securities. Since individual short-term traders may be constrained by the capital loss 
limitations and the wash-sale rules. Miller and Scholes (1982) point out that corporations 
eligible for the dividend income deduction or security dealers taxable at the same rates 
on dividends and capital gains could have incentives to make short-term trading profits. 
Taxable corporations are considered to have stronger incentives to make short-term 
trading than dealers (see Grammatikos (1989)1.
Generally, the preferential tax treatment of dividends relative to capital gains 
may give a taxable corporation strong incentives for short-term trading around the ex- 
dividend day. As a result, a corporation can buy shares of stock in another corporation 
cum-dividend in anticipation of receiving a dividend that will be eligible for the dividend 
income tax deduction. The corporation may finance the cost of an investment in stock 
with borrowed money having tax-deductible interest. After receiving the dividend, the 
corporation can sell the stock ex-dividend and claim any capital loss from selling the 
stock at a lower ex-dividend price in order to offset other capital gains taxable at a 
higher tax rate.
However, this dividend tax deduction is not allowed unless the corporation holds 
the dividend-paying stock for a minimum period. This implies that firms must expose 
themselves to capital loss risks in order to exploit the dividend tax deduction. The 1984
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Tax Reform Act requires that. In order to qualify for the dividend tax deduction, the 
corporation must hold the stock for a minimum 46 days instead of a minimum 16 days, 
as allowed under prior law. This change increases the capital loss risk of firms that 
engage in short-term trading around the ex-dividend day. Since the risk exposure of 
short-term traders has been increased after the 1984 tax reform,* it is predicted that 
excess returns on the ex-dividend day for those short-term traders will increase during 
the post-1984 tax reform period, compared to the pre-1984 tax reform period. 
Hypothesis 4: Average ex-dividend day excess raturns will increase significantly during 
the post-1984 tax reform period compared to the pre-1984 tax reform period.
Since the 1984 tax reform increased the exposure risks of short-term traders, 
these increased risks would be reflected in the stock prices for several short-term trading 
days before and after the ex-dividend day, in addition to on the ex-dividend day during 
the post-1984 tax reform period.
Hypothesis 5; During the post-1984 tax reform period, more significant excess returns 
will be observed for several trading days before and after the ex-dividend day than in the 
pre-1984 tax reform period.
In order to investigate the effects of the 1986 Tax Reform Act on short-term 
trading, the marginal rates of substitution of dividends and capital gains between the 
pre- and post-1986 tax reform period are compared. Under the 1986 Tax Reform Act, 
the effective corporate tax differentials between dividends and capital gains increased 
slightly to 23.8% (the capital gains tax rate of 34% minus the effective dividend tax 
rate of 10.2%| from 21.1% (the capital gains tax rate of 28% minus the effective 
dividend tax rate of 6.9%) during the pre-1986 tax reform period. Michaely (1991) 
argues that, because the marginal rate of substitution between dividends and capital 
gains for highly taxed investors decreased from 1.72 in 1986 to 1.36 in 1987, the 
corporation's incentives to engage in short-term trading is reduced. The calculation.
*The rieke of ahort-term traders due to the 1984 Tax Reform Act 
seemed to be largely systematic (see Brown and Lunmer (1986) and 
Grammatikos (1989)].
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however, shows that the marginal rate of substitution between dividends and capital 
gains during the post-1986 tax reform period is 1.29 (>  (1-0.0691/(1-0.28)1, whereas 
the marginal rate of substitution between dividends and capital gains during the post- 
1986 tax reform period is 1.36 ( -  (1-0.1021/(1-0.34)). It is argued that, if one allows 
for transaction costs, the 1986 Tax Reform Act seems to give little incentive to firms to 
engage in tax-induced short-term trading (see Appendix B).
3. Th* Portfolio Mod*!
The basic idea of our portfolio approach is that the ex-dividend value of stock 
and short-term trading behavior around ex-dividend day should reflect the trade off 
between risk and expected return. Long (1977) argues that 'the portfolio dividend yield 
choice cannot be made independently of the risk-expected return trade-off, since the 
dividend yield of all mean variance efficient portfolios is a linear function of their non- 
diversifiable risk' [Kalay (1982), p. 1059). Thus, it can be inferred that any change in 
the risk-expected return trade-off induced by the tax reforms should be manifested in the 
portfolio choices around the ex-dividend day.
To show how a change in the risk-expected return trade-off is reflected in 
portfolio choices around the ex-dividend day, we construct efficient portfolios using the 
portfolio selection model posed by Markowitz (1952, 1959, 1981) as follows:
Maximize
subject to
where
i f  is the transpose of the expected return vector,
W is the optimal portfolio weights,
V is the covariance matrix of the returns,
A is the investor's risk aversion parameter, and
A and b form a set of linear constraints.
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Efficient portfolio frontiers are computed. First, the efficient portfolio frontiers 
between the pre-1984 tax reform period and the post-1984 tax reform period are 
compared. Within each period, cum-dividend efficient frontiers and ex-dividend efficient 
frontiers are compared. Short-selling is not considered because it seems not to be a 
common practice around the ex-dividend day [see Karpoff and Walkling (1991)1. While 
the portfolio optimization model is usually applied in a normative context, our approach 
is positive.
Before the 1984 tax reform, the required holding period for dividend income tax 
deduction was 16 days. It is predicted that cum-dividend portfolios will be more 
efficient than ex-dividend portfolios, because ex-dividend portfolios are more likely to be 
restricted from trading. This inference is supported by the arguments of Green (1980), 
Grundy (1985)*, and Pogue (1970)*.
Hypothesis 6: Cum-dividend portfoiio efficient frontiers wiil dominete ex-dividend 
portfolio efficient frontiers.
The 1984 Tax Reform Act extended the minimum holding period for the dividend 
income tax deduction to 46 days. Since trading may be restricted for longer ex-dividend 
days, the efficiency gap between cum-dividend efficient frontiers and ex-dividend 
efficient frontiers will be greater after the 1984 tax reform than before the 1984 tax 
reform.
Hypothesis 7: The efficiency gap between cum-dividend efficient frontiers and ex- 
dividend efficient frontiers will be greater during the post-1984 tax reform period than 
during the pre-1984 tax reform period.
^Green (1980) and Grundy (1985) suggest the delay and acceleration 
hypothesis. Their arguments state that trading activities around the 
ex-dividend day will concentrate on the last cum-dividend day and on the 
first ex-dividend day, because investors attempt to avoid costs 
resulting from delaying or accelerating transactions relative to their 
optimum trading date for tax purposes.
^Pogue (1970) reports that portfolios restricted from trading are 
dominated by the unrestricted portfolios.
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Long (1977) shows that, with the Introduction of Income taxation, Investors will 
demand after tax efficient portfolios and that those portfolios may not be before tax 
efficient. For example, under the tax regime that raised the dividend tax rate relative to 
the capital gains tax. Investors are Induced to revise their portfolio holdings to reflect 
these differential taxes. That sort of portfolio revision will result in an efficiency gain at 
the new tax rates because It will Increase the expected after tax return at the new tax 
rates and reduce the after tax variance of the portfolio [see Long (1977)1. Accordingly, 
the after tax efficient portfolio will dominate any given before-tax efficient portfolio on 
an after tax basis. Furthermore, Long predicts that the potential after tax efficiency 
gains due to moving from the before-tax efficient portfolio to the dominating after-tax 
frontier will be smaller If the correlations between two portfolios are large.
The 1986 Tax Reform Act decreased the dividend tax rate from a maximum rate 
of 50% to 2 8 % \ According to the Long's hypothesis. Investors are motivated to 
restructure their portfolio holdings to reflect the new tax rates. However, since the 
dividend tax rate under the 1986 Tax Reform Act has decreased. It Is expected that the 
expected after-tax return will decrease and that the after-tax variance will Increase at 
the new tax rates  ^(see Long (1977), p. 391. Thus, It Is predicted that the after-1986 
tax reform efficient portfolios will be dominated by the before-1986 tax reform efficient 
portfolios.
Hypothesis 8: The efficient portfolio frontier under the pre-1986 tax reform period will 
dominate the efficient portfolio frontier under the post-1986 tax reform period.
^Unless the individual must pay a 5% surcharge, he is taxed at a 
maximum rate o f 28%.
decrease in the expected return is to be anticipated in the tax- 
effect hypothesis since the tax premiums decrease with a drop in 
dividend tax rate, but its variance is not considered in the tax-effect 
hypothesis.
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D. Data and Mathodology
1. Data
The sample for this study consists of taxable dividend payment events by all 
firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and American Stock Exchange 
(AMEX) from January 1, 1980, to December 31, 1989. In order to examine the effects 
of the Tax Reform Acts of 1984 and 1986, the entire sample period is divided into three 
periods: Period I (1/1/80-7/17/84), Period II (7/18/84-12/31/86), and Period III (1/1/87- 
12/31/89).
To obtain uncontaminated samples, the following selection criteria are used for 
each sub-sample period. First, dividend payments whose ex-dividend date are less than 
57 trading days apart from the ex-dividend date of the previous dividend payment are 
deleted. Second, a dividend payment is not considered unless its ex-dividend dates are 
at least 11 trading days away from the declaration (announcement) date of the 
subsequent dividend payment. Third, dividend payment events that have missing 
returns during the period -  including the estimation period and the test period (-55 
through +10 days relative to the ex-dividend day) -  are eliminated.
After this screening, the sample consists of the following dividend payments and 
number of firms by subperiods: 21,334 dividend payments by 2,000 firms in Period I; 
10,335 dividend payments by 1,643 firms in Period II; and 12,525 dividend payments 
by 1,776 firms in Period III. These are reported in Table 4.2. All dividend payments are 
taxable, and cash dividends are paid in U.S. dollars. Stock dividends and splits are 
excluded. Quarterly dividends, semi annual dividends, and annual dividends are 
identified by the CRSP distribution type codes 1232, 1242, and 1252, respectively.
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Tabla 4.2: Numbar of Sainpia Rmia and Oividand Paymant Evants 
from January 1980 throuQh Oaeambar 1989
Data wara obtainad from tha CRSP daily maatar tapa. AH dividand paymanu ara taxabla and 
cash dividands paid in U.S. dollars. CRSP distribution typa codas ara 1232 for quarterly 
dividends. 1242 for semi annual dividands, and 1252 for annual dividands.
Period 1
11/1/80 - 7/17/84)
Period II
17/18/84 - 12/31/86)
Period III
(1/1/87 • 12/31/89)
Numbar of Firms 2,000 1,643 1,776
Numbar of Dividand 
Payment Evants 21,334 10,335 12,525
Dividand Types
Quarterly dividand 20,622 9,912 11,851
Sami annual 
dividand
292 121 148
Annual dividand 82 37 33
Others 338 265 493
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2. Mtthodahgy
The mean mdjueted return model* Is used to calculate ex dividend day excess 
returns. Trading days 55 through 11 relative to the ex dividend day are used as the
estimation period. The 11 day window (-5 through +5) surrounding the ex dividend day
is observed to teat the null hypothesis of zero excess returns for the ex dividend period.
The excess returns'* around the ex dividend day are estimated as follows.
ER,t • R,t - AR,. (4.6)
where
ERj, is the excess return for stock i on day t,
Rh is the realized return for stock i on day t. and
AR| is the arithmetic average of stock i’a returns in
the estimation period.
The average excess return is defined as the cross-sectional mean of excess 
returns. Average standardized excess returns are calculated as the cross-sectional mean 
of excess returns standardized by the standard deviation, which were estimated for the 
period from -55 through -11 days before the ex-dividend day. Average market-adjusted 
excess returns are computed as the average excess returns adjusted by the CRSP 
equally-weighted index for day t. Following Brown and Warner (1985), the t-test 
statistic is calculated as the ratio of the mean excess return to its standard deviation 
that is estimated from the time-series of mean excess returns."
^Brown and Warner (1985) report that the mean-adjusted return 
methodology ie ae powerful as the market model.
^^Since the analyeia of ex-dividend excess returns carries much 
leas risk of heteroscedaaticity than that of the price change-to- 
dividend ratios, exceae returns are examined in this study. The 
heteroacedaeticity problem in the price change-to-dividend ratios can 
be adjusted by the GLS estimation as fades, Hess and Kim (1984) 
euggeated (see Michaely (1991)].
^^Thia procedure takes care of croaa-eectional dependence in excess 
returns.
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E. Empirical Rasuitt
1. D»$e/iptivm R»suttM of Conslstoney
Tabla 4.3 shows the characteristics of the taxable dividend-paying firms for the 
period January 1980 to December 1989. In order to investigate dividend clientele 
effects, four quartile dividend yield groups are examined: Group 1 for stocks with a 
dividend yield less than or equal to 0.7%; Group 2, between 0.7% and 1.1%; Group 3, 
between 1.1% and 1.5%: and Group 4. higher than 1.5%.
Consistent with the tax-effect hypothesis, the average ex-dividend day excess 
return for the overall period is significantly different from zero at the 1 % level. In Panel 
A of Table 4.3, the average ex-dividend day excess return for the overall period is 
0.1126%, with a standard deviation of 2.219%. The overall sample also has an 
average dividend yield of 1.09%, with a standard deviation of 0.9%.
For the overall sample in Panel A of Table 4.3, the negative correlation between 
ex-dividend day excess returns and dividend yields is observed only in the high-yield 
groups. The dividend yield quartiles 3 and 4 have mean yields of 1.29% and 2.21 %, 
respectively, whereas they have respective ex-dividend day excess returns of 0.2371 % 
and 0.0357%. This indicates that there is a clientele effect present in the high dividend 
yields group. Similar trends are observed within each sub-period.
Panel B of Table 4.3 shows the descriptive results for Period I (1/1/80-7/17/84), 
which serves as the control period before the Tax Reform Acts of 1984 and 1986. The 
average ex-dividend day excess return is 0.1376%, which is significantly different from 
zero at the 1% level. The sample for Period I has a dividend yield mean of 1.15%, with 
a standard deviation of 0.7%.
During Period II (7/18/84-12/31/86), the 1984 Tax Reform Act was in effect, 
but the 1986 Tax Reform Act had not yet materialized. Since the 1984 Tax Reform Act 
extended the required holding period for dividend income tax deduction from 16 to 46 
days, the risk of corporate short-term traders has been increased. It is therefore 
predicted that, following the increased risk, excess returns for short-term traders will
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Tabto 4.3: Sampl* Dncriptiva Statistics on Ex-dividsnd Day 
Excasa Ratums and Dividand YWda
Tha mean and tha standard deviation for ax-dividand day axcass returns and dividend yields are 
calculated for tha overall sampla. tha sub-period samples, and tha quartila dividend yield groups. 
Quartiia dividand yield groups are formed as follows: Group 1 for stocks with a dividend yield 
less than or equal to 0.7%, Group 2 batwoan 0.7% and 1.1%, Group 3 batwaan 1.1% and 
1.5%, and Group 4 higher than 1.5%. All estimâtes of tha mean axcass return are significantly 
different from zero at tha 1 % lavai. The dividand yields are calculated by dividing the dividend 
par share by tha cum-dividend price. Tha market values of tha firm are computed by multiplying 
the cum-dividand price par share by tha numbar of shares outstanding.
Panel A : Overall Panod (1/1/80-12/31/891
Total Dividand Yield Quartile
Evants
1
( lAW 1
2 3 4
( High )
Numbar of
Dividand
Payment
Evants
(parcantagal
44194
(100%)
15709
(35.55%)
11312
(25.60%)
7055
(15.96%)
10118
(22.89%)
Ex-dividand 
Day Excess 
Returns (%)
Moan 0.1126** 0.0410 0.2032 0.2371 0.0357
Standard
deviation
2.219 2.359 2.184 2.158 2.061
Dividend
Yields
Mean 0.0109 0.0043 0.0089 0.0129 0.0221
Standard
deviation
0.009 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.012
Market Value 
of the Firm 
( $ mil. )
Mean 1889 1640 1478 1637 2910
Standard
deviation
39885 35254 8272 11582 69644
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Table 4.3 (cont'd)
Panel B: Period 1 (1/1/80-7/17/84)
Total Dividend Yield Quartile
Events 1
(Low)
2 3 4
( High )
Number of 21334 6139 5341 4407 5447
Dividend
Payment (100%) (28.78%) (25.04%) (20.88%) (25.53%)
Eventa
(percentage)
Ex-dividand
Day Exceaa
Returns (%)
Mean 0.1378" •0.0092 0.1389 0.2781 0.1898
Standard 2.329 2.551 2.335 2.302 2.057
deviation
Dividend
Yields
Mean 0.0115 0.0044 0.0090 0.0129 0.0208
Standard 0.007 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.008
deviation
Market Value
of the Firm
( $ mil. )
Mean 921 875 855 1025 1178
Standard 11809 8793 3782 4333 20298
deviation
Panel C : Period II (7/18/84-12/31/86)
Total Dividend Yield Quartile
Events 1
( Low )
2 3 4
( High )
Number of 10335 4424 3024 1428 1461
Dividend
Payment (100%) (42.81%) (29.26%) (13.80%) (14.14%)
Events
(percentage)
Ex-dividend
Day Excess
Returns (%)
Mean 0.1518" 0.1287 0.2881 0.2130 •0.1204
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Standard
deviation
1.962 2.085 1.836 1.715 2.030
Oividand
Yialda
Mean 0.0092 0.0044 0.0088 0.0127 0.0214
Standard
deviation
0.007 0.002 0.001 0.001 0 009
Market Value 
of the Firm
( $ mil. )
Mean 2837 1937 1505 2359 8782
Standard
deviation
71192 44447 5309 23765 170961
Panel D: Period III (1/1/87* 12/31/89 )
Total Dividend Yield Quartile
Events
1
( Low )
2 3 4
( High )
Number of
Dividend
Payment
Events
(percentage)
12525
(100%)
5146
(41.09%)
2947
(23.53%)
1222
(9.76%)
3210
(25.63%)
Ex-dividend 
Day Excess 
Returns (%)
Mean 0.0379 0.0256 0.2329 0.1246 *0.1545
Standard
deviation
2.225 2.341 2.229 2.082 2.061
Dividend
Yields
Mean 0.0114 0.0043 0.0088 0.0128 0.0247
Sundard
deviation
0.013 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.019
Markat Value
of the Firm 
( $ mil. 1
Mean 2755 2536 2579 3003 3171
Standard
deviation
•  9  CixeeeSdaMAM
34623 44749
H  M em  1 9 L
14361 6707 35515
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increase. Consistent with this expectation, the average ex dividend day excess return 
increased from 0.1376% during control Period I (1/1/80-7/17/84) to 0.1518% during 
Period II (7/18/84-12/31/86). This is shown in Panel C of Table 4.3. Dividend clientele 
behavior is also observed in the high dividend yield quartiles of Period II, which is the 
same pattern as that observed during Period I.
Panel D of Table 4.3 presents the results observed during Period III (1/1/87- 
12/31/89) when the 1986 Tax Reform Act had been implemented. Since the 1986 Tax 
Reform Act has equalized the tax rates on dividends and capital gains, the tax-effect 
hypothesis predicts that the price change-to-dividend ratio would be statistically 
indistinguishable from one, or that excess return on the ex-dividend day would not be 
statistically different from zero. During the post-1986 tax reform period, ex dividend 
day excess return decreased to 0.0379%, which is not different from zero at the 1 % 
level of significance. This finding is consistent with the tax-effect hypothesis.
2. Ttst of Short-Torn Troding Hypothosis
Table 4.4 reports non-parametric test results of equality of ex-dividend day 
excess returns between the two periods. In Panel A of Table 4.4, ex-dividend day 
excess returns during the pre-1984 tax reform act are compared to those during the 
post-1984 tax reform act. Average ex-dividend day excess returns after the 1984 tax 
reform increased to 0.1518% from 0.1376% before the 1984 tax reform, and this 
increased percentage seems to be statistically different from zero at the 1 % level. This 
finding is similar to what Grammatikos (1989)" obtained by using the raw price ratios 
on the ex-dividend day. Grammatikos reports that the overall raw price ratio declines
my beet Itnowledge, cramnetikos (1989) is the only study that 
deals with the effects of the 1984 Tax Reform Act.
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Taw* 4.4: Nflfi-Paramatrie Tnta of EquaUty of Ex-Oividand Day Exeau Ratuma 
Batwaan tho Two Pariods
Savaral non-paramatric ttatittica ara ahown to taat tha null hypothatit that tha distribution of 
ax-dividand day axcats ratuma haa tha sama location paramatar across tha two diffarant 
pariods. Statistics basad on tha rank scoras of axcuss ratuma across the two pariods ara tha 
Wilcoxon test. Median test. Van dor Waardan test, and Savage test. Statistics basad on tha 
empirical distribution function ara tho Kolmogorov Smimov test and Kuipar test. Average ax- 
dividand day axcasa returns ara cakulatad as tha maan diffaranca batwaan tha obsarvad ratum 
on tha ax-dividand day and tha simpla avaraga of aach stock's daily ratuma in tha estimation 
period (-55 through -11). Tha Wilcoxon, Madian, Van dar Waardan, and Savage Tests ara 
simpla linaar rank statistics that ara powerful for location shifts. Tha Kolmogorov test and the 
Kuiptar test ara statistics basad on tha empirical distribution functions.
Panel A : Tha Pra-1984 Tax Reform Period Versus tha Post-1984 Tax Reform Period
Dividend 
Yield Quartila
Avaraga Ex-divldand 
Day Exeau Ratum
P-Valua of Non-paramatric Test
Safora tha 
1984 Tax 
Reform
After tha 
1984 
Tax 
Reform
Wilco­
xon
Test
Medi­
an
Test
Van
dar
Waar­
dan
Test
Sava­
ge
Test
Kolm­
ogor­
ov
Test
Kuip­
ar
Test
1
( Low I
-.0092 .1287 .0001 .0003 .0001 .3452 .0001 .0001
2 .1389 .2881 .0005 .0106 .0003 .3432 .0001 .0001
3 .2761 .2130 .6294 .1981 .9665 .0028 .0048 .0001
4
( High )
.1896 -.1204 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001
Sample Maan .1378 .1518 .1739 1821 .1479 .0001 .0001 .0001
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Tabit 4.4 (corn'd)
Panal B : Tha Pra-1986 Tax Raform Pariod Vartus tha Post-1986 Tax Raform Pariod
Dividand 
Yiald Quartila
Avaraga Ex-dividand 
Day Excaaa Ratum
P-Valua of Non-paramatric Taat
Bafora tha 
1986 Tax 
Raform
Attar tha 
1986 
Tax 
Raform
Wilco­
xon
Taat
Madi­
an
Taat
Van
dar
Waar­
dan
Taat
Sava-
0«
Taat
Kolm­
ogor­
ov
Teat
Kuip­
ar
Taat
1
I Low 1
.1287 .0256 .0242 .0330 .0217 .0608 .0549 .2254
2 .2881 .2329 .2471 .2493 .2178 .8050 .2771 .2812
3 .2130 .1246 .2216 .1190 .2600 .4563 .0595 .0467
4
( High )
-.1204 -.1545 .8969 .6889 .8735 .8886 .9661 .8384
Sampla Maan .1518 .0379 .0001 .0005 .0001 .0028 .0001 .0006
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from 0.877 before the 1984 tax reform (1/1/75-7/17/84) to 0.796 after the 1984 tax 
reform (7/18/84-12/31/85).'*
To further examine the changes in behavior of short-term traders between the 
before- and after-1984 tax reform period, uniiice Grammatilcos (1989), we compare 
excess returns for 11 days (-5 through + 5) surrounding the ex-dividend day. Because 
the 1984 Tax Reform Act was intended to expose short-term traders to more risic, 
increased exposure would be reflected in the return behavior for several short-term 
trading days before and after the ex-dividend day in addition to on the ex-dividend day 
during the post-1984 tax reform period. According to the short-term trading hypothesis, 
it is furthermore predicted that there more significant excess returns will occur for 11 
days surrounding the ex-dividend day during the post-1984 tax reform than prior to the 
1984 tax reform.
Table 4.5 shows average excess returns around the ex-dividend day for the 
period from January 1, 1980, to July 17,1984, before implementation of the 1984 and 
1986 Tax Reform Acts. The 11-day window for average excess return has two 
significant excess returns at the 5% level, when the ex-dividend day excess returns are 
excluded.
Tables 4.6 and 4.7 present average excess returns around the ex-dividend day 
for Period II (7/18/84-12/31/86) and Period III (1/1/87-12/31/89) when the 1984 Tax 
Reform Act was in effect. During the latter period, the 1986 Tax Reform Act was also 
in effect, but it does not appear to have affected the behavior of short-term traders (see 
Section C.2 for discussion). Consistent with expectation, the 11-day window for 
average excess returns during Period II (7/18/84-12/31/86) has six significant excess 
returns on each side, excluding the ex-dividend day, two of which are significant at the 
1% level. During Period III (1/1/87-12/31/89), the 11-day window for average excess
^^GranmatDcce (1989) compares a sample of 19,407 observations 
before the 1984 tax reform (1/1/75-7/17/85) and a sample of 2,032 
observations after the 1984 tax reform (7/18/84-12/31/85). His samples 
appear to be seriously unbalanced.
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TaWt 4.5: Avtrag* Excms RMwnt Around Iho Ex>Oividmd Day 
for tha Pariod January 1, 1980. to July 17.1984
Tha «ample pariod contains 21.334 dividend payment event*. Average excess returns are 
calculated as tha mean difference between the observed return on day t and the simple average 
of each stock's daily ratuma in the estimation period 1-55 through -11). Average 
standardized excess returns are the average excess returns standardized by the standard 
deviation which was estimated during the same estimation period. Average market-adjusted 
excess returns are the average excess ratuma adjustad by the CRSP equally waighted index 
for day t. Tha t-tast statistic is the ratio of the mean excess retum to its standard deviation that 
was astimatsd from the time-serle* of mean excess retums. * * ’  and '  denote the average 
excess retums significantly different from zero at the 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively.
Trading Day Average
Excess
Return
(%)
t-value Average
Stand­
ardized
Excess
Retum
(%)
t-value Average
Markat-
Adjust-ed
Excess
Retum
{%)
t-value
-5 -.0544 -1.53 -.0160 -1.13 .0032 0.19
-4 -.0124 -35 -.0032 -.20 .0065 0.39
3 .0820 2.31* .0362 2.27* .0332 2.00
-2 .0349 0.96 .0254 1.59 .0207 1.24
-1 .0645 1.62 .0429 2.69* .0995 5.99**
Ex-Dividend Day .1375 3.67" .0741 4.66** ;1651 11.14**
+ 1 .0360 1.01 .0150 0.94 .0556 3.36*
+ 2 .0525 1.46 .0319 2.00 .0326 1.97
+ 3 .0344 .97 .0224 1.41 -.0233 -1.40
+ 4 .0547 1.54 0327 2.05* .0041 .25
+ 5 -.0763 -2.15* -.0279 -1.75 -.0121 -.73
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Tibto 4.6: Avtrigc Excm*  R#lwm# Around 6w Ex-OivMond Day 
for Iho Poriod July 18.1984. to Docombor 31,1986
Tho sompio poriod comoino 10.335 dividond poymont ovonts. Avorago oxcou ratuma ara 
calculatad aa tha maan diffaranea batwaan tha obaarvad ratum on day t and tha almpla average 
of each atock'a daily retuma in tha aatimatkm period i-S5 through -11). Avaraga 
atandardizad axcaaa returns are tha avaraga axcaaa ratuma atandardizad by the atandard 
daviation which waa eadmatad during the aama eadmation period. Average market edjuated 
exceaa ratuma ara the avaraga axcaaa ratuma adjuatad by the CRSP equally weighted index 
for day t. Tho t taat atadadc la the redo of tha maan axcaaa ratum to ita atandard daviadon that 
waa aadmatad from tha dma-tarlas of maan axcaaa ratuma. and " " denote the average 
exceaa retuma aignificandy diffarant from zero at the 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively.
Trading Day Avaraga
Exceaa
Return
t-value Average
Stand­
ardized
Exceaa
Retum
1%)
t-value Average
Markat-
Adjuat-od
Excaaa
Ratum
(%)
t-value
-5 .0219 -.74 .0014 .09 .0055 0.28
-4 .0755 2.56* .0530 3.48* .0684 3.51"
-3 .0754 2.55* .0448 2.95*' .0435 2.23*
-2 .0896 3.04** .0678 4.46** .0436 2.23*
-1 .1004 3.40** .0751 4.94* .0722 3.70"
Ex Dividend Day .1517 5.14** .0905 5.95" .1840 9.43"
+ 1 .0775 2.63* .0516 3.39" .0695 3.56"
+ 2 .0624 2.11* .0378 2.48* .0655 3.36"
+ 3 .0469 1.59 .0356 2.34" -.0092 -.47
+ 4 .0551 1.87 .0449 2.95" -.0159 -.82
+ 5 -.0125 -.42 .0007 .05 .0010 .05
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Tabla 4.7: Avaraga Excaaa Ratuma Around tha Ex«Dlvldand Day 
for tha Pariod January 1.1987. to Daeambar 31.1989
Tha aampla pariod containa 12.525 dividand payment avants. Avaraga axcasa retums ara 
caiculatad as tha maan diffaranca batwaan tha obsarvad ratum on day t and tha simple avaraga 
of aach atock's daiiy ratums in tfia aatimation pariod ( 55 through -11). Avaraga 
atandardizad axcasa ratums ara tha avaraga axcasa ratums standardized by tha standard 
daviation which waa aatimatad during tha aama estimation pariod. Avaraga markot-adjustad 
axcasa ratums ara tha avaraga axcasa ratums adiustad by tha CRSP aquaily waightad indax 
for day t. Tha t-tast statistic ia tha ratio of tha maan excess ratum to its standard daviation that 
was estimated from tha tims-sarias of maan excess ratums. *** and '  denote tha average 
excess ratums significantly different from zero at tha 0.05 and 0.01 level, raspactivaly.
Trading Day Average
Excess
Retum
(%)
t-value Average
Stand­
ardized
Excess
Ratum
(%)
t-valua Avaraga
Marfcat-
Adjust-ed
Excess
Ratum
(%)
t-valua
-5 .0163 .39 -.0137 -.86 .0545 2.14*
-4 .1021 2.43" .0431 2.72" .0418 1.64
-3 .1096 2.6 V .0495 3.13" .0383 1.50
-2 .1377 3.27" .0660 4.17" .0529 2.08’
-1 .0862 2.05* .0403 2 54" .0420 1.65
Ex-Dividand Day .0378 .90 .0077 .49 .0586 2.30*
+ 1 .0021 .05 -.0082 .52 .0046 .18
+ 2 .0534 1.27 .0214 1.35 -.0168 -.66
+ 3 .0274 .65 .0206 1.30 -.0290 -1.14
+ 4 .0169 .40 .0021 .13 -.0807 -3.17"
+ 5 .0011 .03 -.0346 -2.18' -.0194 -.76
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retums has four cum dividand significant excess returns, one of which is significant at 
the 1 % level. During periods II and III, excess returns appear to concentrate cum- 
dividend because ex-dividend days are likely to include a minimum period of 46 days in 
which short-term traders are restricted to trade by the law. Thus, these evidences 
strengthen the short-term trading hypothesis, predicting that the 1984 Tax Reform Act 
would have an effect on the retum behavior of short-term traders.
When average excess retums are compared for 11 days, including the ex- 
dividend day between the before- and after-1984 Tax Reform Act by using average 
standardized excess return and average market-adjusted excess return, the evidence is 
consistent with what is shown in Tables 4.5, 4.6, and 4.7.
3. Têst of TêX’Effoct HypothoMis
Panel B of Table 4.4 compares average excess returns on the ex-dividend day 
between the before-1986 tax reform period and the after-1986 tax reform period. 
Consistent with the predictions of tax-effect hypothesis, the overall average excess 
return on the ex-dividend day has decreased from 0.1518% before the 1986 tax reform 
to 0.0379% after the 1986 tax reform. The null hypothesis of equality of excess 
retums between the two periods is rejected at the 1 % level of significance in five non- 
parametric tests.
Further comparisons of ex-dividend day excess retums between the before- and 
after-1986 tax reform are reported in Tables 4.5, 4.6, and 4.7. Tables 4.5 and 4.6 
show that, prior to the 1986 tax reform, average standardized excess returns and 
market-adjusted excess retums, as well as average raw excess returns, are positively 
significant at the 1 % level. However, as shown in Table 4.7, after the 1986 tax reform, 
both average raw excess retum and average standardized excess retum are reduced to 
levels which are not different from zero at the 1 % and 5% levels of significance. Only 
market-adjusted ex-dividend excess returns are significant at the 5% level.
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These results lend strong support to the tax-effect hypothesis. It can be also 
inferred that the differential taxation of dividends and capital gains has affected the 
market valuation of the stock on the ex-dividend day.
Previous studies'* on the ex-dividend day effects of the 1986 Tax Reform Act 
show mixed evidences. For example, Michaely (1991) reports that the 1986 average 
price change-to-dividend ratio is not significantly lower than those of 1987, rejecting the 
tax interpretation of the ex-dividend day behavior. In contrast, Robin (1991)'* argues 
that the ex-day abnormal retums declined between the pre 1986 tax reform period and 
the post-1986 tax reform period. The finding reported is consistent with Robin's.
Dividend clientele effects imply the negative correlation of ex-dividend day 
excess returns with dividend yields. In order to examine possible changes in the 
dividend clientele behavior, we regress ex-dividend day excess retums on dividend yields 
for the pre- and post-1986 tax reform periods. The cross-sectional regression results are 
reported in Table 4.8. The coefficient estimates of dividend yields are negative and 
statistically significant at the 1 % level for each of the two periods. A comparison of the 
coefficient estimates of dividend yields between the pre- and post-1986 tax reform 
periods shows an interesting evidence on the change of dividend clientele behavior.
Since the coefficient estimate of dividend yields changed from -8.6683 during the pre- 
1986 tax reform period to -4.9625 during the post-1986 tax reform period, it can be 
argued that the 1986 Tax Reform Act somewhat discouraged dividend clientele behavior 
of investors through the equalization of differential tax rates on dividends and capital 
gains.
^^Other ceeearchera who examine the effect of the 1986 Tax Reform 
Act include Bolster. Lindsey and Mitrusi (1989). and Fedenia and 
Grammatikos (1991). Bolster. Lindsey and Mitrusi (1989) compare trading 
behavior in December 1986 and January 1987 and find that relative 
trading volume was considerably high in December 1986 for long-term 
winners. Fedenia and Grammatikos (1991) argue that the abnormal volume 
around the ex-dividend day increased in 1986 and 1987.
^^Robin (1991) was published at the end of June 1991, at which time 
this study had been completed.
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T#W# 4.8: Crou-SaetioiMl ftosrtsaion of Ex*Oivid«nd Day 
Exeoss Ratuma on Dividand Yialda
EXRET, -  dto + YIELD, + (
Panal A : Bafora tho 1986 Tax Raform ( 7/18/84 . 12/31/861
EXRET, -  0.2320 • 8.6683 YIELD,
(7.085"! (-3.015")
Adi-R: -  0.0008 
Obaarvationa » 10331
Panal 8 : Aftar tha 1886 Tax Raform ( 1/1/87- 12/31 /88 I
EXRET, -  0.0848 • 4.8625 YIELD, 
(3.562! (-3.203"!
Adj-R* -  0.0007 
Obaarvationa -  12521
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4. Portfolio Tost RosuNs
This section reports the main results of this study. The aim of this section is to 
investigate the relationships between the ex-dividend retum behavior and the ex-post 
portfolio choice around the ex-dividend day in the context of the 1984 and 1986 tax 
reforms. Previous studies [see, e.g., Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986) and Fedenia and 
Grammatikos (1990)1 which advance or support the short-term trading hypothesis seem 
to have followed a model of trading volume behavior, rather than an equilibrium model 
with appropriate measure of risk and return. Thus, the portfolio approach is taken in this 
section.
Following Long's (1977) argument, it is expected that the Tax Reform Acts of 
1984 and 1986 have effects on the risk-expected retum trade-off of investors, which 
wiil be reflected in the portfolio choices around the ex-dividend day. To show possible 
changes in the risk-expected retum trade-off of investors, efficient portfolios around the 
ex-dividend day are constructed, using Markowitz's (1959) portfolio selection model. 
Assuming that investors take into account short-term trading activities after the 
announcement of dividend payments, the windows between the dividend announcement 
day and the ex-dividend day should be chosen for their portfolio selection." In order 
to examine the effects of the 1984 Tax Reform Act, which increased minimum holding 
period from 16 days to 46 days, it would be reasonable to consider the windows from 
-25 to 2 days and from +2 to +25 days relative to the ex-dividend day." To this 
aim, securities are omitted whose ex-dividend dates are 25 or fewer trading days apart
l*Thia can alao iaolata potential bias due to the proximity of the 
announcement day and the ex-dividend day [see Bades, Hess and Kim 
(1984)).
^^To test for the sensitivity, these procedures can be repeated on 
different windows. However, these efforts may be restricted by the 
inefficiencies of the extant portfolio selection algorithms in dealing 
with sparse matrices. Nevertheless, we repeated the window of 10 days, 
which yielded consistent results with our conclusion reported in this 
study.
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Tabic 4.9: Comparison of Cum Dividand and Ex-Oividand Efficient Portfoiioa batwaan 
lha Pra 1984 Tax Raform Pariod and tha Pott-1984 Tax Raform Pariod
For aach pariod, 14 comar portfoiioa baginning tha portfolio with maximum ratum ara 
shown. Portfolio revisions around tha ax-dividand day ara axpactad to concantrate on 
about 14 stocks bacausa pravious rasaarchaa indicate that an avaraga 
of 14 firms want ax-dividand on aach day Isaa Karpoff and Walkling i1990)1, or an 
avaraga number of 18.6 stocks arc in aach ax-day portfolio isaa Eadas, Hess and Kim 
(1984)1. 4 is tha investor's trada-off batwaan risk and ratum. E(r,| and o ', denote tha 
axpactad ratum and standard daviation of tha portfolio, raspactivaly.
Panal A ;: Bafora tha 1984 Tax Raform
Cum-dividand Efficient Portfolio
Comar
Portfolio
À E(r^ Average Portfolio 
Dividand Yiald
1 509.34 1.8578 14.7883 0.0058
2 108.87 1.8480 7.5858 0.0043
3 40.92 1.8359 8.0959 0.0082
4 29.78 1.8204 5.0044 0.0082
5 25.18 1.8128 4.5735 0.0058
6 24.17 1.8097 4.4324 0.0085
7 12.05 1.5518 2.3280 0.0088
8 7.42 1.5088 1.4898 0.0071
9 8.78 1.4998 1.3814 0.0078
10 2.87 1.4197 0.5895 0.0071
11 2.84 1.4188 0.5835 0.0073
12 2.29 1.3985 0.4805 0.0070
13 1.90 1.3784 0.3881 0.0078
14 1.87 1.3745 0.3808 0.0078
Avaraga Sampla Dividand Yield -  0.0112
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Tabla 4.9 (corn'd)
Ex*dividand Efliciant Portfolio
Comar
Portfolio
À EIrp Avaraga Portfolio 
Dividand Yield
1 51.76 1.6605 16.1636 0.0042
2 47.84 1.6469 15.03 0.0043
3 45.26 1.6356 13.79 0.0045
4 12.69 1.4372 2.2959 0.0049
5 4.32 1.3432 0.6966 0.0066
6 3.22 1.3229 0.5436 0.0076
7 2.96 1.3151 0.4955 0.0067
8 2.42 1.2960 0.4032 0.0062
9 1.76 1.2771 0.3155 0.0067
10 1.46 1.2667 0.2612 0.0076
11 1.05 1.2496 0.2366 0.0060
12 0.91 1.2411 0.2216 0.0066
13 0.66 1.2362 0.2164 0.0065
14 0.60 1.2260 0.1994 0.0116
Avaraga Sampla Dividand Yiald -  0.0112
Panal B : Aftar tfw 1964 Tax Raform
Cum-dividand Efficiant Portfolio
Comar
Portfolio
À Elr.) Avaraga Portfolio 
Dividand Yield
1 10.06 2.0560 6.9653 0.0017
2 9.11 2.0257 6.3653 0.0033
3 6.79 2.0066 6.0236 0.0029
4 6.34 1.6460 3.6240 0.0024
5 5.44 1.7666 2.9234 0.0029
6 3.51 1.6577 1.7510 0.0031
7 2.94 1.6147 1.4739 0.0062
a 2.92 1.6124 1.4604 0.0057
9 2.14 1.5054 0.9197 0.0057
10 1.74 1.4392 0.6633 0.0056
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Tabla 4.9 (cant'd)
11 1.18 1J348 0.3589 0.0056
12 1.12 1.3218 0.3291 0.0055
13 0.94 1.2857 0.2547 0.0060
14 0.73 1.2340 0.1684 0.0057
Avaraga Sampla Dividand Yiald -  0.0097
Ex-dividand Efficiant Portfdie
Comar
Portfolio
À Elr.) a*-. Avaraga Portfolio 
Dividand Yiald
1 118.63 1.8080 22.3477 0.0246
2 26.31 1.7007 6.7936 0.0135
3 8.85 1.6105 3.6198 0.0119
4 6.40 1.5583 2.8245 0.0101
5 4.95 1.4910 2.0612 0.0097
6 4.73 1.4808 1.9627 0.0084
7 3.59 1.4089 1.3645 0.0081
8 3.47 1.4015 1.3129 0.0085
9 1.47 1.2328 0.4792 0.0077
10 1.26 1.1988 0.3866 0.0076
11 1.10 1.1714 0.3219 0.0077
12 1.07 1.1656 0.3093 0.0078
13 0.71 1.1001 0.1931 0.0081
14 0.61 1.0700 0.1534 0.0077
Avaraga Sampla Dividand Yiald -  0.0097
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from the declaration dates. As a result, 445 securities are obtained from the Period I 
(1/1/80-7/17/84) sample, 224 securities from the Period II (7/18/84-12/31/86) sample, 
and 224 securities from the Period III (1/1/87-12/31/89) sample.'* These sub-samples 
satisfy the previous selection criteria used for the uncontaminated sample.
Rrst, to consider the effects of the 1984 Tax Reform Act that increased the risk 
exposure of short-term traders, cum-dividend and ex-dividend efficient frontiers were 
compared for the pre-1984 tax reform period and the post-1984 tax reform period in 
Table 4.9. For each period, 14 corner portfolios beginning the portfolio with maximum 
return are shown. Portfolio revisions around the ex-dividend day are expected to 
concentrate on about 14 stocks because previous studies indicate that an average of 14 
firms went ex-dividend on each day [see Karpoff and Walkling (1990)1, or an average 
number of 18.6 stocks are in each ex-day portfolio (see Eades, Hess and Kim (1984)1.
Consistent with expectations, cum-dividend efficient portfolios dominate ex- 
dividend efficient portfolios during the before- and after-1984 tax reform periods.'* 
Furthermore, the efficiency gap between these cum- and ex-dividend efficient portfolios 
expanded during the after-1984 tax reform period, compared to those during the before- 
1984 tax reform period. Graphic comparisons of cum- and ex-dividend efficient frontiers 
for the two periods are shown in Rgures 4.1 and 4.2. These results indicate that the 
portfolio choices around the ex-dividend day cannot be independent of the risk-expected 
retum trade-off of traders as suggested by Long (1977).
Table 4.9 reports further evidence on the clientele behavior of investors. A 
comparison of average portfolio dividend yields for the cum- and ex-dividend efficient 
portfolios indicates that the average portfolio dividends yields for the before-1984 tax
this study, portfolios ars formed by selecting securities (not 
observations) that meet our selection criteria.
l*The statistical tests to be conducted are the joint tests of 
equality of mean and variance between the cum- and ex-dividend efficient 
portfolios. Non-parametric tests rejected the null hypothesis at the 
1% level. For the pre-1984 TRA period, P-values of Wilcoxon tests were: 
0.0033 for mean, 0.7227 for variance. For the post-1984 TRA period, P- 
values of Wilcoxon tests were: 0.0009 for mean, 0.8030 for variance.
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reform period and those for the cum-dividend efficient portfolio after the 1984 tax 
reform show an increasing trend as comer portfolios increase. The average portfolio 
dividend yields for ex-dividend efficient portfolios after the 1984 tax reform show a 
decreasing trend vis-a-vis corner portfolios. An interpretation of this result is as follows. 
If tax-induced short-term trading occurs, investors are likely to have more interest in the 
capital loss deduction and financial cost deduction than in the dividend income tax 
deduction because dividends are progressively taxed. Thus, tax-induced short-term 
traders are motivated to choose first the securities with lower dividend yields in their 
portfolios. However, if tax-induced trading is restricted such as in the ex-dividend days 
after the 1984 tax reform, there will exist only dividend capture traders who are 
interested in buying and selling securities to strip dividends for purposes other than 
taxes."
Next, to examine the effects of the 1986 Tax Reform Act, cum-dividend efficient 
portfolios between the before-1986 tax reform period and the after-1986 tax reform 
period were compared. Table 4.10 presents evidence that the after-1986 tax reform 
portfolios are dominated by the before-1986 tax reform portfolios.'' This result is also 
depicted in Figure 4.3. These findings are consistent with Long's prediction that, under 
the new tax regime, investors are motivated to restructure their portfolio holdings to 
reflect the new tax rates.
Another evidence reported in Table 4.10 is that the average portfolio dividend 
yields, vis-a-vis corner portfolios, show an increasing trend during the before-1986 tax 
reform period, whereas those average portfolio dividend yields display a stabilized trend 
during the after-1986 tax reform period. Prior to the 1986 Tax Reform Act, long-term 
traders are taxable at the unfavorable tax rates on dividends relative to capital gains.
20on# exemple is Jepsnese life insurance companies which have a 
preference for dividend income because of regulatory laws. These 
traders have incentives to buy the securities with higher dividend 
yields.
21p-.values of Wilcoxon tests ttere: 0.0009 for mean, 0.9S33 for 
variance.
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T#W# 4.10: Comparison of Cum4Nvidand Efficlsnt Portfolios botwssn tha Pro 1986 
Tax Raform Poriod snd tha Post 1988 Tax Raform Poriod
For aach poriod, 14 comar portfolios boginninp tho portfolio with maximum rotum ara 
shown. Portfolio ravisions around tho ox-dividond day sro oxpoctod to concantrate on 
about 14 stocks bacausa pravious rasaarchaa indicsto that an avorago 
of 14 firms wont ox*dividond on aach day (sao Karpoff and Walkling (1990)1, or an 
avaraga numbar of 18.6 stocks ara in aach ax-day portfolio Isaa Eadas, Haas and Kim
(1984)1. 4 ia tha invaator'a trada-off batwaan risk and ratum. Eir,) and o ', danote tha 
axpactad ratum and atandard daviation of tha portfolio, raspactivaly.
Panel A : 8afore tha 1986 Tax Raform
Comer
Portfolio
À Eir^ o*. Avaraga Portfolio 
Dividand Yiald
1 10.06 2.0580 6.9853 0.0017
2 7.45 1.96S1 5.4289 0.0033
3 5.81 1.8833 4.2903 0.0039
4 3.94 1.7234 2.7321 0.0034
5 3.93 1.7222 2.7225 0.0071
6 3.66 1.6809 2.4094 0.0100
7 3.49 1.6539 2.2156 0.0095
8 1.79 1.3788 0.7628 0.0084
9 1.57 1.3411 0.6360 0.0082
10 1.55 1.3357 0.6193 0.0081
11 1.39 1.3013 0.5181 0.0076
12 1.32 1.2844 0.4724 0.0071
13 1.12 1.2367 0.3561 0.0066
14 1.04 1.2173 0.3141 0.0070
Avaraga Sampla Dividand Yiald -  0.0069
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Tabto 4.10 (corn'd)
Pant) B ; Aftar tha 1986 Tax Raform
Comar
Portfolio
À E(r^ Avaraga Portfolio 
Dividand Yiald
1 98.07 1.3623 8.2020 0.0010
2 79.99 1.3552 6.9429 0.0031
3 41.78 1.3312 4.0240 0.0027
4 29.39 1.3204 3.2535 0.0030
5 9.67 1.2996 2.4411 0.0032
6 7.51 1.2621 1.7967 0.0033
7 2.71 1.1482 0.6336 0.0031
8 1.11 1.0414 0.2255 0.0032
9 0.98 1.0246 0.1905 0.0031
10 0.88 1.0089 0.1614 0.0031
11 0.71 0.9813 0.1175 0.0032
12 0.40 0.9202 0.04S7 0.0038
13 0.36 0.9127 0.0441 0.0038
14 0.31 0.9034 0.0379 0.0038
Avaraga Sampla Dividand Yiald -  0.0069
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Thus, during the before-1986 tax reform period, dividend clientele effects would be in 
effect, and it is expected that the negative correlations between dividend yields and 
excess returns will be observed during the same period.
After the 1986 tax reform, since investors are taxed at the same rates on 
dividends and capital gains, the clientele incentives of long-term traders are predicted to 
be reduced. Average portfolio dividend yields are expected to maintain a stable trend 
regardless of the expected return during the post-1986 tax reform period. These 
evidences are consistent with the expectations of the dividend clientele hypothesis. As 
shown in Table 4.10, the average portfolio dividend yields show a negative correlation 
with the expected portfolio return during the before-1986 tax reform period, but the 
dividend yields seem to have remained at a stable level during the after-1986 tax reform 
period.
F. Chapter Summary and Conclusions 
This essay has investigated the portfolio choice around the ex-dividend day in 
the context of the 1984 and 1986 tax tax reforms. The fundamental idea has been to 
show that the ex-dividend value of stock and short-term trading behavior around ex- 
dividend day reflect the trade-off of risk and expected return. The 1984 Tax Reform Act 
increased the risk exposure of tax-induced short-term traders by extending the minimum 
holding period for the dividend income tax deduction. The 1986 Tax Reform Act 
decreased the dividend tax rate from a maximum rate of 50% to 28%, leading to the 
equalization of the tax rates on dividends and capital gains. By comparing the efficient 
portfolio frontiers between the pre-tax reform period and the post-tax reform period, an 
attempt was made to report changes in the risk-expected retum trade-off around the ex- 
dividend day. These portfolio results was related to the excess retum behaviors on 
which the 1984 and 1986 Tax Reform Acts are also documented to have had effects.
First, the effects of the 1984 and 1986 Tax Reform Acts on the retum behaviors 
around the ex-dividend day were documented. Numerous studies have evidenced the
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tax-effect hypothesis and the short-term trading hypothesis. But, although these tax 
reforms provide a valuable laboratory to test the extant hypotheses, researches on the 
ex-dividend day effects of the 1984 and 1986 Tax Reform Acts are very few (see 
Grammatikos (1989), Michaely (1991), and Robin (1991)], and ihei, evidences are 
mixed. The findings in this essay are consistent with both the tax-effect hypothesis and 
the short-term trading hypothesis, and they are summarized as follows:
(1) Prior to the 1986 tax reform, significant positive excess returns were 
observed on the ex-dividend day.
(2) During the post-1986 tax reform period, average ex-dividend excess returns 
were not different from zero at the 1 % significance level.
(3) There existed the negative correlationships between the dividends yields and 
ex-dividend day excess retums, which correlationships decreased from the 
pre-1986 tax reform period to the post-1986 tax reform period.
(4) Average ex-dividend day excess returns increased significantly during the 
post-1984 tax reform period compared to the pre-1984 tax reform period.
(5) During the post-1984 tax reform period, more significant excess returns 
were observed for 11 trading days before and after the ex-dividend day 
compared to the pre-1984 tax reform period.
The second approach is quite different from the extant researches, and more 
insightful and consistent conclusions were obtained. The cum- and ex-dividend efficient 
portfolios between the pre-1984 tax reform period and the post-1984 tax reform period 
were compared. The following evidences to support the short-term trading hypothesis 
were found.
(6) Cum-dividend efficient portfolios dominate ex-dividend efficient portfolios.
(7) The efficiency gap between cum-dividend efficient frontiers and ex-dividend 
efficient frontiers has expanded more during the post-1984 tax reform period 
than during the pre-1984 tax reform period.
Following Long's (1977) argument, it was predicted that the 1986 Tax Reform Act
would decrease the expected after-tax return ar the new tax rates and increase the
after-tax variance of the portfolio. Consistent with this expectation, it was found that
(8) The efficient portfolio frontier during the post-1986 period was dominated 
by the efficient portfolio frontier during the pre-1986 tax reform period.
This result may be interpreted as a tax effect since the tax premiums decrease with an
decrease in dividend tax rate. But, the variance as risk factor was not considered in the
tax-effect hypothesis.
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To conclude, the evidence of excess return behaviors supports the existence of 
both tax effects and short-term trading around the ex-dividend day. These tax effects 
and short-term trading are not mutually exclusive, but co-existent as long as short-term 
trading is tax-induced. They interact to have an impact on the ex-dividend return and 
volume behaviors. This finding was effectively supported by portfolio test results. The 
portfolio approach is quite advantageous over the extant approaches, because this 
approach incorporates the tax effect as well as the short-term trading. The portfolio 
approach also seems to be useful in explaining dividend capture tradings by Japanese 
life insurance companies that are not tax-induced.
It can be emphasized that the ex-dividend behavior cannot be understood 
independently of the risk-expected return trade-off. Also, it is proposed that this 
portfolio approach can be best used in many branches of corporate finance ( for 
example, turn of-the-year effect ) where portfolio revisions are considered to occur.
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Chapter 5. EMPIRICAL TESTS OF DIVIDEND SIGNALLING
A. Introduction
With the publication of Bhattacharya’s (1979) paper, the notion of imparting 
information to shareholders with dividends (commonly referred to as dividend signalling) 
has attracted considerable attention among financial economists. Miller and Rock
(1985), John and Williams (1985), Ambarlsh, John and Williams (1987), Ofer and 
Thakor (1987), and Williams (1988) develop formal models of dividend signalling. These 
models, in general, derive their logic from the seminal papers of Spence (1973, 1974) 
and Riley (1979). Miller's (1987) suggestion of the stringency conditions necessary for 
a sustainable dividend signalling equilibrium notwithstanding, signalling still appears to be 
one of the most catching theories explaining the enigma of dividend policy.
The need and opportunity for dividend signalling arise when corporate agents 
know more about the quality of the enterprise than outsiders do. Outside investors 
cannot differentiate the quality of projects undertaken by the firm, because they lack 
perfect information. They value and buy the firm's stock at the price that corresponds 
to only the average quality of projects. Agents (insiders) are the only ones who know 
the true prospects facing their firms and attempt to optimize the objective function of 
shareholders. Thus, they have an incentive to avoid the adverse selection problem by 
informing the market of their firms' excellence. They can signal high cash flows of the 
firm by paying higher dividends. If this signal is correctly received in the market, the 
shares of the firm will command a higher price, benefiting the firm and its shareholders.
The intention of this essay is to test empirically the John and Williams' (1985) 
(JW) signalling equilibrium model. This test is conducted in order to provide statistical 
evidence of the empirical validity of this model. The reason for selecting this model is 
twofold. First, the authors argue that their model is empirically testable and provide 
guidelines for such testing. Second, this model is a reasonable representation, given its
113
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assumption, of the class of models dealing with the so-called signalling equilibrium.
There are no reports of large-scale empirical validation of this model.
The JW model implies that, in equilibrium, corporate insiders with superior 
information about future cash inflows have incentives to signal by distributing larger 
dividends "... if and only if the demand for cash by both their firm for investment and 
their stockholders for liquidity exceeds the internal supply of corporate cash" (John and 
Williams (1985). p. 1055]. The signal of larger dividends results in raising the stock 
price and consequently benefiting the firm or current shareholders when selling the 
stock. The JW model attempts to explain why many firms prefer paying dissipative' 
dividends to repurchasing shares, while others simultaneously pay dividends and float 
new shares. It is argued that the payment of dividends is induced by clienteles of 
stockholders who demand current cash. Their model also shows the explicit relationship 
among the announcement effect, dividends and eu/n-dividend market values.
The intrinsic weakness of signalling models is the difficulty in testing empirically 
their theoretical implications. JW assert that their signalling model is testable, because 
the cross-sectional impact of dividends is a simple function of observable variables. In 
the remainder of this chapter, the task of empirical testing is undertaken. Section B 
contains a more detailed discussion and review of the JW model. In Section C. the 
methodology is explained. Section D describes the data and the proxy variables.
Section E presents tests, results, and their interpretation. Section F is a summary, 
including some guidelines for future research.
^The term "dissipative" originates from electrical engineering and 
it means wasteful. In this context, the meaning is that shareholders 
are required to bear the cost of this signal via their tax liability for 
the dividend payments.
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B. Th# John and WBliams Modal
1. Nênativ»
JW develop a signalling equilibrium with dividends and single dissipative costs 
(i.e., a proportional tax on dividends). In this model, capital gains are not taxable, and 
issuing, retiring, and trading shares are costless. According to their arguments, if the 
liquidity demand by the firm and its current shareholders exceeds internally generated 
funds, corporate insiders are motivated to distribute a taxable cash dividend and to 
reveal to outside investors the present value of their firm's future cash inflows. This 
signal would result in raising the stock price to the benefit of current stockholders.
JW attempt to explain why some firms do not pay dividends, whereas others do 
and simultaneously sell new shares to investors. In order to finance investments, a firm 
must either issue new shares or retire fewer outstanding shares. Similarly, to collect 
cash for personal use, current stockholders must sell their shares. In either case, 
stockholders have to suffer some dilution in their fractional ownership of the firm. 
Current shareholders desire to reduce this dilution on corporate or personal accounts. 
Hence, insiders, in the best interest of current stockholders, are inclined to convey 
favorable information by paying a taxable dividend. Recognizing the relationship 
between favorable information and the value of the shares, the market bids up the stock 
price, mitigating stockholders' dilution.
The JW signalling equilibrium is achieved because the marginal gain from paying 
dividends is balanced against the marginal cost incurred by the tax on dividends. In the 
market, stocks with marginally larger dividends are rewarded with a premium, 
compensating current shareholders for the dissipative effect of their marginal income 
tax. For firms paying marginally smaller dividends, the dead weight cost of dividends 
outstrips the marginal benefit of reducing ownership dilution. In the JW model, an 
optimal signalling equilibrium is reached when firms with favorable inside information 
distribute higher dividends than firms without favorable information.
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2. Tntêblu Analytkêl Modêl^
The JW formulation of the problem is anchored in the idea that "... other things 
equal, firms which pay dividends have clienteles of stockholders who demand current 
cash-such as widows, senior citizens, and financial institutions" {ibid., p. 1065). This 
concept is expressed mathematically, as a signalling equilibrium. In their Equation 13.' 
Accordingly,
D{X) ~ ' l M a x { I - C * L .  0 ) ' L a ( X ) ]  fOT X i  L. (5.1)t
where D(X) is the optimal dividend at equilibrium;
t is the constant, marginal personal tax rate on the dividend;
I is investment;
C is corporate cash available;
L is the liquidity need of the shareholders; and
X is the present value of the future cash inflow.
Equation (5.1) implies the equilibrium condition. At equilibrium, the dividend increases
proportionally to the logarithm of the stock's present value, a property common to
many other dividend models. Equation (5.1) also shows that dividends decrease in t and
C and increase in L. The key element of this model is that the firm has exogenous
demand for liquidity by its shareholders. The demand for cash is the catalyst to signal
via dividends. This, in turn, implies that the boundary condition for insiders to pay
dividends is
C g I + L;
that is, the demand for cash from the firm is non negative.
HYPOTHESIS #1 : Demand for liquidity causes dividend payments.
^The models in this section build on John and Williams (1985) to 
posit JW'e model correctly for this testing.
^The mathsmatical proof of JW's models is presented in Appendix C 
of this dissertation.
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When insiders optimally declare a dividend (when shareholders' demand for cash, 
I + L, exceeds the firm's internal supply of cash. Cl, the model for the marginal effect 
of announced increments in dividends becomes*
P'[D{X)] .  g. - L  ^ for X > 1 and C < I*L,
(5.2)
where P'(D(X)] is the change in the stock price with respect to the announced
increments in dividends; and 
P[D(X|] is the firm's market price.
According to equation (5.2), increments in dividends around the optimal 
dividend, D(X), increase the market price of the firm's stock, P(D(X)1, measured cum- 
dividend. This means that larger dividends are associated with cum-dividend higher 
stock prices. This is not surprising, since prior to JW many scholars document dividend 
announcement effects both theoretically and empirically. However, unlike many event- 
study models, a testable implication of the JW signalling model is that the stock price is 
an increasing function of the signal.*
HYPOTHESIS #2: The equilibrium price is monotonie in the dividend signel (or
private information!.
Another aspect of JW's equation is that its cross-sectional effects are explicit 
and empirically testable. JW contend that in equilibrium, shareholders are compensated 
by a proportional increment in their stock price for incurring the proportional cost of 
personal taxes levied on dividends. Equation (5.2) makes the cross-sectional 
connection for dividend announcement effects on stock prices, market value of the firm, 
tax rate, dividends, and shareholders' demand for cash.
HYPOTHESIS #3: Announcement effects (excess returns during the event period)
are an endogenous function of dividend levels, the demand for 
liquidity, and market value of the firm.
^Equation (15) of JW. 
^Sm  Acharya (1988).
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C. Mathodoiogy
Stock price reactions to quarterly dividend announcements are estimated by 
calculating prediction errors for stock returns of dividend paying firms from a market 
model. Then, the return prediction error for stock i on day t is expressed as
PEic - Rte ■ «i - (5*3)
where PE,, is the prediction error for stock i's return on day t;
Rh is the realized return to firm i on day t:
a„ fii are the market model's parameter estimates; and
Rm, is the return on the equally weighted Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP) market portfolio on day t.
The market model parameter estimates are obtained using the stock returns of
each firm over 120 trading days, ending 30 days before the dividend announcement
date. For each firm i and each trading day t within the event period It = 30 to t = + 15,
46 days), the prediction error, PE*, is calculated.
The average prediction error on event day t for a portfolio of N securities is then
expressed as
APB  ^ •  ( 1 )  (5 4)
The test statistic, Z,, for APE, is based on the standardized prediction errors (SPE*), and 
is obtained from
It is customary to accept that the distribution of Z, is unit normal.
Each standardized prediction error of firm i on day t is defined as
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.  I D -S ’ 1*
SPE,,» P E u / lo ^ a  * ) 1 , (5 .6 )
i j
where a, is the standard deviation of the residuals in the market modei estimation
period:
T is the number of days in the estimation period;
Rm, is the return on the market portfolio for day t;
Rm is the mean return on the market portfolio over the estimation period;
and
Rmk is the return on the market portfolio for the k th day of the estimation 
period.
The cumulative prediction error for stock i, CPE,. is obtained by summing prediction 
errors over the event time,
(5-7)
while the cumulative average prediction error over the event time is calculated from
CAPE • (1) CPEi . (5.8)
The prediction error for trading volume is also estimated, using a "trade-volume” 
model, similar to equation (5.31:
“ Ti ♦ «1 V^ e ♦ 5ie (5 .9 )
where V„ is the rate of change in the trading volume from day t * 1 to day t for
firm i. V„ > (trading volume for firm i on day t - trading volume for firm
i on day t * 1 ) /  trading volume for firm i on day t ■ 1 );
Vm, is the rate of change in the trading volume from day t 1 to day t for the
market. -  (trading volume for the market portfolio on day t minus 
trading volume for the market portfolio on day t * 1 ) /  trading volume for 
the market portfolio on day t -1  );
K„d, are trade volume model parameter estimates; and
C, is the prediction error for the trading volume of stock i on day t.
In order to obtain the average prediction error, the Z-statistic and the cumulative average
prediction error, the procedure outlined for equations (5.4), (5.5), and (5.8), 
respectively, is followed.
This "trade-volume" model [equation (5.9)1 is different from prior models-i.e., 
those that typically follow Beaver (1968)"in two ways. First, prior models regress each
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firm's percentage of shares traded to its shares outstanding on the percentage of total 
shares traded on exchange to the market shares outstanding. These models carry an 
inherent tendency of heteroscedasticity in spite of attempts by several authors (e.g., 
Pincus (1983), Richardson, Sefcik and Thompson (1986)1 to correct for this problem.
The model here is more analogous to the market model and less heteroscedastic since 
each firm's trading change rate is regressed on the market trading change rate.
Second, the focus of prior models has been restricted to the abnormal trading 
volume to model information effects. More important, this paper highlights the role of 
normal trading volume, which has been mentioned only sparingly in prior research. 
Traders in the market are generally divided into two groups; information traders and 
liquidity traders. While abnormal trading volume may reflect the trading activities of 
information traders, normal trading volume itself may exhibit a perpetual level of demand 
of liquidity traders. The rationale for using this normal trading volume is that the level of 
liquidity demand may vary with market conditions, but it is independent of any 
information motivated trading.
D. Data and Proxy Variables
Firms traded on either the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or the American 
Stock Exchange (AMEX) are selected to form a primary data base. In order to be 
included in the primary selection, firms must appear in both the CRSP Daily Returns, 
1991 Files and the Quarterly Industrial COMPUSTAT, 1991 File. For selection, stocks 
must also have consecutive data for 1986 through 1990. The study period is limited to 
20 quarters, commencing from the first quarter of 1986. The constraint on the starting 
quarter is due to the availability of daily trading volume data on the CRSP tape.* This 
database is called the "initial sample."
^Trading volume data on stocks appear in the CRSP file only after 
January 1986.
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For a firm to be included in the final aample, quarterly dividend announcement 
dates must be both available and verifiable. Quarterly dividend announcement dates are 
identified from the declaration dates of quarterly dividend payments on the CRSP tape 
by assuming that these events are known to investors on the next business day through 
public media. Other sources of announcement dates are the Wall Street Journal Index 
and Moody's Annual Dividend Record. All stocks for which these dates cannot be 
ascertained are excluded from the final sample. Stocks that report stock splits and 
stock dividends are also eliminated from consideration.
For each quarter, the sample data are grouped according to the direction of 
changes in dividend per share from the previous quarter to the current quarter. The vast 
majority of the data are for firms whose dividends are unchanged from quarter to 
quarter. Consequently, the final sample consists of firms that increase dividend per 
share, decrease dividend per share, and do not change dividend per share on a quarter- 
to-quarter basis. Table 5.1 presents the quarterly frequencies for each category, for 
both the initial and the final samples, by year.
The cardinal problem of testing models such as (5.1) and (5.2) is the derivation 
of the theoretical variables for the purpose of empirical measurement. Even variables 
that are unambiguously defined are hard to measure because of lack or inaccuracy of 
data. Other variables are more troublesome in that they are defined only in a theoretical 
sense and cannot be observed directly. Thus, empirical research has to face the 
impasse of (1) resorting to the use of proxy variables, or (2) grinding to a halt. Option 
(1) is followed in this study, and the uneasy task of the empirical derivation of the 
theoretical variables is undertaken.
Data used in this study are obtained from the CRSP tape and the COMPUSTAT 
1991 Quarterly Industrial File. Because firms use different fiscal years, those listed on 
the CRSP tape are matched with those in the COMPUSTAT file, on a calendar basis. 
Table 5.2 shows the names and definitions of COMPUSTAT variables and their data item
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numbers. In the following subsections, these proxy variables are discussed in more 
detail.
1. UquU itv
In the JW model, the demand for liquidity is an exogenously specified function, 
unrelated to the quality of the firm. Also, liquidity is not influenced by investors' 
assessment of the signal used by the firm. A reasonable proxy for liquidity demand 
seems to be trading volume, although in such situations one must exercise exceptional 
care.
Trading volume is affected by investors' perception of firm quality and their 
reassessments caused by changes in the firm's dividend policy. Release of information 
concerning quality through dividends could cause investors to alter their portfolio 
compositions, thereby creating an endogenous link between the signal (firm quality) and 
trading volume (demand for liquidity). This link is at odds with the JW notion that 
demand for liquidity gives rise to the desire to signal.
Liquidity demand of current shareholders is characterized by the trading volume 
and the number of shares outstanding. Hence, liquidity demand is measured by price 
per share times the number of shares traded as estimated from the "trade volume" 
model.
LIQUlDTYit - . (5.10)
where ^   is the stock price of firm i on day t; and
VOL* is the expected trading volume for firm i on day t:
vsüTt ■ (i*? n ) • v o i-f.t-i. (5 .1 1 )
where V* is the expected trading volume change rate: and
VOLi,,., is the actual trading volume on day t 1.
Then, liquidity demand is standardized by the market value of the firm for sake of
comparability across firms. For each firm, liquidity demand on day t is computed as a
liquidity ratio in relation to firm size:
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L IQ U ID ^  (5.12)
Finally, the unique liquidity proxy for each firm is obtained by taking the average of the 
liquidity ratios for trading days t - 30 through t - 8, in order to nullify possible 
informational effects. Consequently, RATIOBAR, is a proxy for a normal level of liquidity 
demand the firm attempts to maintain.
RATIOBAR, .  L Ig M T IO ,, ( » • « !
In order to double check the validity of this proxy, an alternative measure of 
liquidity demand, the natural logarithm of the number of shares outstanding before the 
dividend announcement date, is also used.
LNSHARt > iTi (SHAR^m ,) , (5.14)
where SHARESNO) is the number of shares outstanding as of t - 30.
2. Fim  SU»
Arm size is measured by the natural logarithm of the firm's market value, which 
is obtained by multiplying the number of common shares outstanding at t«  30 by the 
average stock price for t=  30 through t=  8.
MKTVALi » SHARESNOi • 7 ]
1 i  (5.15).  SHARESNOi * ^  ^  Pit
■* e— 30
where P* is the stock price for firm i on day t.
3. Dhridtnd PoSey
In the JW model, the firm attempts to satisfy a certain perpetual level of liquidity 
by maintaining its level of dividends. The firm's dividend policy is measured by its
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dividend yield before the dividend announcement. The dividend yield for firm i is 
estimated as the dividend per share divided by its average stock price.
DIVYIELDi - (5.16)
where DjVIPSHA, is the dividend per share for firm i; and
PRC, is the average stock price for t  « 30 through t=  8.
Larger changes in dividends are construed as stronger signals and are expected
to draw larger price reactions, ceteris peribus. To control for the actual magnitude of
the dividend change, the difference between the current and previous dividend yields is
considered.
DIVYDIFF, • DIVYIELDi^t - DIVYIELD,,^.^ , (5.17)
where Dl WIELD,,, is the dividend yield for the current quarter; and
Dl WIELD,,,., is the dividend yield for the previous quarter.
DIWDIFF represents the dividend signal corporate agents use to signal the firm's quality
to the market.
4. Aeeountihg Veriebles
Accounting data are collected from the quarterly COMPUSTAT tape. They 
include increases in investment (INVEST), long-term debt issued (DEBTISSU), long-term 
debt retired (DEBTRETI), sale of common and preferred stock (EQUSELL), purchase of 
common and preferred stock (EOUBUY), cash dividend (DIVIDEND), cash and cash 
equivalents (CASH), and increase in short-term working capital (WORKCAP).'
The demand for cash by the firm, if measured by net investment, may ignore 
demands for cash for other purposes. Other reasons for cash needs may include 
repayment of debt, repurchase of shares, and increases in short-term working capital 
needs. As a result, the level of investment may vary, cross-sectionally. To control for
^Definitions of COMPOSTAT data are presented in Table 5.2.
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the cross-sectional effect of external financing, an approach of grouping firms by 
external financial needs is taken.
The cross-sectionally observable model of the theoretical equilibrium condition of 
Equation (5.1) is then
DEHANDi • mVEST, * LIOUIDTY, -  CASH,, i»l   N. (5.18)
where DEMAND, is the demand for cash from firm i;
INVEST, is the increase in investments in firm i;
CASH, is the cash and cash equivalents of firm i; and
LIQUIDTY, is the liquidity demand of current shareholders.
E. Testing
1. Sêmplê StsH$Hes
Table 5.3 presents quarterly summary statistics of the variables included in the 
tests. The contrast of the quarterly statistics for dividend-increasing and dividend- 
decreasing firms suggests several interesting differences.
First, a simple one-way analysis of variance for the variables in the table 
indicates that the dividend-increasing and dividend-decreasing groups are different at the 
0.01 level for stock repurchase.' This is a fascinating observation in and of itself. It 
suggests that the amounts dissipated by firms that show a propensity to increase 
dividends is in fact larger than the amount of dividends paid. This is so since the 
repurchase, de facto, amounts to a selective dividend disbursement scheme.
Second, at the 0.01 level of significance, the null hypothesis of the ANOVA (no 
difference between the two groups) is also rejected for the market value of the firm. 
This difference may suggest that larger firms are more willing (or perhaps better 
expected) to pay dividends.
Finally, at the 0.01 level, there are significant differences in dividend yields for 
dividend-increasing, dividend-decreasing, and dividend-unchanging firms. However, no 
significant differences in total dividend payments are found, although net stock
ie speculated that this difference is due to the influence of 
the repurchase component.
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repurchases are significantly greater for dividend paying firms. Since the bulk of the 
data is post-1986, this cannot be attributable to a tendency to reduce shareholders' tax 
liability.
Table 5.4 presents the Pearson correlation matrix of the proxy variables. Each 
cell in the table contains the correlation coefficients of dividend-increasing, dividend- 
decreasing, and dividend-unchanging firms.
The correlation coefficient of DIVYIELD with all the other variables and their level 
of significance are shown in italics in the table. For dividend-increasing firms, DIVYIELD 
is negatively correlated with RATIOBAR and MKTVAL at the 0.05 level. However, the 
correlation with EQUSELL is positive and significant at the 0.01 level. Correlations are 
not significant for CASH, INVEST, DEBTISSU, and EQUBUY.
For dividend-decreasing firms, the picture is quite different. Except for the 
negative correlation with RATIOBAR (-0.251, the correlations with all other variables are 
insignificant. This is consistent with the JW argument to the extent that the model 
should hold for increases in dividends only.
2. HYPOTHESIS #1: Demand for UguiditY eêus»s divkfend paynMnts.
a. Information-Motivated Trading
Several studies, notably in the accounting literature, are concerned with 
abnormal trading volume to explore the information content of a corporate event. Some 
authors (e.g., Bamber (19B6)] acknowledge that using abnormal trading volume does not 
provide a better theoretical tool to determine the information content of an event. Still, 
it is believed that abnormal trading volumes are indicative of the depth of the market's 
response to information, while abnormal returns reflect the breadth of such response. 
Accordingly, by regressing each firm's trading volume change rate on the market trading 
volume change rate, the market's reaction to the dividend announcement can be 
measured.
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Table 5.5 exhibits the statistical properties of the trading model [equation (5.9)1. 
For a 7-day window around the announcement day. the dividend-increasing firms have 
two of the APE'S significant and positive at the 0.01 level.
In contrast, dividend-decreasing firms have three significant APE's, one prior to 
the announcement day and two after the announcement. When one looks at the plot of 
the ACPE's for the entire 46-day time horizon (Figure 5.1), it seems that just prior to the 
announcement, for both types of firms, trading volume changes are mostly random. The 
trading volume changes become systematic at and after the announcement day. 
Dividend-increasing firms have decreasing trading volumes. Dividend-decreasing firms 
also have declining trading volumes. For this subsample, all APE's are negative with the 
exception of days 6, 11, and 15.
The data and Figure 5.1 indicate that, while the market correctly anticipates the 
positive price effect of dividends, trading decreases for both declining and increasing 
firms. The anticipation of dividend changes should have been coupled with a change in 
trading around the same days. Instead, it is shown that the increase in dividends 
decreases trading considerably.
For stable dividend firms, trading increases. Thus, the paradox here is that 
trading decreases with a change in dividend policy and increases in the absence of 
change. The ad-hoc conclusion is that a change in policy, whether it is construed as 
good or bad, thwarts trading. This evidence is in complete juxtaposition to the JW 
model and are perplexing as well.
The findings of stock volume responses to dividend announcements reported 
here are different from the empirical studies of Harris (1986) and Richardson, Sefcik and 
Thompson (1986). These two papers document a positive correlation between daily 
stock volume and stock price changes. The evidence reported here, however, is 
consistent with a recent study by John and Lang (1991). John and lang demonstrate 
the impact of insider trading around dividend announcements, congruous with the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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results reported in Table 5.5 and Figure 5.1. All data considered, the verification of the 
empirical validity of the JW model is still missing.
b. Liquidity Trading
The motivation of liquidity traders is different from that of information traders 
Information traders enter the market with information that must have changed the 
fundamental price of the stock. Liquidity traders sell their stocks because they desire 
liquidity to meet consumption or savings objectives. Liquidity demand by shareholders 
reflects the unique ownership structure of the firm. Consequently, it can be safely 
assumed that (1) liquidity demand shows a stable or perpetual trend over time ("normal" 
trading volume): (21 it is firm-unique: and (3) it does not reflect unexpected information 
in the market.
"Normal" trading volume is obtained from the predicted values of model (5.9), 
theoretically clear of any noise in volume created by information flows. The approach 
that is taken here is to extract the "normal" level of trading as a proxy for liquidity 
demand. Predicted trading volume is standardized by firm size and averaged before the 
dividend announcement for each firm.
In Figure 5.2, the ratio of normal liquidity trading to the market value of the firm 
around the dividend announcement day is charted. For dividend-increasing firms, 
liquidity ratios maintain a stable level before the dividend announcement date, increase 
slightly on the announcement day, and come back to the "normal" level thereafter. 
Dividend-decreasing firms also display a rather stable liquidity ratio before the dividend 
announcement date. The ratio Jumps dramatically at the announcement date, only to 
regress to the normal level three days after the announcement. Dividend-unchanging 
firms always maintain a normal level of liquidity, even around announcement days.
The evidence that liquidity ratios rise sharply at the dividend announcement date 
for dividend-decreasing firms appears to be radically at odds with JW's argument that a 
higher level of liquidity trading should occur only for dividend-increasing firms. Unlike 
the JW signalling model, it is argued here that dividend policy is useo to satisfy liquidity
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demands of current shareholders. When the level of liquidity trading is low. the firm 
increases dividends to satisfy the liquidity needs of shareholders. When the normal 
trading level is too high, the firm decreases dividends, lowering the liquidity level of 
shareholders. Consequently, shareholders faced with declining dividends increase 
liquidity trading to boost their liquidity level. In the long term, a separating equilibrium 
will be achieved, and a certain perpetual level of liquidity trading will be maintained as 
portrayed by the case of dividend unchanging firms,
c. Regressions of Dividends on Liquidity Demends
Feldstein and Green (1983) argue that "... there is the desire on the part of small 
investors, fiduciaries, and nonprofit organizations for a steady stream of dividends with 
which to finance consumption" [ibid., p. 17). JW encapsulates this argument in the 
firm's value maximization problem for its current shareholders such that liquidity 
demands may cause dividend payments because of information asymmetry.
In the JW model, the demand for cash from the firm (DEMAND) is the total of 
the demand by current stockholders on personal accounts (LIQUIDTY) and the liquidity 
demand on corporate account (INVEST), less the firm's internal supply of cash (CASH). 
JW argue that the dividend is paid if and only if DEMAND is positive. Whenever 
DEMAND is positive, current stockholders and the firm collectively sell shares to new 
investors, thereby diluting the fractional claim of current owners. As a consequence, 
stock prices go up to reduce the dilution and to meet the cash demand of current 
stockholders.
In this scenario, the line of causality goes from the demand for cash from the 
firm (DEMAND) that should motivate the payment of dividends. The optimal dividend 
condition of the JW signalling equilibrium of equation (5.1) implies that insiders pay 
dividends whenever C <  I + L. In addition, when insiders pay dividends, the magnitude 
of dividends increases on the demand for personal liquidity (LIQUIDTY) and investment 
(INVEST) and decreases on the supply of corporate cash (CASH).
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In order to examine the causal relationship between liquidity demands and 
dividend payments, two puxy variables of shareholders' liquidity demand, RATIOBAR 
and SHARESNO, are regressed on dividend yield, DIVYIELD. The estimates obtained 
from these two regressions are shown in Table 5.6. Models (1), (21, and (3) are 
designed to prevent potential multicollinearity between two liquidity variables and assess 
each variable's marginal explanation for variations in dividend policy. Model (4) is 
constructed to control for cash demand by the firm itself. Toward this objective,
INVEST and CASH are standardized by the market value of the firm.
In the table, all the regressions have significant t statistics for RATIOBAR and 
In(SHARESNO). CASH is insignificant for all samples but dividend unchanging firms. As 
discussed earlier (see correlation matrix), a strong, negative correlation between 
RATIOBAR/SHARESNO and DIVYIELD persists in these regressions. This significantly 
negative relationship between liquidity demand and dividend policy contradicts the JW's 
optimal dividend condition [Equation (5.1)1 that higher demand for liquidity motivates the 
firm to pay larger dividends. Instead, this outcome lends strong support to the 
contention posited in the previous section: that higher (lower) levels of liquidity demand 
are associated with lower (higher) dividend payments. Since the estimates for INVEST 
and CASH are not significant, it appears that cash demand by the firm and the firm's 
cash holdings do not play a significant role in dividend policy. In short, this finding 
shows that liquidity demand by shareholders is one of the negative determinants for the 
firm's dividend policy.
3. HYPOTHESIS #2: The aquXbrium prie» is monotonie in the dividend signei
lor privets kiformetionl. 
e. Single Lineer Pricing Reietion in Signelling
Table 5.7 presents the average return prediction error. As the table shows, the 
announcements of quarterly dividend increases generate, on average, significant positive 
return prediction errors around the announcement day. In a 7-day window around the
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announcement day (15 days total), three average prediction errors are significantly 
positive at the 0.01 level. Of the three, one each is at, prior to, and after the 
announcement day. This is a strong indication that the market correctly anticipates a 
rise in dividends. The largest prediction error occurs one day prior to the announcement 
day (0.53 percent), more than any other prediction error in the same window. The 
announcement day and the following day have significant prediction errors of 0.35 and 
0.16 percent, respectively. This is interesting because it is evidence of a somewhat 
slow reaction speed to "favorable" information. Still, even these errors may be deemed 
immaterial in magnitude.
The cumulative average return prediction error, CAPE, is plotted in Figure 5.3 for 
visual dramatization. The CAPE rises to 0.98 percent by the announcement day and 
continues to drift upward through event day t -  + 13, when it reaches its peak at 1.30 
percent.
In contrast with dividend increases, firms that announce quarterly dividend 
decreases, on average, experience significant negative return prediction errors around 
the announcement day. For an identical 7 day window for this sub-group, four average 
prediction errors are significantly negative at the 0.01 level. Three of the four are prior 
to the announcement day, and one is at the announcement day. This may indicate that 
while "bad news" is not very well anticipated, the reaction time to bad news is short.
In the interest of visual contrast, the CAPE for dividend reducing firms is plotted 
in Figure 5 3. For these firms, the CAPE decreases to -4.37 percent by event day t= -2  
and drops significantly after that until it reaches a minimum of -8.37 percent on event 
day t>  +10. The only conclusion one may draw from these data and the figure (in 
addition to what was already surmised) is rather trivial: the market considers a dividend 
increase good news and a reduction in dividend unfavorable news.
These findings are not at all surprising. Several empirical studies document the 
announcement e ffects wf dividends, supporting the information content of dividends 
(Aharony and Swary (1980), Asquith and Mullins (1983), Penman (1983), Patell and
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Wolfson (1984), Kalay and Loawenstein (1985) and Richardson, Sefcik and Thompson 
(1986)]. Hence, the empirical evidence that is shown here in the context of the JW 
model is not forthright. JW's contention is the formulation of a theoretical model for the 
announcement effects of dividends, documented in numerous empirical studies. Their 
model is a pricing function, dependent on dividends culminating in a signalling 
equilibrium. The positive relation between the dividend signal and price is just one of the 
outcomes of the signalling equilibrium.
b. Firm Size and the Signai-Price Relationship
in order to examine a potential size effect in signalling, every subsample is 
grouped into quintiles, based on the market value (MKTVAL) of the firm. Since it was 
shown in the previous section that the stock price at the dividend announcement date is 
an increasing function of dividend changes, three return interval prediction errors 
(CPE(k), k -  7, 5, 1) are regressed on dividend changes (DIVYDIFF) for each size- 
quintile. CPE(k), is the cumulative return prediction error of firm i for a k-day window, 
respectively.
Table 5.8 reports the regression results by size quintiles. Regressions for the 
three smallest size quintiles (quintiles 1, 2 and 3) show significant t-statistics for 
DIVYDIFF. In contrast, the two largest size quintiles (quintiles 4 and 5) have 
insignificant t-statistics for DIVYDIFF. When the R* and the P-value of the F-statistics 
are compared across each size quintile, it is found that dividend changes (DIVYDIFF) 
explain much better the variation in price changes for the three smallest size quintiles 
than for the two largest size quintiles. These differences are consistent with the "small-
firm effect" reported in many other studies (e.g., Banz (1981), Zeghal (1983), Barry and
Brown (1984) and others).
To interpret the differences between the small and large quintiles in the 
regression results here, it is argued that larger firms present easier and more timely 
access to information than do smaller firms. Further, more individuals disseminate this 
information. Because small firms present to outsiders more limited information.
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invastors require a compensating premium in the form of stock price increases when 
evaluating their investment risk.
What the small-firm effect implies in the context of signalling is that the signal- 
price relationship may occur only in small firms and that signalling is not evident in large 
firms. JW argue that dividend and market value of the firm combine to increase stock 
prices positively at the dividend announcement date. The evidence presented here is not 
consistent with this argument.
c. Polynomial Transformations of tha JW  Signalling Equilibrium
To test the empirical validity of the JW signalling equilibrium, the consistency of 
the signalling-pricing function with the data must be explored. Toward this end, the 
independent variables of the regressions of dividend changes (DIVYDIFF) on the return 
interval prediction errors (CPEIk], k« 7, 5, 1) are introduced as polynomials. This non­
linear transformation is permissible because it does not affect the parameters of the 
model, but provides a better fit for estimation. Three models are fitted and tested, and 
their results shown in Table 5.9.
In order to control for possible correlations among the independent variables, a 
step-wise regression is applied, where the independent variables enter one at a time. 
Since the JW dividend-signalling model implies a separating equilibrium, no regressions 
for dividend-decreasing firms show significance. When (DIVYDIFF)* is entered in the 
dividend-unchanging and dividend-increasing samples, its coefficients are significant and 
negative. Coincidentally, the coefficients of DIVYDIFF remain significant and positive. 
Likewise, adding (DIVYDIFF)* shows a much greater explanatory power of the model as 
evidenced by the significant increase of the R*’s (adjusted for degrees of freedom) in 
each sample. When (DIVYDIFF)* enters the regression, it always has a significant and 
positive coefficient in each sample, while the significance and signs of the other 
coefficient estimates remain unchanged. Adding (DIVYDIFF)* also raises significantly the 
explanatory power of the model. From the test results shown in Table 5.9, it can be 
concluded that the polynomial form of an empirically estimable signalling-pricing model
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Tabla 5.9 (cont'd)
Dapandant Modal INTBRCBPT DivyoïFP (DIVYDIPP)^ (DlVrOIPP)-* R' Pcob. of P
Slsa Vaclabla TO Tl T2 »3
CPlfl» m .0070 .0812 .003 .0052
(9.91)** (2.79)**
(21 .0063 .4155 -.3576 .011 .0001
|8.66)** (5.31)** (-4.60)**
(3) .0045 1.3824 -6.4790 4.7079 .034 .0001
(6.061** (9.52)** (-8.29)** (7-87)**
Panai C. Olvldand-Oacraaalng Plraa
287 CPB(7) (1> -.0413 .4278 .003 .3481
(-4.471** (.94)
(2) -.0363 1.1074 10.2969 .005 .5195
(-3.03)** (.97) (.657)
(3| -.0262 3.2800 90.0410 655.1571 .009 4515
(-1.76) (1.49) (1-26) (1-15)
CPE(5| (1) -.0403 -.0147 .000 .9707
(-4.96)** (-.03)
(2| -.0362 .5446 6.4755 .001 .8271
(-3.44)** (.54) (.61)
(3| -.0261 2.7064 87.8215 651.8804 .007 .5555
(-2.00)* (1.40) (1-41) (1-30)
CPB(l) (1) -.0205 .2990 .004 .3158
(-3.40)** (1.00)
(2) -.0136 1.2491 14.3967 .010 .2252
(-1.74) (1.69) (1-40)
(3) -.0089 2.2547 51.3062 303.2357 .013 .3025
(-.92) (1.57) (1-10) (-81)
Mot#* t valu## ar# in paranth####. 
«Significant at th# 0.05 laval. 
•«Significant at th# 0.01 laval.
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fits the data well. This polynomial pattern is inconsistent with the monotonie 
relationship between price and signal that other authors assume (e.g., Acharya (1988)1.
d. Likelihood Retio Tests of Non-UnearitY in Peremeters
In this section, the cross sectional model of dividend announcements of equation 
(5.2) is examined. Equation (5.2) is the testable cross-sectional relation among the 
dividend announcement effect, the market value of equity, dividends, liquidity demand 
by current shareholders, and the cash demand from the firm.
The non linear equation (5.2) is proposed to be tested with the following 
regression model:
CPE(k) I
C- (MKTVALj * fPIVIDENDi - LIQUIDTYj) (5.19)
DEMAND
where CPE(k), is the cumulative return prediction error of firm i for a k-day
window;
k is 7, 5, and 1, respectively;
t is the constant, marginal personal tax rate on dividends;
MKTVAL, is the market value of firm i at the announcement date;
DIVIDEND, is the gross dollar amount of dividends;
LIQUIDTY, is total liquidity demand by current stockholders; and
DEMAND, is the combined net demand for cash on personal and corporate
accounts.
Multiplying the numerator by t and carrying through the division, equation (5.19) 
can be rewritten as
CPE{k)t ■ t-MKTADJ, * C^-DIVADJ, - C-LIQADJ,. (5.20)
where MKTADJ, is MKTVAL, /  DEMAND,;
DIVAOJ, is DIVIDEND, /  DEMAND,;
LIQADJ, is LIQUIDTY, / DEMAND,; and
all other variables are as defined in equation (5.19).
Using proxy variables and imposing non-linear parameter constraints on equation
(5.20), the testable equation (5.21) is obtained:
CPEik)i - Po * P,ln(AarvaL), ♦ PjOJVYDIFF, ♦ fijRATIOBAJi, , (5.21)
subject to the constraints:
A) ”  0;
A  — A ;
A  -  (fi)'.
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JW argue that
Not surprisingly. Increments In dividends around the optimal dividend,
D(X), Increase the market price of the firm's stock, P(D(X)1, measured 
cum-dividend. More surprisingiy, this Impact Is proportional to the 
personal tax rate, t, on dividends as shown by substituting (14) into (151 
(i.e., equation (5.19)1. In other words, in equilibrium stockholders must 
be compensated at the margin by a proportional increment in their stock 
price for Incurring the proportional taxes from dividends [ibid., p. 1063- 
10641.
Consequently, the estimation of equation (5.21) should yield a significantly 
different set of parameter estimates than an unconstrained model. The null hypothesis 
that the coefficient estimates of regression (equation (5.21)1 and the unconstrained 
estimates of the same model are not significantly different Is tested.
Two sets of parameter estimates are obtained from regression equation (5.21); 
one set by minimizing the error sum of squares subject to the equality constraints of
(5.21), and the other set by simple OLS. Since the constraints of regression (5.21) are 
non linear In parameter space, the multivariate secant method* Is used to minimize the 
sum of squared residuals. A likelihood ratio test Is applied to compare the error sums of 
square of the unconstrained model with that of the constrained model.
The likelihood ratio Is then defined as:
■21ogX •= W l o g ( . ^ ^ l  - W l o g [ . ^ ^ ]  , (5-22)
where N Is the total number of observations;
N
8(6) = Z(y,-f(x„0))* Is the sum of squares estimated from the constrained
I « 1 model; and
N
8(6) -  Z(y,-f(x„6)l* Is the sum of squares estimated from the unconstrained
I m 1 model.
^This is an iterative process, whereas a starting value for the 
coefficient estimatee is chosen. This set of values is changed
continuously until the error sum of squares cannot be further reduced. 
This multivariate secant method is selected over other methods (for 
example, the Gause-Newton method) because it estimates the parameters 
from the history of iterations, rather than from an analytical 
derivation.
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Asymptotically,
2lo(M -  / I f ) ,  
where r It the number of restrictions.
Table 5.10 reports the results of these likelihood ratio tests for dividend- 
increasing, dividend-decreasing, and dividend-unchanging firms, for each year and for 
the combined sample. For each subsample, the number of observations, the likelihood 
ratio statistic, and its probability are show n.N one of the likelihood ratio test 
statistics for the total sample is significant at the 0.01 or less level. For dividend- 
increasing firms, only the statistics of 1989 and 1990 using CPEID are significant at the 
0.01 level. But the same results are obtained for the full sample as well. Otherwise, 
probabilities (of no difference) are high for both types of firms and for the pooled 
sample. Hence, the null hypothesis of "no difference" between the constrained and 
unconstrained models cannot be rejected. This is interpreted as strong empirical 
evidence that the proportionality condition of equation (5.21) and the implied signalling 
equilibrium of equation (5.2) posited by JW is either inconsistent with the data, or the 
empirical model is misspecified.
4. HYPOTHESIS #3: Announemnmtt «fftaets (9xeess ntums during thn nvnnt
pnriod) «r* en nndogtnous function o f dMdond hvois, the 
domond for Squidity. morkot vaiuo ond fkm sin.
a. Tests of the Cross-Sectional Relation of the JW  Mode!
Equation (5.2) implies that the potential causes for stock price reactions to 
dividend announcements are the market value of the firm, gross dividends, liquidity 
demand by current stockholders, and the demand for cash from the firm. To test the 
intensity and duration of the prediction errors, the same windows around the 
announcement day as before are examined. The linear relationship between the
quarterly obeorvatione can be pooled because the sum of 
independent etatietice is also
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cumulative return prediction error (CPE(k), k « 7, 5, 1) and the proxy variables 
MKTVAL, DIVIDEND, LIQUIDTY, and DEMAND is studied. One should note, however, 
that DEMAND is defined as the sum of INVEST and LIQUIDTY, less CASH. In a linear 
relation, this presents a potential multicollinearity problem. In order to circumvent this 
problem arising from the correlation between LIQUIDTY and DEMAND, the latter variable 
is excluded from the cross-sectional regression.
CPEIkl's are regressed on In(MKTVAL), DIVYDIFF and RATIOBAR for each 
sample. The linear relation to be estimated is
CPE(k)i - «0 ♦ t^ln(HKTVAL), ♦ b^DIVYDIFF, * ijMTIOBARj, (5.23)
where CPE(k), is the cumulative return prediction error of firm i; and 
k is a 7-, 5-, and 1-day window, respectively.
The parameter estimates obtained from regressing each quarter's observations 
are checked for the OLS assumptions of normality and homoscedasticity. The analysis 
of residuals indicate that the assumptions of normality and homoscedasticity are not 
violated. Interestingly, contrary to recent arguments" by Eckbc, Maksimovic, and 
Williams (1990), no evidence of distribution truncation of the standardized residuals at 
the dividend announcement date for dividend-increasing and dividend-decreasing firms is 
found.
The analysis of "condition indices" is applied as the multicollinearity diagnostic. 
The condition index number is the square root of the ratio of the largest eigen value to 
each individual eigen value. When this number is very large, estimates may be biased. 
Belsley, Kuh and Welsch (1980) suggest that condition indices greater than 10 indicate 
weak dependence and that condition indices of 30 to 100 indicate moderate to strong
^^Bckbo, MakalnoviCr and William# (1990) argue that bocauae of 
corporate inaider# ' private information, the diatributiona of reaiduala 
at the voluntary event announcement date will be truncated, and that 
thia truncation biaa will lead to the inconalatent eatimatora of OLS and 
GLS.
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collinearity. All condition index numbers are found to be less than 10. Hence, it is 
concluded that the parameter estimates are unbiased.
The estimated coefficients, F statistic probabilities, and the R"s of regression 
equation (5.23) for each sample for the three types of firms for the three different 
windows are displayed in Table 5.11. The table is organized in three panels: Panel A 
portrays the estimates and statistics of the full sample, while panels B and C show the 
same for dividend-increasing and dividend decreasing subsamples, respectively.
In Panel A of Table 5.11, the full sample has a positive and significant coefficient 
for DIVYDIFF and negative and significant coefficient for RATIOBAR, as reported already 
In the previous sections. The MKTVAL estimate is significant for the 7-day window 
only. For dividend-decreasing firms, none of the variables have significant coefficients. 
This seems to be consistent with the JW model since dividend-decreasing firms may not 
signal in a separating signalling equilibrium.
Panel B of the table demonstrates negative and significant coefficient estimates 
for RATIOBAR and MKTVAL. Nevertheless, DIVYDIFF is significant only for the 1 -day 
window, as a result of controlling for the magnitude of the dividend changes. The 
striking evidence reflected in the table is that the signs of the MKTVAL estimates are 
negative for dividend-increasing firms. This is completely unexplainable by the JW 
model. JW suggests that when the firm announces a dividend payment to signal, the 
magnitude of the dividend and the market value of the firm impact positively on the 
stock price.'' The inescapable conclusion is that the JW model cannot be supported 
by empirical evidence. Stock price reactions to dividend announcements are not too 
well explained by the market value of the firm’s equity, dividends, and cash demand
the JW model, the market value of the firm is endogenously 
determined when dividend payments affect the stock price. In order to 
verify the results of Table 3.11, the market value of the firm at the 
announcement day is estimated using the stock price. With these 
estimated values, in place of the actual values, the tests in this 
section are repeated. Results identical to those of Table S.11 are 
obtained with those estimated values.
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Table 5.12$ Teate of Liquidity belated Variables by Pire Sise, Squat loo (5.23) 
CPB(1)£ - 5o + InlMRTVALj^ ) + 63 DIVDIPPj^  + 63 SATIOBAR^
"O
CD
C/)
C/)
8■D
CD
3 .
3"
CD
CD■D
O
Q.
C
aO3
"O
o
CD
Q.
■D
CD
C/)
C/)
Ind.pand.nt
V.riabl.a
Quintll. 1 
(Sa.ll)
Qulntil. 2 Qulntil. 3 Qulntil. 4 Oiintlli
(Largi
Pan.1 A. Qulntil.a Groupad by INVI8T
m m c i P T .0026 .0101 .0014 .0099 .0055
«0 (0.90) (3.39)» (0.54) (3.20)" (1.68)
ln(MXTVAL| .0002 -.0009 .00001 -.0009 -.0003
«1 (0.59) (-2.15)' (0.04) (-1.92) (-0.86)
olvioirr .4596 .0687 .3665 .6893 .1039
«2 (1.94) (0.65) (4.44)" (5.81)" (3.02)'
RAtlOWUl -.4778 -.3579 .0260 -.4145 -.0308
_ «3 (-2.51)* (-1.60) (0.18) (-2.29)' (-0.19)
.0039 .0028 .0074 .0152 .0036
Prob. of r .0140 .0600 .0002 .0001 .0200
Panel B. Quintiles Grouped by BQUBUY
INTIRC8PT .0050 .0089 .0028 .0076 .0021
«0 (1.64) (3.12)" (0.99) (2.33)' (0.57)
In(NKTVAL) -.0002 -.0008 -.00005 —.0006 .00001
«1 (-0.58) (-1.84) (-0.13) (-1.19) (-0.02)
DIWDIPP .6327 .7967 .4812 .9981 .0343
«2 (2.58)" (5.21)" (5.66)" (7.35)" (1.23)
RATIOBAR -.3151 -.1543 -.1186 -.3320 -.0241
, *3 (-2.15)' (-0.86) (-0.73) (-1.48) (-0.13)
R* .0042 .0116 .0120 .0211 .0006
Pcob. of P .0100 .0001 .0001 .0001 .6740
Panel C. Qulntil.. Groupad by DBBTRBTI
IRTRRCBPT .0073 .0034 .0086 .0058 .0151
«0 (2.53)' (1.34) (2.61)" (1.83) (3.72)"
In(HXTVAL) -.0003 -.00005 -.0011 -.0005 -.0014
«1 (-0.89 ) (-0.14) (-2.09)' (-1.21) (-2.85)"
DIVTDIPP .3276 .9376 .5494 .5731 .0592
*2 (1.94) (7.67)" (3.61)" (5.92)" (1.81)
RATIOBAR -.3874 -.3836 -.1120 -.2070 -.1754
,  S3 (-1 02) (-2.27)' (-0.57) (-1.55) (-0.81)
R* .0030 .0239 .0063 .0141 .0042
Prob. of r .0440 .0001 .0007 .0001 .0100
(XIO)
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from the firm (or liquidity demand by current shareholders). Stated differently, the 
theoretical equilibrium relationship described by equation (5.2) empirically does not hold.
As it was indicated earlier, the results of likelihood ratio tests are evidence that 
the JW's dividend signalling model is inconsistent with the data and is possibly 
misspecified. The results of the cross sectional analyses give additional weight to this 
argument.
b. Controlling for Liquidity Factors
In addition to the liquidity demand by current shareholders, cash demand from 
the firm may be influenced by investment, repayment of debt, repurchase of shares, and 
funding increases in short-term working capital. These other liquidity factors may 
impact the analysis in two ways. It may have an effect on the cross-sectional relation 
between dividend levels, liquidity demands, and firm size. It may also provide biased 
estimates of coefficients. In addition, in a Modigliani and Miller (1958) world, the firm's 
external financing is construed as the residual of its investment decision. Since levels of 
investment vary across firms, external financing also varies cross-sectionally. It follows 
that differences in external financing across firms must be isolated.
To control for liquidity-related factors and to verify the robustness of the 
estimator function, the regression of the previous section is repeated for each quintile 
grouped by INVEST, EQUBUY. DEBTRETI, WORKCAP, and DEBTISSU, respectively. The 
parameter estimates for each of these regressions are reported in Table 5.12. 
Comparisons between five quintiles and with the previous results indicate that the 
estimates between quintiles are at variance with each other.
In the interest of brevity, the results are given only for the regression in which 
CPE(1)'s are used as the dependent variable." The figures shown in the table imply 
that estimates obtained from the linear model might be biased. Accordingly, the 
robustness of the tests of the previous section can be scrutinized. Clearly, more
^^The cegreseione using CPE(7) and CPE(5) result in similar 
estimates.
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rigorous testing of the effects of the liquidity-related variables on the cross-sectional 
model is required.
An additional set of tests of the liquidity-related variables (INVEST, EQUBUY, 
DEBTRETI, WORKCAP, and DEBTISSU) is performed, applying a two-step procedure. At 
the first step, the error terms are estimated from the cross-sectional regression equation 
(5.23). At the second step, the estimated error terms are regressed on each of the 
liquidity-related variables. The null hypothesis is that the errors obtained at the first step 
are unrelated to each one of the explanatory variables of the second step.
The results of this last set of tests are reported in Table 5.13. The estimated 
coefficients of the liquidity-related variables are insignificant in each secondary 
regression except for two cases: regressions using CPE(I) show significant estimates for 
INVEST and DEBTRETI at the 0.05 level. Overall, it is safe to conclude that the cross- 
sectional model of equation (5.23) appears to be robust enough to portray the firm's 
liquidity-related variables.
F. Chapter Summary and Conclusions
In this essay, the dividend signalling model developed by John and Williams 
(1985) is empirically tested. First, it is examined whether the demand for cash from the 
firm motivates the payment of dividends as JW, or Feldstein and Green (1983) suggest. 
JW assert that, in equilibrium, larger dividends are paid only if the demand for cash from 
the firm is high. It is found that there is a negative relation between liquidity demands 
and dividend payments, inconsistent with the JW contention. Instead, it seems that the 
empirical evidence supports Feldstein and Green's reasoning that firms have a strong 
desire to satisfy liquidity demands of their current shareholders by paying dividends. It 
is documented here that liquidity demand by shareholders is one of the determinants of 
the firm's dividend policy.
Second, stock price and volume reactions to quarterly dividend announcements 
are studied. It is observed that announcements of dividend increases bid up the stock
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price while trading volume decreases. In contrast, announcements of dividend 
decreases reduce both stock price and trading volume. The JW model posits that higher 
(lower) dividends are associated with higher (lower) stock price and trading volume and 
dividends can be used as a signal (see also Miller's (1987) signalling conditions). Hence, 
the findings of stock price and volume reaction to dividend announcements are not 
consistent with some of the basic relations of the JW model.
Third, it is also discovered that the positive relationship between dividend 
changes and price changes is significant for smaller firms and insignificant for larger 
ones. This may imply that a signal price relationship exists for small firms, but not for 
large firms. At best, the indication is that the signal price relationship is cross- 
sectionally negatively related to firm size. This finding is not consistent with the JW 
model's notion that dividends and the market value of the firm combine to increase 
stock prices positively at the dividend announcement date. The likelihood ratio tests 
indicate that the cross-sectional model of JW [equation (5.2)1 is inconsistent with the 
data or empirically may be misspecified.
Fourth, it is found that the polynomial form for the signalling-pricing function fits 
the data very well. This polynomial pattern is neither consistent with the monotonie 
relationship between signal and price that many authors assume, nor compatible with 
the non-linear relationship that JW posits.
Fifth, the key argument that JW assert to be empirically testable is examined. It 
is this argument around which are developed the tests of the cross-sectional model that 
relate the dividend announcement effects, the market value of the firm, dividends, 
liquidity demand by current shareholders, and the cash demand from the firm. A cross- 
sectional regression analysis shows that stock price reactions to dividend 
announcements are not explained by the JW model (and that the latter is also 
inconsistent with the data).
Despite all the empirical evidence reported here, a caveat is in order. It is quite 
possible that some of the conclusions reached here may hinge on measurement
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problems. Unfortunately, these problems will exist in all empirical work, making the 
verifiability (or perhaps, more important, the refutabilityl of a theory impossible. 
Notwithstanding, while scores of studies focus on formulating theoretical models of 
signalling, empirical research is a must for the testing of the validity of these models.
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Chapter 6. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH
The objective of this dissertation has been to extend empirical work on dividend 
policy in three ways. The dissertation encompasses three essays.' The first essay 
empirically investigated a wide range of dividend determinants including investments, 
earnings, debt, free cash flows, firm size, beta, and industry classification. This essay 
employed time series cross sectional tests and vector autoregression (VAR) methodology 
to analyze the explanatory power of the various theories of dividend policy. The second 
essay proposed an alternative approach to the ex dividend anomalies that fully 
incorporates both the tax effect hypothesis and the short-term trading hypothesis. This 
essay investigated some observable differences between cum and ex-dividend efficient 
portfolios based on a portfolio selection model in the context of the 1984 and 1986 tax 
reforms. The third essay analyzed the empirical validity of a dividend signalling 
equilibrium model and tested the explicit relationship among the announcement effect, 
the dividends, and the cum-dividend market values, suggested by a signalling equilibrium 
model.
In Chapter 3, time-series cross-sectional regressions using an error components 
model were estimated to test for the contemporaneous relationships among theoretical 
dividend determinants. It was found that a firm's dividend payments are significantly 
related to earnings, free cash flows, beta, and firm sizes. Perhaps the most important 
finding is that dividends are not influenced by investments and debts, consistent with 
the irrelevance proposition of Miller and Modigliani (1961). It was also shown that 
industry effects might not exist or might be only the manifestation of firm size effects.
'These essays did not converge to certain unified conclusions because they empirically 
examined separate dividend theories based on different assumptions and models.
163
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On the other hand, in order to examine the dynamic relationships among these variables, 
the vector autoregression analyses were conducted. The variance decompositions and 
impulse response analyses consistently demonstrated that dividends have significant 
short-term effects on itself, whereas other variables have no dynamic effects on 
dividends. It appears that only dividends have short memory of its own past and that 
other variables have no dynamic interactions with dividends.
Based on these results, a lagged dividend model was developed and tested for 
robustness. The evidence suggests that dividend payments are heavily influenced by a 
series of the past dividend payments as well as contemporaneous factors such as 
earnings and free cash flows. Although this lagged dividend model may be rather 
exploratory, it will shed some light on the model of puzzling dividend policy. One fruitful 
avenue for future study may be to apply a structural vector autoregression which 
simultaneously incorporates both contemporaneous variables and dynamic factors.
Chapter 4 attempted to report changes in the risk-expected return trade-off 
around the ex-dividend day by comparing the efficient portfolio frontiers between the 
pre-tax reform period and the post-tax reform period. These portfolio results were 
related to the excess return behaviors on which the 1984 and 1986 Tax Reform Acts 
are also documented to have had effects.
First, the effects of the 1984 and 1986 Tax Reform Acts on the return behaviors 
around the ex-dividend day were documented. The results are consistent with both the 
tax-effect hypothesis and the short-term trading hypothesis, and they are summarized as 
follows: (1) prior to the 1986 tax reform, significant positive excess returns were 
observed on the ex-dividend day; (2) during the post-1986 tax reform period, average 
ex-dividend excess returns were not different from zero at the 1 % significance level; (3) 
there existed the negative correlationships between the dividends yields and ex-dividend 
day excess returns, which correlationships decreased from the pre-1986 tax reform
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period to the post-1986 tax reform period; (4) average ex-dividend day excess returns 
increased significantly during the post-1984 tax reform period compared to the pre-1984 
Tax Reform period; (51 during the post-1984 tax reform period, more significant excess 
returns were observed for 11 trading days before and after the ex-dividend day 
compared to the pre-1984 tax reform period.
Second, the cum- and ex-dividend efficient portfolios between the pre-1984 tax 
reform period and the post-1984 tax reform period were compared. The following 
evidences supporting the short-term trading hypothesis were found: ID  cum-dividend 
efficient portfolios dominated ex-dividend efficient portfolios; and (2) the efficiency gap 
between cum-dividend efficient frontiers and ex-dividend efficient frontiers expanded 
more during the post-1984 tax reform period than during the pre-1984 tax reform 
period.
Following Long's (1977) argument, it was predicted that the 1986 Tax Reform 
Act would decrease the expected after-tax return at the new tax rates and increase the 
after-tax variance of the portfolio. Consistent with this expectation, it was also found 
that the efficient portfolio frontier during the post-1986 tax reform period was 
dominated by the efficient portfolio frontier during the pre-1986 tax reform period. This 
result may be interpreted as the tax-effects since the tax premiums decrease with an 
decrease in dividend tax rate. But, the variance as risk factor was not considered in the 
tax-effect hypothesis.
To conclude, the evidence of excess return behaviors supported the existence of 
both tax effects and short-term trading around the ex-dividend day. It appeared that 
these tax effects and short-term trading are not mutually exclusive, but co-existent as 
long as short-term trading is tax-induced. And this finding was effectively supported by 
portfolio test results. It was argued that portfolio approach is quite advantageous over 
the extant approaches, because this approach incorporates the tax effect as well as
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short-term trading. It was noted that ex-dividend behavior cannot be understood 
independently of the risk-expected return trade-off. It was also proposed that this 
portfolio approach can best be used in many branches of corporate finance (e.g., turn-of- 
the-year effect I where portfolio revisions are considered to occur.
In Chapter 5, the dividend signalling model developed by John and Williams 
(1985) was empirically tested. It was examined whether the demand for cash from the 
firm motivates the payment of dividends (see John and Williams (1985) or Feldstein and 
Green (1983)]. It was found that there is a negative relation between liquidity demands 
and dividend payments, inconsistent with the JW contention. The empirical evidence 
supported Feldstein and Green's reasoning that firms have a strong desire to satisfy 
liquidity demands of their current shareholders by paying dividends.
Stock price and volume reactions to quarterly dividend announcements were 
studied. It was observed that announcements of dividend increases bid up the stock 
price while trading volume decreases. In contrast, announcements of dividend 
decreases reduce both stock price and trading volume. The JW model posits that higher 
(lower) dividends are associated with higher (lower) stock price and that trading volume 
and dividends can be used as a signal. Hence, the findings of stock price and volume 
reaction to dividend announcements are not consistent with some of the basic relations 
of the JW model. It was also found that the polynomial form for the signalling-pricing 
function fits the data very well. This polynomial pattern was neither consistent with the 
monotonie relationship between signal and price that many authors assume, nor was it 
compatible with the non-linear relationship that JW posits.
The key argument that JW assert to be empirically testable was examined. The 
cross-sectional model that relates the dividend announcement effects, the market value 
of the firm, dividends, liquidity demand by current shareholders, and the cash demand 
from the firm were tested. The regression analysis showed that stock price reactions to
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dividend announcements were not explained by the JW model. The likelihood ratio tests 
also indicated that the cross sectional model of JW is inconsistent with the data or 
empirically may be misspecified. While scores of studies focus on formulating 
theoretical models of signalling, empirical research is a must for the testing of the 
validity of these models.
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APPENDIX A: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DIV AND FCASH
In order to examine the contemporaneous relationship between free cash flows
and dividend payments, the simple regression is first assumed as follows’ :
Y *  X ,^ ,  +  X j^ ,  + e, (A.1)
where Y is DiV;
X, is EARN;
X, is FCASH; and 
e ~  N(O.o').
A two-step procedure is taken to estimate the coefficient of X,. The first step is
to regress X% on X,. The estimated residual terms from this step is:
Û = X j - X, ♦
= X; - X,(X,'X,) ’X,'X,
= ( I - X,|X,'X,) ’X,' I X,
-  M, X, , (A.2)
where $  -  |X,'X,) ’X,'X,
M, -  I ! - X,|X,'X,) ’X,' 1.
The second step is to regress Y on the residual terms obtained from the first 
step. The resulting coefficient estimate of 0 from the second step is equal to the 
coefficient estimate of X, in (A.1).
-  (û'û)’û' Y
-  [ |M,X,)'|M,Xa) r' (M,Xj)' Y
-  ( X,'M, M,X, )•’ (X,'M,) Y. IA.3)
^The masure of free cash flows is estimated by the operating 
incom minus inccm taxes, minus interest expenses, minus total amounts 
of dividends paid (see Section B.2 of Chapter 3).
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Substituting X, > X, • Y into (A.3), 
ht -  ( Xj'M, M,X, )•' (X, - V)' M, Y
-  [ X,'M, M,Xj )•’ X,' M, Y - ( X,'M, M,X, ) ’ Y'M, Y. (A.4I
Since M, is an idempotent matrix,
M,* » M,; and
X,'M , -  X / l  I • X,(X,'X,) 'X ,' I
-  X ,' - X,'X,(X,'X,| ’X,'
-  X ,' - X,'
-  0 .
Thus,
ht -  • (X,’M,X,1’ Y' M,Y < 0 . (A.5)
Now, let X , -  X, - Y - X„ where X, may be interest expenses, and substitute 
this constraint into (A.3).
ht -  I X,'M, M,X, ]•' (X, - Y - X,)' M, Y
= (Xj'M, ' X,' M, Y - (Xj'M, M,Xjl ’ Y'M, Y • (X /M , M,X,1’ X,'M, Y. 
= - (X,'M, M,X,I ’ Y'M, Y - [X,'M, M,X,) ’ X,'M, Y. (A.6)
The sign of the first term in equation (A.6) is always negative, but the sign of 
the second term depends on the correlation between X, and Y. Then, it is not easy to 
predict the sign of
Therefore, it is evident that, as more terms such as taxes are added to the 
constraint, the sign of hi will be affected by the complex correlations between the 
dependent variable and those elements in the constraint.
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APPENDIX B: THE EFFECTS OF 1986 TRA
A taxable firm aligibla for tha 85% dividend income deduction could engage In 
short-term trading by buying cum-dividend and selling ex-dividend if the following tax- 
induced trading return is positive.
-fgu. +D[l-(l-0.85)T^] -Ccd-Tq,), (S.l)
where
Ted ie the marginal tax rate on corporate dividends received,
T„ is the marginal tax rate on corporate capital gains, and 
C, is the round trip transaction costs.
Before the 1986 Tax Reform Act, the short-term trading return for these taxable 
corporations could be expressed as
♦(Pe^-P^)x0.28 -Cgll-O.Ze) . (B.2)
Under the 1986 Tax Reform Act, the corporate dividend deduction percentage 
was reduced to 70%, and corporate dividend and capital gains tax rates were equalized 
to 34% (see Table 4.1). Thus, the trading return for short-term traders could be 
changed to
(1-0-70) XO. 34] 34-0,(1-0.34) . (B.3)
Now, the tax-induced short-term trading returns between the pre-1986 tax 
reform period and the post-tax reform period are compared. It is noted that the 
coefficients of capital gains increased from 0.28 to 0.34, whereas those of dividends
180
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decreased from 0.931 to 0.898. In addition, the weights that transaction costs take out 
of the unit trading return decreased from 0.72% to 0.66%. Thus, by introducing 
transaction costs, it seems to be inconclusive whether the 1986 Tax Reform Act offered 
taxable corporations more incentives to exploit short-term trading around the ex-dividend 
day.
Security dealers and brokers also have similar incentives to exploit short-term 
trading. Denier  ^and brokers are subject to the same tax rates on dividends and capital 
gains. They could undertake short-term trading by buying cum-dividend and selling ex- 
dividend if the following trading return is positive.
*(PoM-P,ri r„-Ce(l-r„) , (B-4)
where T„ is the corporate income tax rate.
During the pre- and post-1986 tax reform period, the short-term trading return 
for dealers could be written as
( 1 -0.46) + (f X O .46-Cg( 1 -0.46) . (B.5)
( 1 -0 .34) * ( XO . 34-C,( 1 -0.34) . (B.6)
While the coefficient of dividends increased from 0.54 to 0.66, the factor of 
capital gains decreased from 0.46 to 0.34. Also, the burden incurred by transaction 
costs has increased from 0.54 to 0.66. Thus, as in the case of taxable corporations, it 
is not clear whether the 1986 Tax Reform Act provided securities dealers with 
incentives for tax-induced short-term trading.
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APPENDIX C: SIGNALLING MODEL'
A representative firm is modeled. Corporate management in the best interests of 
current shareholders can make an investment of I, and pay a dividend of D. Funds for 
both investment. I, and dividends, D, are obtained from either internally retained cash, C, 
or net new shares of stock, N, which are issued at the ex dividend price per share, p„. 
The constraint for a firm's sources and uses of funds is:
D + I -  C + p„N. (C.1I
Suppose that Q is the number of shares outstanding before N shares are sold.
At the ex dividend day, current shareholders receive the dividend per share, (1-tlD/Q, 
where t is a single tax rate on dividends. In equilibrium, the cum-dividend price per 
share, p, is equal to the sum of the ex-dividend price por share, p^, and the after tax 
dividend per share, (1-t)D/Q:
P * P., + <1-t) D/Q. (0.2)
Assume that management has strong incentives to signal for the firm's stock to 
command a higher price in the market. This signalling is generally induced when the firm 
issues new shares or current shareholders sell some fraction of their outstanding shares. 
Suppose that the liquidity demand from the firm by its current shareholders is L. Current 
shareholders can sell some portion of their shares either cum or ex-dividend to satisfy 
their consumption needs. They are supposed to sell M outstanding shares to new 
investors at the ex-dividend day. The liquidity supplied to these current shareholders is 
measured by;
L « D p„ M. (C.3)
Management's objective is to maximize current shareholders' wealth. This can 
be achieved by maximizing current shareholders' cash inflow, (1-t)D + p,M. Since the
^Appendix c proves the signalling model of John and Williams 
(1985).
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current shareholders' equity in the firm is diluted after the sale of shares on both 
personal and corporate account, the fractional equity of current shareholders is (Q-M) /
(Q + N), where M outstanding shares and N new shares are sold to new investors. 
Therefore, the true present value of current shareholders' remaining equity is 
X(Q-M)/(Q+N), where X is the present value of the future cash inflow (X is inside 
information, known to insiders but not observed directly by outsiders).
Consequently, management's job is to select the optimal dividend, DIX), and net 
new funds, p, N(X), which maximize the firm's present value to its current shareholders.
Q -M
Max{ |1-t)D + p„M  +  X }. (0.4)
D, p„N Q + N
Substituting the above constraints, (C D through (C.3), into the maximand (C.4), 
we get the equivalent maximand:
From (C.3), p„M -  L • D.
From (C.l), P „ N  -  D + I -C.
From (C.2), pQ = p„Q + (1-t)D,
P *  p„Q + (1-t)D, 
p«,Q ■ P • (1-t)D. 
p„Q - p„M “ IP  -(1-t)D ] - [ L-D] = P - D + tD -L + D  
“ P + to - L.
P«Q + P«N “  IP -(1 -tD ) ] + I D +1 -C l = P - D +tD +D +1 -C 
“  P + tD + I - C.
P«Q • P«M p„ (Q-M) P + tD - L
p„Q + p„N p« (Q+N) P + tO + I - C
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Thus,
Q -M
U ID, P, X) -  |1-t)D + p„M +
Q + N
P + to - L
|1-t)D + (L-D) + ------------------------ X
P + tD + I - C
P + tD - L
L - t D  + ------------------------X. (C.5)
P + tD + I - C
In short, management's problem simplifies to deciding the optimal dividend DIX).
Max U |D,P,X). IC.6)
D>0
If the firm's private attribute, X, were known to outsiders, then a market price, 
P, would be equal to its true value, V. Substituting the value V into the maximand 
IC.5), we get
V + tD - L
V = I L- tD) + ------------------- X
V + tD + I - C
V *  I V + tD + I - C ) -  IL - tD ) * I V + tD + I -C)
+ I V + tD - L) X
V» + I tD + I -C) V I L-tD) V + IL-td) * I tD + I - Cl 
+ V X + I tD - L) X
V* + [ iD + I - C - X - IL-td) 1 V -  IL-tD)* ( tD + I -C-Xl
V* - [ IL-tD) + IC + X-l-tD) ] V + IL-tD)* I C + X-l-tDJ -  0
{ V - IL-tD) } { V - 1C + X - 1 -tD )) = 0
Thus,
V ID.XI » PIDIXI) -  C + X - 1 - tD. IC.7)
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Oifferentiating the maximand (C.5) with respect to the aggregate, cum-dividend 
price, P, we obtain
IP+tD-U'IP+tD + l-C) ■ (P+tD-U(P + tD + l-C)'
( P + tD + I - O *
P + tD + l -  C - P - t D  + L 
( P + to + I - O*
l - C  + L
Up *  ------ ---------— — X . (C.8)
I P + to + I - o *
This means that, whenever C < L + I, U, > 0 .  That is, management's maximand 
increases in the price P. When liquidity demand from the firm on personal account, L, 
and corporate account. I, is greater than the firm's internal supply of cash, C, a stock 
price, P, increases, benefiting current shareholders who sell their shares.
Differentiating the maximand (C.5) with respect to the dividend, D, we obtain
(P(D)+tD-Ll'(P(D)+tD + l-C) - (P(D)+tD-U(P(D) + tD + l-C)' 
Un ■ -t + ----
P(D) + tD + I - C ]*
[P'(D)+t](P(D)+tD + l-C] - (P(D) +tD-LI[P'(D) + t) 
[ P(D) + tD + I - C )*
[ P' + 1 1 [ I - C + L ]
Uo = -t + ----------------------------  X
( P + tD + I - C P
When Uo = 0,
L + I -C
t .  ( t + P' )  X. (C.9)
( P + tD + I - C )*
This implies that management determines dividend such that the marginal benefit of 
dividend to current shareholders may be equal to its marginal cost.
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Now, we substitute (C.7) into the first-order condition (C.9) for the 
announcement effect.
From (C.9),
L + l-C L + l-C
t .  t --------------X + P '-------------------- X
(P + tD + l-O* (P+tD + l-O*
L + l - C  L + l -C
P '-------------- X -  t [ 1 ----------------------X ]
(P+tD + l-O* (P+tD + l-O*
P "  (L  + I - O X  = t [ (P + tD + l-O* • (L + l-C) X 1 
Since (P+tD + l-C) = X in (C.7),
P "  (L + l-C) X -  t [  X* - (L + l-C) X )
-  f X * [ X - ( L + l - C )  1
P'*(L +1-0 -  11 X - ( L  + l-C) I
-  t [  (P + tD + 1 - 0 - (  L + l-C) )
» t ( P + tO - L 1
( P + tD - L )
P' -  t -----------------
(L  + l - C )
Thus, the dividend announcement effect is 
PID(X)1 + tD(X) - L
P'[D(X)1 -  t --------------------------- . (C.10)
Finally, for the dividend signalling function, we substitute both (C.7) and the 
derivative of (C.7) with respective to X into (C.l).
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From (C.7), PID(X)j -  C + X - 1 -tD.
P'[D(X)1* D IX) -  1 - tO'IX).
1 - tD'IX)
P'(D(X))  --------------
□MX)
From (C.10).
1 ■ tD'(X) [C + X-l-tD(X)] + tO(X) - L 
D'(X) I ■ C + L
(1-tD') (l-C+ L) = t D ' *  ( (C + X-l-tD) +tD-L]
(1-tD') (l-C + L) -  t D '* [ C + X - 1 - L )
( l-C + L ) -  t D *  ( (l-C + L) + (C + X-l-L) )
-  tD  * X.
l - C  + L
D'   . (C.11)
tX
Integrating (C.l 1) subject to the condition (C.9) gives the optimal dividend condition.
1
D(X) = —  Max (l-C + L, 0) Ln(X). (C .l2)
t
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